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Abstract
Countries come in all sizes and shapes, and their number is also inseparable from
the historical rise and falls of empires and nations. In 2010, 195 entities in the world
qualified as sovereign states. Globalisation, while downplaying the importance of
military force, has enabled the rise and integration of small countries in the world
economy. But what is country size exactly? In economics, it is defined in relative
terms: small countries as price takers, and large ones as price makers on international
markets. However, country size is a multi-dimensional concept, encompassing
various aspects such as geographical area, population, political influence, military
clout, domestic market, exports, capital flows, to cite a few. How such a multi-faceted
gathering of idiosyncrasies influences economic performance and in particular GDP
growth is therefore a complex issue; one that requires an interdisciplinary approach
including econometrics, political economy analysis and macro-economic modelling.
The second chapter focuses on the inclusion of country size in a two-country
monetary-union model. It features micro-foundations, New-Keynesian and DSGE
(Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) modelling. The purpose of the model is
the analysis of fiscal policies in the context of a heterogeneous monetary union where
countries can differ in terms of size, openness, and price rigidities. Original features
are introduced to ensure on the one hand, that the cost of debt increases with the
indebtedness level as well as the stationarity of the model and on the other hand, to
replicate the making of discretionary fiscal policy in the monetary union. Stochastic
simulations for economic and fiscal policy shocks in both closed and open-economy
settings flesh out the model’s dynamics.
In the third chapter, using the monetary-union model previously developed, we
simulate different fiscal policies – an increase in government spending and tax
cuts – in response to a crisis and comparatively assess their effectiveness. We rely
on deterministic simulations to further the understanding of the workings of a
heterogeneous monetary union, fiscal externalities and their implications for national
economic policies. We detail how countries of different sizes react differently to their
own and their neighbours’ fiscal policies to determine what type of size-appropriate
fiscal policies may cushion GDP growth in the wake of a crisis. Contrary to Cwik
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and Wieland (2009), we contend that the spillovers of fiscal stabilisation policies are
positive and non negligible. In this chapter we also assess the effects of “internal
devaluation” on countries of the monetary union and whether it may provide an exit
out of the sovereign debt crisis.
The fourth chapter broadly tackles the issue of country size and economic per-
formance from an empirical perspective. We carry out the analysis by considering
not only country size and its interactions with GDP growth, but also by taking into
account the link between country size and business cycle volatility. To investigate
these relationships, we used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to develop an
original country-size index that includes population, GDP and the surface area of
countries. This indicator enables us to avoid the shortcomings of either a purely
demographic measure or one based on GDP rankings and to capture a more complete
size effect. Using a panel data set of 163 countries for 1960–2007, we find, contrary
to Rose (2006), that country size has a significant and negative impact on economic
performance for all countries and within certain groups, i.e., small countries, OECD
and even the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China). In our analysis, we also isolate
the scale or country-size effect from those of several economic variables, especially
that of trade openness. We show that there is a negative relationship between country
size and volatility independent of trade openness, extending Furceri and Karras’s
(2007) results, especially for small countries. Our results are robust to the inclusion
of several control sets, country size specifications and detrending methods. The
estimations for the PCA size index that we introduced support our assumption that,
when accounting for growth and its volatility, there is more to a country than its
population figures. Moreover, we corroborate that trade openness is conducive to
long-term growth, but find no evidence that it increases growth volatility. Furthering
the analysis of country size and economic performance may require looking into less
quantifiable factors such as institutions and policies. For instance, the eurozone, in
which we highlighted strong negative relationships between country size, economic
performance and volatility, showcases the peculiar interactions at play with country
size in the context of a monetary union.
The fifth chapter sheds light on how an original institutional context – namely that
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) – makes country size play a particular
role in accounting for economic growth. Our focus is on the aggregate growth level,
not on its distribution within countries, which would entail a distinct analysis for
each Member State. Country size determines a number of economic structures: a
greater openness is observed in smaller countries and a heavier reliance on internal
demand is observed in larger countries. In the eurozone, country size also impacts on
economic performance, as a “size divide” appears between small, and fast-growing
economies and larger laggard ones. Furthering the political economy analysis led by
Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006), we detail the incentives structure of Member States
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according to their size. Indeed, the “one-size-fits-all” rules of the monetary union –
namely, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the European Central Bank (ECB)
policy – suit the economic structures and policies of the eurozone smaller economies
and hinder those of the larger economies. On the one hand, the SGP constrains larger
countries in their ability to fiscally boost internal demand; on the other hand the ECB
cannot internalise the negative externality generated by small countries because of
their usually higher inflation and encourages price competitiveness policies. These
“political economy” hypotheses are econometrically tested, using panel data for the
fifteen eurozone countries (1998–2008). The regressions ran separately for large
and small countries using dynamic panel estimation methods, documented the
emergence of a “size divide” within the eurozone – that is, a sizeable negative effect
of demographic size on GDP growth. The “size effect” is even more negative for small
countries. These results are robust to different econometric specifications. Further
robustness checks consisted in enlarging the scope of the data to run “placebo”
regressions on the pre-monetary union period and on countries that opted out of
the monetary union. They were useful to comparatively assess the effects of the
monetary union and confirm that the “size divide” was indeed a by-product of
the monetary union. Theoretical research on the modelling of country size and its
implications for the conduct of economic policies in the monetary union should
complete these empirical findings and is carried out in the following chapter.
Putting these analyses together, we conclude that country size has an incidence on
economic structures of nations and consequently on their pace of growth. Whether
this impact is negative, neutral or positive is largely contingent on the international
environment in which countries trade and rely on each other for capital, investment
and migration flows. In addition to the inner institutional and territorial efficiency
levels of countries, economic policies matter most in explaining the impact of country
size on growth. In particular, in a monetary union, size-appropriate fiscal policies
are more conducive to growth. In the eurozone, the non-acknowledgement of the
importance of country size for the sake of sovereign equality between Member
States has led to marked differentials in terms of economic performance. However,
common policy objectives and interests are crucial to the durability of the monetary
union. In the wake of the 2008–2010 financial and sovereign debt crises, it is of
paramount importance to understand these asymmetries and their consequences,
and accordingly revamp the Stability and Growth Pact so as to better anchor the
credibility of the currency area.
Keywords: EMU; Eurozone; Monetary union; European Central Bank; Stability and
Growth Pact; Fiscal policy; Country size; Heterogeneity; Growth; Principal component
analysis; Business cycle volatility; Political economy.
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Zusammenfassung
Länder gibt es in allen Größen und Formen, und ihre Zahl ist untrennbar mit dem
historischen Aufstieg und Fall von Reichen und Nationen verbunden. Im Jahre 2010
existieren weltweit 195 geografische Gebilde, die als unabhängige Staaten aner-
kannt sind. Die Globalisierung hat die Wichtigkeit militärischer Macht reduziert
und im selben Zug den Aufstieg und die Integration kleiner Länder in die Weltwirt-
schaft ermöglicht. Aber was ist die „Größe eines Landes“ genau? Die Ökonomik
betrachtet sie stets relativ: kleine Länder als Preisnehmer und große Länder als
Preissetzer auf internationalen Märkten. Allerdings ist die „Größe eines Landes“ ein
multidimensionales Konzept, das zahlreiche Aspekte wie z. B. geografische Lage, Be-
völkerung, politischen Einfluss, militärische Bedeutung, inländische Märkte, Exporte
und Kapitalströme einschließt. Zu erfassen, wie solch ein facettenreiches Konglo-
merat von Eigenschaften die ökonomische Leistungsfähigkeit und inbesondere das
BIP-Wachstum beeinflusst, ist daher eine komplexes Unterfangen; ein Unterfangen,
das einen interdiszipliären Ansatz erfordert, der Ökonometrie, politische Ökonomie
und makroökonomische Modellierung zusammenbringt.
Das zweite Kapitel behandelt die Berücksichtigung der Ländergröße in einem
Zwei-Länder-Modell einer Währungsnion. Bei dem Modell handelt es sich um ein mi-
krofundiertes neukeynesianisches dynamisches Allgemeines-Gleichgewicht-Modell
(DSGE-Modell). Zweck der Modellierung ist die Analyse unterschiedlicher Fiskalpo-
litik im Kontext einer heterogenen Währungsunion; die Heterogenität bezieht sich
dabei auf die Ländergrößen, die Offenheit hinsichtlich internationalen Handels und
den Grad der Preisrigidität. Zu diesem Zweck führen wir ggü. der existierenden
Literatur neue Charakteristika ein, um die die Stationariät des Modell sicherzustellen
und die Natur diskretionärer Fiskalpolitik in einer Währungsunion abzubilden. Sto-
chastische Simulationen ökonomischer und fiskalpolitischer Innovationen (Schocks)
sowohl unter der Annahme geschlossener als auch offener Volkswirtschaften legen
die Dynamik des Modells dar.
Im dritten Kapitel simulieren wir, basierend auf dem in Kapitel 2 entwickelten Mo-
dell einer Währungsunion, die Wirkung verschiedener fiskalpolitische Maßnahmen –
Erhöhung der Staatsausgaben sowie Steuersenkungen – als Antwort auf eine Krise
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und vergleichen ihre Wirksamkeit. Wir verwenden deterministische Simulationen,
um das Funktionieren einer Wähungsunion mit heterogenen Mitgliedsstaaten bei
fiskalischen Externalitäten und ihre Implikationen für die nationale Wirschaftspolitik
näher zu verstehen. Wir legen detailliert dar, wie Länder unterschiedlicher Größe
auf ihre eigene Politik und auf politische Maßnahmen ihres Nachbarstaates reagie-
ren, um herauszufinden, welche Art größenangepasster Fiskalpolitik Einbrüche im
Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) im Zuge einer Krise abfangen kann. Im Gegensatz zu
Cwik and Wieland (2009) finden wir, dass die auf die Nachbarstaaten übergreifenden
Effekte (Spillover-Effekte) stabilisierender Fiskalpolitik positiv und nicht zu vernach-
lässigen sind. In diesem Kapitel untersuchen wir zudem die Auswirkungen einer
„internen Abwertung“ auf die Mitgliedsstaaten der Währungsunion und gehen der
Frage nach, ob sie einen Ausweg aus der Staatsschuldenkrise bieten kann.
Das vierte Kapitel betrachtet das Thema der Ländergröße und ökonomischer
Leistung empirisch. Wir führen eine Analyse, die nicht nur den Zusammenhang
von Ländergröße und BIP-Wachstum, sondern auch von Ländergröße und kon-
junktureller Volatilität untersucht, durch. Um diese Zusammenhänge darzustellen,
nutzen wir die Hauptkomponentenanalyse (Principal Component Analysis, PCA), mit
deren Hilfe wir einen neuartigen Ländergrößen-Index, der Bevölkerung, BIP und
Fläche von Ländern kombiniert, berechnen. Dieser Indikator erlaubt es uns, die
Unzulänglichkeiten rein demografischer Maßzahlen und der reinen BIP-Betrachtung
zu umgehen und Größeneffekte vollständiger zu erfassen. Basierend auf einem
Paneldatensatz (Längsschnittstudie), der 163 Länder für den Zeitraum 1960–2007
umfasst, stellen wir – im Gegensatz zu Rose (2006) – fest, dass die Ländergröße einen
signifikant negativen Einfluss auf die ökonomische Leistungsfähigkeit hat – sowohl
über alle Länder gerechnet als auch innerhalb bestimmter Gruppen, z. B. der kleinen
Länder, der OECD-Mitglieder und sogar den „BRICs“ (Brasilien, Russland, Indien,
China). In unserer Analyse trennen wir zudem die Größe des Ländergrößeneffekts
von dem Einfluss diverser anderer ökonomischer Variablen, speziell dem der in-
ternationalen Handelsintegration. Wir zeigen, dass es einen negativen Einfluss der
Ländergröße auf die Volatilität unabhängig von der Offenheit eines Landes gibt und
erweitern damit die Erkenntnisse von Furceri and Karras (2007), v. a. im Hinblick
auf kleine Länder. Unsere Resultate sind robust gegenüber der Berücksichtigung
zusätzlicher Kontrollvariablen, verschiedener Ländergrößenspezifizierungen und
Trendbereinigungsmethoden. Die Schätzungen des PCA-Größenindex, den wir ein-
führen, unterstützen unsere Annahme, dass mit ihm ein Land besser als durch seine
reine Bevölkerungszahl beschrieben werden kann, wenn es darum geht, den Einfluss
auf BIP-Wachstum und -Volatilität zu erklären. Darüber hinaus erhärten wir den Be-
fund, dass die Marktoffenheit das langfristige Wachstum bestimmt, finden allerdings
keinen Beleg dafür, dass sie die Volatilität erhöht. Um die Analyse von Größenef-
fekten und ökonomischer Leistungsfähigkeit fortzuentwickeln, wird es vermutlich
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nötig sein, auch schlechter quantifizierbare Faktoren wie das institutionelle Umfeld
und politischen Einfluss zu betrachten. Beispielsweise illustriert die Eurozone, für
die wir einen ausgeprägten negativen Zusammenhang zwischen Ländergröße, öko-
nomischer Leistung und Volatilität finden, die eigentümlichen Interaktionen, die
zwischen Ländergröße und anderen Variablen im Kontext einer Währungsunion
wirken.
Das fünfte Kapitel beleuchtet, wie ein spezifischer institutioneller Rahmen – näm-
lich die Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (Economic and Monetary Union,
EMU) – den von der Ländergröße ausgeübten Einfluss auf das Wirtschaftswachstum
beeinflusst. Unser Fokus liegt dabei auf dem aggregierten Wachstumsniveau und
nicht auf der Einkommensverteilung innerhalb von Ländern, was eine gesonderte
Analyse auf der Ebene der einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten erfordern würde. Die Länder-
größe bestimmt eine ganze Reihe ökonomischer Charakteristika: In kleinen Ländern
lässt sich ein größerer Grad an Offenheit und in größeren Ländern eine stärkere
Abhängigkeit von der Binnennachfrage beobachten. In der Eurozone beeinflusst
die Ländergröße auch die ökonomische Leistung, wie anhand eine Kluft zwischen
kleinen, schnell wachsenden und größeren, langsameren Ländern deutlich wird
(„size divide“). Wir entwickeln die von Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006) eingeführte
Politische-Ökonomie-Analyse weiter, indem wir die Anreizstruktur der Mitglieds-
staaten in Abhängigkeit von ihrer Größe untersuchen. Tatsächlich stellt sich heraus,
dass die auf alle Länder gleich angewandten Regeln der Währungsunion – nämlich
der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt (SWP) und die Geldpolitik der Europäischen
Zentralbank (EZB) – eher den ökonomischen Strukturen und Politiken der kleineren
Staaten zugute kommen und die größeren Staaten tendenziell behindern. Einerseits
beschränkt der SWP die größeren Länder in ihrer Fähigkeit, per Fiskalpolitik die
Binnennachfrage zu steigern; andererseits kann die EZB die negativen Externalitäten,
die von kleinen Ländern generiert werden, wegen deren normalerweise höheren
Inflationsraten nicht internalisieren, was Politik, welche die Konkurrenzfähigkeit
im Preiswettbewerb steigert, fördert. Diese Hypothesen bezüglich der „politischen
Ökonomie“ werden im zweiten Kapitel empirisch getestet, wofür wir einen Panelda-
tensatz für die 15 Euro-Mitgliedsstaaten von 1998 bis 2008 nutzen. Die Regressionen
wurden unter Verwendung dynamischer Paneldaten-Analyseverfahren separat für
größe und kleine Länder durchgeführt und dokumentieren das Bestehen eines
„Size-Divide“ in der Eurozone – d. h. eines deutlichen negativen Einflusses der Bevöl-
kerungszahl auf das BIP-Wachstum. Für kleine Länder ist dieser Größeneffekt noch
stärker negativ ausgeprägt. Diese Ergebnisse sind robust über verschiedene ökono-
metrische Spezifikationen hinweg. Weitere Robustheitsüberprüfungen bestanden
darin, die Datenbasis zu verbreitern und „Placebo“-Regressionen sowohl für den
Zeitraum vor der Währungsunion als auch für Länder, die der Währungsunion nicht
beigetreten sind, durchzuführen. Dies erlaubt es uns, den von der Währungsunion
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ausgeübten Effekt zu isolieren und zu bestätigen, dass es sich bei dem „Size-Divide“
tatsächlich um eine Nebenwirkung der Währungsunion handelt.
Aus der Zusammenschau der Ergebnisse dieser Analysen schließen wir, dass
die Ländergröße einen Einfluss auf die ökonomischen Strukturen von Staaten und
folglich die Geschwindigkeit ihres ökonomischen Wachstums hat. Ob dieser Ein-
fluss negativ, neutral oder positiv ist, wird zuvorderst von dem internationalen
Umfeld, in dem Länder miteinander Handel treiben, und der Art, wie sie hinsichtlich
Kapital-, Investitions- und Migrationsströmen verflochten sind, bestimmt. Zusätzlich
zu den inneren institutionellen und territorialen Effizienzniveaus von Ländern ist
die Wirtschaftspolitik der bestimmende Faktor in der Erklärung des Einflusses der
Ländergröße auf das Wachstum. Insbesondere in einer Währungsunion, ist es von
Bedeutung für das Wachstum, dass die Fiskalpolitik auf die ¨Größe der jeweiligen
Länder zugeschnitten ist. In der Eurozone hat die Nichtberücksichtigung der Bedeu-
tung der Ländergröße zugunsten der Gleichbehandlung aller Mitgliedsstaaten zu
spürbaren Differenzen hinsichtlich der ökonomischen Leistung geführt. Allerdings
muss erwähnt werden, dass gemeinsame politische Ziele und Interessen maßgeblich
für die Stabilität der Währungsunion sind. Angesichts der von 2008 bis 2010 an-
dauernden Finanz- und Auslandsverschuldungskrise ist es von größter Wichtigkeit,
diese Asymmetrien und ihre Konsequenzen zu verstehen, um den Stabilitäts- und
Wachstumspakt so umzugestalten, dass die Glaubwürdigkeit des Währungsraums
stärker in ihm verankert ist.
Schlagwörter: WWU; Eurozone; Währungsunion; Europäische Zentralbank; Stabilitäts-
und Wachstumspakt; Fiskalpolitik; Ländergröße; Heterogenität; Wachstum ; Hauptkom-
ponentenanalyse ; Konjunkturzyklenvolatilität; Politische Ökonomie .
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Résumé
Les pays recouvrent diverses tailles et formes. Leur nombre est aussi intimement
lié à l’essor et chutes des empires et nations dans l’Histoire. En 2010, on compte 195
États souverains dans le monde. La mondialisation, en faisant passer au second plan
la force militaire, a permis le développement et l’intégration des petits pays dans
l’économie mondiale. Mais qu’est ce que la taille d’un pays exactement ? L’analyse
économique en donne une définition relative : les petits pays comme preneurs de
prix, et les grands comme faiseurs de prix sur les marchés internationaux. Mais la
taille des pays est un concept multidimensionnel incluant des aspects variés tels, la
superficie, la population, l’influence politique, la force militaire, le marché intérieur,
les exportations, les mouvements de capitaux pour n’en citer que quelques uns.
Comment une notion multi-facette pétrie des idiosyncrasies nationales influence la
performance économique et en particulier la croissance du PIB est donc une question
complexe, exigeant une approche interdisciplinaire mêlant économétrie, économie
politique et modélisation macro-économique.
Le second chapitre est consacré à l’inclusion de la taille des pays dans modèle
d’union monétaire à deux pays. Il s’agit d’un modèle DSGE (Équilibre Général
Dynamique Stochastique) micro-fondé, d’inspiration néo-keynésiennne. Le but de
la modélisation est l’analyse des politiques budgétaires dans le cadre d’une union
monétaire hétérogène où les pays diffèrent en termes de taille, ouverture et rigidités
nominales. A cet effet, des caractéristiques originales sont introduites, pour d’une
part introduire un coût de la dette croissant avec le niveau d’endettement assurer la
stationnarité du modèle et d’autre part répliquer au mieux les politiques budgétaires
discrétionnaires dans une union monétaire. Les mécanismes et dynamiques du
modèle sont explicités par des simulations de chocs économiques et politiques.
Dans le troisième chapitre, en utilisant le modèle précédemment exposé nous
simulons une augmentation des dépenses gouvernementales et des baisses d’impôts
en réponse à une crise pour évaluer comparativement leur efficacité. Ces simula-
tions déterministes permettent d’étayer les effets - notamment transnationaux - des
politiques budgétaires dans une union monétaire hétérogène, et voire quel type de
politique est le plus efficace pour renforcer la croissance du PIB après une récession.
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Contrairement à Cwik et Wieland (2009), nous montrons que les effets de spillover
des politiques de relance sot positifs et non négligeables. Enfin, nous évaluons les
effets d’une politique dite de dévaluation interne sur les pays de l’union monétaire
afin de voire si elle présente une alternative viable pour sortir de la crise de la dette
souveraine.
Le quatrième chapitre aborde de manière générale et empirique la question de
la taille des pays et de la performance économique. Nous considérons non seule-
ment les interactions entre la taille des pays et la croissance du PIB, mais aussi le
lien entre la taille des pays et la volatilité du cycle économique. Pour étudier ces
relations, nous recourons à l’Analyse en Composant Principal (ACP) et développons
un index original de la taille des pays incluant population, PIB et superficie. Cet
indicateur nous permet d’éviter les écueils d’une mesure purement démographique
et de capturer ainsi un effet de taille plus complet. Utilisant des données de panel
pour 163 pays de 1960 à 2007, nous trouvons, contrairement à Rose (2006), que la
taille des pays a un impact significatif négatif sur la performance économique pour
tous les pays et dans certains groupes, tels les petits pays, ceux de l’OCDE et même
les BRICs (Brésil, Russie, Inde et Chine). Dans notre analyse, nous isolons également
l’effet de la taille des pays de ceux de plusieurs variables économiques, notamment
celui de l’ouverture commerciale. Nous montrons qu’il existe une relation négative
entre la taille des pays et la volatilité indépendante du degré d’ouverture, ce qui
élargit l’analyse de Furceri et Karras (2007). Nos résultats sont robustes à l’inclusion
de plusieurs variables de contrôle, de différentes mesures de la taille des pays et de
méthodes d’extraction de la composante cyclique. Les estimations relatives à notre
indicateur de taille APC confirment notre hypothèse selon laquelle la composante
démographique n’est pas le seul facteur de taille ayant un pouvoir explicatif sur la
croissance et sa volatilité. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que l’ouverture commerciale
favorise la croissance à long terme, mais ne pouvons mettre en évidence son rôle
sur la volatilité. Poursuivre l’analyse des interactions entre taille des pays et perfor-
mance économique demande que l’on se penche sur des facteurs moins facilement
quantifiables tels que les institutions et politiques. Par exemple, la zone euro, dans
lesquelles nous avons mis en valeur des relations négatives fortes entre taille des
pays, performance économique et volatilité, est une illustration de ces interactions
particulières dans un contexte d’union monétaire.
Dans le cinquième chapitre, nous étudions comment un contexte institutionnel
original – à savoir cela de l’Union économique et monétaire (UEM) – fait exercer à
la taille d’un pays une incidence particulière sur sa croissance économique. Nous
considérons le niveau agrégé de croissance et non sa distribution interne, ce qui
nécessiterait une analyse distincte pour chaque État Membre. La taille d’un pays
détermine un certain nombre de ses structures économiques : une plus grande
ouverture est observée dans les petits pays tandis que les grands pays dépendent
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davantage de la demande intérieure. Dans la zone euro, pour la décennie précédant
la dernière crise financière, on observe également un clivage entre d’une part, des
petites économies performantes qui entreprennent des réformes et d’autre part les
plus grandes économies à la traîne. Poursuivant l’analyse d’économie politique
menée par Laurent et Le Cacheux (2006), on détaille la structure des incitations
institutionnelles selon la taille des États Membres. En effet le gouvernement “taille
unique” de la zone euro avec d’une part le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance (PSC)
et d’autre part, la politique de la Banque Centrale Européenne (BCE), favorise les
politiques des petits pays et entrave celles des plus grands. Ainsi le PSC contraint
davantage les grands pays dans leur capacité à stimuler la demande intérieure. Par
ailleurs, la BCE ne peut neutraliser l’externalité négative générée par la plus forte
inflation des petits pays ce qui encourage les politiques de compétitivité-prix . Nous
testons économétriquement ces hypothèses d’économie politique. Les estimations
dynamiques menée pour les quinze pays de la zone euro entre 1998 et 2008 (données
de panel), et dans un souci de robustesse, également pour la période précédant
l’UEM et pour les pays de l’Union européenne qui ont choisi de rester en dehors de
l’Union monétaire, montrent que le clivage lié à la taille en termes de performance
économique est bien le fait de l’UEM. Ces résultats empiriques sur la taille des pays
et de ses implications pour la conduite des politiques économiques sont complétés
par la modélisation macro-économique du chapitre suivant.
Synthétisant ces analyses, nous concluons que la taille des pays a une incidence
sur les structures économiques des nations et par conséquent sur leur rythme de
croissance. Le sens de cet impact dépend largement de l’environnement international
dans lequel les pays commercent, échangent capitaux, investissements et flux migra-
toires. En outre le degré d’efficience institutionnelle et territoriale propre à chaque
pays, les politiques économiques ont le plus grand pouvoir explicatif de l’impact de
la taille des pays sur la croissance. En union monétaire par exemple, des politiques
budgétaires appropriées à la taille d’un pays favorisent davantage la croissance.
Dans la zone euro, cette importance de la taille des pays est ignorée au bénéfice de
l’égalité institutionnelle entre États Membres souverains, ce qui explique en partie
les forts différentiels observés en termes de performance économique. Cependant,
l’existence d’objectifs politiques et d’intérêts communs est nécessaire à la pérennité
de l’union monétaire. Au lendemain des crises financière et de dette souveraine de
2008–2010, il devient primordial de mieux comprendre ces asymétries et leurs effets,
afin de rénover en conséquence le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance et ainsi ancrer la
crédibilité de l’union monétaire.
Mots-clés : UEM ; Zone Euro ; Union monétaire ; Banque Centrale Européenne ; Pacte
de Stabilité et de Croissance ; Politique budgétaire ; Taille des Pays ; Hétérogénéité ;
Croissance ; Analyse en Composant Principal ; Volatilité du cycle ; Économie politique.
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1 General Introduction
Countries come in all sizes and shapes, and their number is also inseparable from the
historical rise and fall of empires and nations. 2010 GDP growth projections1 rank among
the fastest growing countries very small states such as Qatar (18.5%) and Lebanon (6%),
as well as very large economies such as China(10%) and India (8.7%). There are thus
no obvious size patterns in accounting for growth, regardless of the overly simplistic
fad mottos of the past, such as “small is dangerous” from the Cold War-imbued 1950s,
or “small is beautiful” from the 1980s. Indeed, the path-breaking literature on size
and growth in the 1960s – with Kuznets (1960) and Robinson (1960), among others –
placed emphasis on the vulnerability of small economies in the internationalising world
economy, and the ways to resort to it.
However large country size comes with its set of predicaments as well, the more
obvious of which being the difficulties encountered in managing large territories and
populations. That being said, there seems to be a shift in thought today – with the
break-up of empires, the increase in the number of countries established after World
War II, the decolonisation process and the end of the Cold War,– the 20th century has
witnessed a multiplication of nation-states. In 1945 there were 50 countries in the United
Nations; it now counts 192 members. Globalisation, while minimising the importance of
military force and bolstering that of trade, has enabled the rise and integration of small
countries in the world economy through facilitated access to world markets. Now, in
the aftermath of the 2008-10 global economic and financial recession, the BRICs (Brasil,
Russia, India, China) – endowed with very large populations, markets and territories –
have emerged as relaying engines of the world economy. Contrary to small developing
economies, their success has not been based on complete openness to world markets,
and while the phenomenon is not likely to bring a new growth paradigm, it certainly
hints at a possible “scale effect” of country size on GDP growth.
Large size enables these countries to carry political clout and put pressure on their




a way for smaller countries to reach this critical size in globalised markets. In fact, just as
the above two simplifying catchphrases on the benefits of size show, it would be illusory
to search for an optimal country size in today’s world economy. Should such an optimal
size ever be established in theory, it would have very little practical policy implications,
for one cannot break up or expand nations at will. However, this is not tantamount to
say that size does not matter for economic performance, as Rose (2006) or Backus, Kehoe,
and Kehoe (1992) contend.
This dissertation investigates the relationship between country size and growth in
particular in the context of a monetary union. Country size has often been taken as
exogenous by economists, and its effects not much discussed. Macroeconomic research
on scale effects is more limited than micro-econometrics studies as scale effects are less
conspicuous at the aggregate level. While our purpose is not to account for the size of
countries, we delve into its manifold effects in the following chapters. Additionally, the
experience of economic integration in the European Union (EU) – unique in its depth –
provides an original canvass for interactions between Members States of different sizes,
halfway between the bilateral and global relations.
Definition of key-concepts
First, a few definitions are required. A country is generally defined as a populated and
governed sovereign territory, usually diplomatically recognised 2. For economic analysis,
a more functional definition is useful: a country is the governed aggregation of diverse
and organised economic activities and set of technical factors within political borders.
The notion of an economic nation or country can fluctuate in the case of the EU and even
more in that of the eurozone. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is in itself a
large economic country endowed with a Single Market within which coexist a number of
small and medium countries providing common public sovereign goods, such as law and
police, even if on either side of national borders the mobility of the factors of production
is different, and if banking, financial and political systems vary.
Country size is to be understood in relative terms. An economic functional definition
sees small countries as price takers and large countries as price makers on international
markets. Country size encompasses a number of dimensions – population, geographical
size, GDP, per capita income, natural resources, workforce, human capital, technological
level, military capacities, and diplomatic relations – each one yielding different size rank-
2Notwithstanding the differences between the concepts, the terms “country”, “nation” and “state” will be
used interchangeably.
2 Olfa Alouini – Country Size, Growth and the Economic and Monetary Union – 2011
ings, as these dimensions are not necessarily linearly related to one another. Population
is most often the retained criterion, as it is correlated with territory size and GDP. Ac-
cordingly, one may set an upper threshold on population to categorise small economies.
Kuznets (1960) limited it to 10 million inhabitants: 134 fall into that category today. In this
dissertation, country size will be proxied alternatively by a compound indicator of GDP,
population and surface area, by population for comparability purposes and by relative
GDP weight. Differing definitions of country size yield different economic results with
respect to growth. Kocher (2003) thus finds a negative relationship between a country’s
population and its public sector expenditure, but none with GDP. We therefore must bear
in mind the relativity of our definitions and thus of the results we may find. To Wittman
(2000), who defines a country as “a nexus of public goods”, the size of nations is the result
of maximising efficient production while minimising political costs within a reliable
institutional framework. Success in doing so may increase the size of the country through
territorial conquest or immigration, while failure may lead to depletion or break-up
of the political entity. Friedman (1977) posits that the country is the largest political
unit in which tax collection is coordinated and contends also that the geographical size
of nations results from the maximisation of revenue. He points out the existence of
contradicting forces impacting on the size of nations, such as the development of tax
collections, trade, rent, or the provision labour that imposes boundedness and a certain
degree of homogeneity, for at some point diseconomies of scale occur. The size of the
domestic market relative to that of the export markets is a helpful indicator to understand
the differentiated functioning of small and large economies. While small countries are
more open to trade, large countries rely more on national suppliers to satisfy their larger
internal demand and spur their growth. As put forward by Katzenstein (1985), and later
Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005), there is a negative relationship between country
size and openness to trade so that openness may be a crucial criterion in establishing a
distinction between small and large economies.
Economic growth is the rate of change of gross domestic product (GDP), and measures
the quantity of goods and services produced. We focus on the level of aggregate income
at the business cycle frequency, not its per capita distribution within countries in the long
run. GDP is indeed an important measure of economic “hard power” and offers a clear
international hierarchy in terms of economic size. GDP per capita rankings or “living
standards” hierarchies depict a different pecking order, with small European countries
often at the top, even if an increase in the GDP of a country is generally taken as an
increase in the standard of living of its inhabitants. Considering the GDP aggregate is an
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easier way of considering a country’s forces and weaknesses even if it may be incomplete.
Economic performance can be better fleshed out and evaluated with the four objectives
of Kaldor (1971)’s magic square: growth, external balance, employment and inflation.
This is a relevant rationale to analyse economic performance, as it includes the four main
goals of economic policy: growth, full employment, external accounts and stabilised
inflation. Kaldor presented it also as an impossibility square, as economic policy could
never attain all four goals at once.
Literature overview and relevant issues
Country size and economic growth: The long-run path of economic growth is one
of the central questions of economics. While one of the purposes of this disseration
is to see how country size matters for short-term growth, the large body of literature
on long-term growth may offer us insights as the two types of growth are obviously
linked. In a neoclassical framework, like that used by Solow (1956), country size has no
effect on growth. In an endogenous growth model, like that described by Aghion and
Howitt (1998) or Romer (1994), a larger country size means a large endowment, with
scale effects driving economic growth. The argument is straightforward; the larger the
country, the larger its workforce and resources – especially in terms of human capital and
R&D – to be engaged in industries with increasing returns to scale. This also implies a
larger domestic market to sustain growth and that the aggregate catch-up will be quicker.
Conversely, Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005) puts forward that small countries
benefit more from trade. Indeed pundits no longer focus on the vulnerability of small,
open economies in the global economy, but rather on their efficiency and ability to adapt
to ever-changing conditions. Kuznets (1960) and Katzenstein (1985) highlight the positive
relationship between vulnerability and efficiency. Small countries need a larger outlet
than their domestic markets to benefit from scale-effects as the bigger economies do. The
constant exposure to international competition from their openness to trade prompts
their alignment on the best efficiency standards. And conversely, bigger countries –
whose size is also a bulwark against painful changes – often allow archaic structures and
obsolete industries to survive.
The new economic geography goes beyond the opposition between extensive and
intensive economic growth. Krugman (1991) and Fujita and Krugman (2003) introduce
the assumption of increasing rather than constant returns to scale, thus enabling country
size to play a role in models for growth and economic activity localisation. Thus, be-
cause of the importance of economies of scale, scope, network and endowments, bigger
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countries are – thanks to their on-average larger firms – better able to reap the benefits
of commercial integration and tend to export products from scale- and R&D-intensive
industries. Fujita and Krugman’s theories, even if they do not explain nation size, account
for core-periphery patterns because of the concentration of monopolistic industries with
scale economies in clusters near the markets with the largest demand, better manufactur-
ing structures and network synergies at the expense of other regions. As a consequence,
national economies are often driven by leader regions. In Europe, for instance, night-time
satellite imagery reveals the famous “blue banana” or industrial core that spreads from
Southern England to Northern Italy via the Rhine region.
Reconciling political economy and quantitative macroeconomics: How country size
– a multi-faceted collection of idiosyncrasies – influences economic performance, and in
particular GDP growth, is therefore a complex issue; one that requires an interdisciplinary
approach. Exploring the link between country size and growth involves investigating
political and institutional settings as well. The new political economy which, following
Drazen (2000), studies “how politics affect economic outcomes [...] by the use of the
conceptual and technical tools of modern economic analysis” provides a useful analytic
grid for the interactions between economics and politics. The root causes for the birth
of countries are indeed primarily political. Likewise, as underlined by Eichengreen and
Frieden (1993) the EMU was launched because of political will and not out of compliance
with the economic criteria of an optimal currency area (Mundell (1961)). The monetary
union is a political act and, in this sense, the worthy great-granddaughter of the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which was thought up as a device to seal peace by
means of industrial cooperation in a war-traumatised Europe. The four pillars of the
Economic and Monetary Union – the Single Market and the EU Budget, complemented
by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – are also
political constructs.
It is thus relevant to consider how the politics and institutions of the EMU mingle
with macroeconomics.Persson (2002) indeed argued that economic events are institution-
dependent. Extending Lucas (1976)’s reasoning, EMU settings may change the deep
parameters by which policy measures affect the real economy. In the course of our analy-
sis, we will pin down these developments that qualify as “EU- or EMU-induced”. It is
not so straightforward to spot these contingencies, as with time one no longer questions
their origin. One of the more obvious examples is that of trade integration, which would
not have reached such a degree had the Single Market not been implemented. There also
Olfa Alouini – Country Size, Growth and the Economic and Monetary Union – 2011 5
1 General Introduction
exists a “European growth” phenomenon as trade integration and gradual monetary uni-
fication have contributed to the synchronisation of business cycles across Member States.
Referring to Buti, Roeger, and Veld (2001), the EMU is a unique monetary union in which
sovereign countries retain fiscal autonomy – within the rules and criteria of the Stability
and Growth Pact – and where the ECB has both goal and instrument independence. One
of the purposes of the SGP was to “make fiscal discipline a permanent feature of the
EMU” (Buti (2003)), and in a way it succeeded, as fiscal consolidation has been a key
consideration of European governments since the implementation of the EMU and it
certainly brought about specific growth developments in the area. Interactions between
politics and economics have such effects, that an institutional novelty like the EMU
may permanently alter economic outcomes in participating countries. As described by
Peyton Young (1998) the new social norm thus created becomes self-reinforcing. Fitoussi
and Saraceno (2004) refer to it as the “Brussels-Frankfurt consensus”. However, as the
2010-11 sovereign debt crisis shows, these new norms – among which the Maastricht
criteria – do not guarantee the economic stability they uphold.
International policy coordination and the EMU: The literature on international policy
coordination not only considered future forms of monetary union, but also provides
insights as to the dynamics of monetary integration and potential strategic problems
arising between Members of the EMU. In the 1970s and 1980s, growing economic in-
terdependence between industrialised economies put forward that national policies
carry externalities or spillovers. An often-quoted example is that of the1984-1985 U.S.
expansionary fiscal policy, which served as a locomotive for the world economy, and this
even in the face of restrictive fiscal policies in Germany and Japan.
Modelling these interactions confirmed that the equilibrium reached by non-
cooperative macroeconomic policy making is likely to be inefficient as countries fail
to take into account the spillover effects of their policies on their partners. However,
Frankel and Rockett (1988) or McKibbin and Sachs (1986) showed that in a game-theoretic
framework where policymakers act strategically, coordination could under certain condi-
tions allow policies to yield greater welfare to all while avoiding problems of free riding
or beggar-thy-neighbour measures. In reality, the attempts at coordinating fiscal policies
among the G-7 nations in the 1980s proved relatively unsuccessful and the “locomotive”
approach was scrapped. With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, research on
international macroeconomic policy coordination focused mainly on external imbalances
and on monetary policy in fixed exchange rate versus flexible exchange rate regimes.
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With the generalisation of floating rates, coordination was also a means of protection
against third countries. For instance, the creation of the European Monetary System has
also been interpreted as a way to deal with the United States’ "benign neglect" regarding
the U.S. dollar.
These monetary developments were to have a strong impact on fiscal policies inter-
actions. McKibbin and Sachs (1988) showed that, depending on the monetary system
in place, fiscal transmission multipliers and spillovers differed. Even if exchange rate
agreements were meant to eliminate harmful policy competition such as competitive
disinflation, every new set of rules enforces its own forms of strategic behavior, possibly
inefficient. According toOudiz and Sachs (1984), the aim of new rules is indeed to repli-
cate cooperative outcomes through independent policies but this does not necessarily
rule out suboptimal equilibria, hence the importance of studying the impact of institu-
tional settings on policy coordination. By this token, internal devaluation – which will be
analysed at the end of Chapter 3 – may qualify as one of the inefficient equilibria brought
about by the new framework of the monetary union.
Policy-making in a heterogeneous monetary union: Asymmetries between Member
States make interactions between monetary and fiscal policies more complex, and this,
in turn, complicates the optimal task sharing, particularly when it comes to handling
adverse economic shocks. Mundell (1961) suggested that a monetary union restricts the
formulation of economic policies to react to idiosyncratic shocks: as explained by Buti
(2003), EMU institutional designs combine a "strong" central bank with fiscal constraints
that constrain the ability of governments to respond to shocks affecting the national
economy. This proves particularly detrimental to welfare when the nature and scope
of shocks vary substantially across countries within the union as the central bank can
indeed exert its stabilisation power only in the face of common or perfectly correlated
shocks. However, Cooper and Kempf (2004) have shown that independent fiscal policies
in a monetary union can in fact alleviate these idiosyncratic shocks.
The common monetary policy means that countries have lost the possibility of fine-
tuning the exchange rate in the face of adverse developments in addition to the power
of devaluation to alleviate a sluggish economy. The "gross-tuning" of the ECB was
expected to become gradually finer as business cycles synchronised across the eurozone.
Unfortunately, national cycles are far from being perfectly correlated, so the policy of the
ECB addresses only bluntly the developments in the countries of the eurozone. The policy
repartition problem is particularly interesting in the aftermath of the 2008-9 financial
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crisis as interest rates are close to their zero lower-bound and government spending has
proven to be the only instrument left to stimulate the economy. In this context, Calmfors
(1998) argued that as a substitute for exchange rate depreciation, governments would
resort to “internal devaluation”, i.e., wage or labour cost-moderation policies, to maintain
their price competitiveness. This debate is relevant to our study as we examine fiscal
externalities and their implications for the best fiscal policy responses to shocks.
A major institutional shortcoming of the monetary union is its lack of appropriate
policy instruments to sustain growth. The policy assignment approach developed by
Tinbergen (1952) describes how each economic policy instrument should be devoted
to the attainment of one target so as to reach optimal outcomes. Policy objectives are
numerous, conflicting and demand trade-offs. While the ECB has solely pursued price
stability in a bid to foster its credibility, the SGP and its 3 percent and 60 percent limits on
public deficit and debt fails to make room for the enhanced fiscal cooperation necessary
to spur growth and to prevent high yield spreads on sovereign bonds. The tensions
already present in the EU are exacerbated in the EMU without a full-fledged economic
government, and Europe’s Single Market set countries in competition with each other on
the basis of their economies and institutions. These inconsistencies hark back to the cre-
ation of the monetary union and the disagreement between French and German leaders
on its goals, whether central bank independence should be counterbalanced by elected
politicians and a European economic government. They illustrate well Rodrik’s (2000)
“trilemma” between deep economic integration, national sovereignty and democratic
politics.
Country size in the monetary union: Another “by-product” of EMU features is the
“size divide” in terms of economic performance between small and large countries since
the launch of the monetary union. Considering stylised facts of economic indicators of
the Member States over the period going back to the creation of the eurozone, Laurent
and Le Cacheux (2006) highlight that small countries outperform larger ones in terms
of growth, inflation and lower unemployment rates. Paradoxically, large country size
cannot be equated with political strength and even less with economic supremacy; the
alleged political giants are economic lame ducks. As Member States are considered
equally sovereign and granted equal status, the economic rules that preside over the
formation of economic policy in the eurozone are the same for all countries, or “one-
size-fits-all”. Common EU policies, in particular, the EMU, are based on the premise
of convergence in nominal and real terms between countries. Indeed, a shared pool of
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interests and structures is necessary to implement and sustain any common policy, and
so the degree of commonality between countries is assumed to outweigh their differences.
However the size of an economy has a great impact on its structures with regards to
openness and internal demand, and so on transmission channels for fiscal and monetary
policies. Country size is therefore to be managed as a policy constraint.
Johnson (1961), commenting on the complexity of considering countries for compar-
ative economic analysis and the importance of policy, noted that: “the nation acquires
economic relevance largely in its political capacity as a policy-making unit, endowed
with fiscal and monetary powers; but the fact that they have economic policies is about
all that nations have in common. Their heterogeneity makes it extremely difficult to
disentangle the economic influence of size.” Country size encompasses a number of
dimensions, including economic size reflected by GDP, demographics and territorial
size. In this dissertation, we will restrict our attention to the following dimensions
of country size: GDP (which exhibits an almost linear relationship with population),
trade openness and, to a lesser degree, price rigidities, which, as a pattern, is harder
to establish in this case (see Dhyne, Alvarez, Bihan, Veronese, Dias, Hoffmann, Jonker,
Linnemann, Rumler, and Vilmunen, 2005). Country size defines the structure of an
economy but the performance of a country seems to be a matter of appropriate policies
and growth strategies. Thus for small open economies, sensible growth strategies foster
price competitiveness, wage moderation, and tax attractiveness. For large countries,
the same policies would hamstring domestic demand and reduce the tax intake. At the
same time, country size determines a number of economic structures whose implications
transcend national borders, for example trade openness, real exchange rates and policy
transmission channels. Accordingly, we argue that differences in country size can be
considered a rationale for heterogeneity in the EMU. But in the EMU, as we will see,
economic policies are limited so that the span of policy choices does not match the array
of “sizes” present in the Union – between Malta, with a population of 400.000 inhabitants
and a GDP of 5.000 million euros, and Germany for which those figures are respectively
160 times and 400 times larger, with a population reaching 82 million and a GDP of 2.500
billion euros3. In particular the Stability and Growth Pact and the monetary policy of the
ECB – affect the economic development of each Member State differently, which may
account for growth differentials between smaller and larger countries.
3Source: Eurostat, 2007 figures.
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Position in the literature: Focusing on country size as a source of heterogeneity, this
dissertation builds upon the literature on heterogeneous monetary unions. Heterogeneity
between countries raises the question of the long-term sustainability of the monetary
union. For instance, Suardi (2001) noted that "the decision to launch EMU has focused
attention on possible asymmetries in output and prices’ responses to the single monetary
policy across EU countries”. The stark and protracted inflation differentials witnessed
in the EMU have been the subject of several studies, and the possible causes of these
differentials are numerous: varying degrees of competition on markets (Andres, Ortega,
and Valles, 2008), price inertia (Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2004), monetary transmission
(Mihov, 2001), the effects of services on inflation (Altissimo, Ehrmann, and Smets (2006)),
demand shocks (Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2005)) or trade openness. Country size
matters for these differences: smaller countries seem to generate higher inflation through
imports and their smaller weights in the central bank’s reaction function. Their greater
inflationary growth spurs borrowing and investment due to lower real interest rates.
Papers focusing on economic performance in the monetary union also highlight an
inverse relationship between country size and employment performance (Saint-Paul
(2004)) or incentives to implement structural reforms (Duval and Elmeskov (2005)).
Theoretical chapters draw upon the New Keynesian literature, more precisely on
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) modelling of monetary unions as in
Moons, Garretsen, van Aarle, and Fornero (2007) and Andres, Ortega, and Valles, 2008.
Studies of policy optimality in a currency area by Gali and Monacelli (2008) and also by
Benigno (2004) oriented our research.
Overall, this dissertation relates to the economic literature on the welfare implications
of monetary unions. For instance, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2005) find that small
countries incur larger welfare losses as less weight is given to their inflation rates in the
reaction function of the central bank. Mykhaylova (2009) finds no such disadvantage
when including capital markets and perfect risk-sharing.Dubois, Hericourt, and Mignon
(2007) use a GVAR model to quantify the benefits and costs of euro membership in
terms of output and inflation rate; they show that the small countries that joined the
eurozone clearly benefited from the enhanced monetary policy credibility, while the
outcome is less clear cut for Germany, France and Italy, whose conflicting interests can
hardly all be supported by a single monetary regime. Focusing on the effects of fiscal
policy, Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Klaassen (2005) empirically demonstrated that small
countries of the EMU, because of their greater openness, may benefit more from fiscal
expansions led abroad than their larger counterparts would. Assessing the expansionary
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effects of different fiscal shocks and using a two-country monetary union model with
debt containment mechanisms, Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2010) find that these effects
are important and largely positive when medium-term consolidation is implemented
after fiscal expansions.
Dissertation contents
The purpose of this dissertation is thus to investigate the relationship between coun-
try size and growth at the international level and comparatively in the Economic and
Monetary Union, and to draw up its consequences for the conduct of growth-orientated
fiscal policies. To further a global understanding of the link between country size and
growth in the EMU, we follow an interdisciplinary approach, including macro-economic
modelling, econometrics and political economy analysis. In the following chapters, we
take country size as exogenous and consider it a rationale for heterogeneity in terms of
economic structures, policy transmissions and incentives between countries.
The second chapter focuses on the inclusion of country size in a two-country monetary-
union model. It features micro-foundations, New-Keynesian and DSGE (Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium) modelling. The purpose of the model is the analy-
sis of fiscal policies in the context of a heterogeneous monetary union where countries
can differ in terms of size, openness, and price rigidities. Original features are introduced
to ensure on the one hand, that the cost of debt increases with the indebtedness level
as well as the stationarity of the model and on the other hand, to replicate the making
of discretionary fiscal policy in the monetary union. Impulse response functions for
economic and fiscal policy shocks in both closed and open-economy settings flesh out
the model’s dynamics.
In the third chapter, using the monetary-union model previously developed, we
simulate different fiscal policies – an increase in government spending and tax cuts – in
response to a crisis and comparatively assess their effectiveness. We rely on deterministic
simulations to further the understanding of the workings of a heterogeneous monetary
union, fiscal externalities and their implications for national economic policies. We detail
how countries of different sizes react differently to their own and their neighbours’ fiscal
policies to determine what type of size-appropriate fiscal policies may cushion GDP
growth in the wake of a crisis. Contrary to Cwik and Wieland (2009), we contend that
the spillovers of fiscal stimulus policies are positive and non negligible. In this chapter
we also assess the effects of “internal devaluation” on countries of the monetary union
and whether it may provide an exit out of the sovereign debt crisis.
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In the fourth chapter, we ask whether country size matters for aggregate growth
and its volatility. To capture the effect of country size in its many dimensions, we use
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to develop an original country-size index that
includes population, GDP and surface area. Using a panel data set of 163 countries for
the period 1960 through 2007, we find that country size has a significant and negative
relationship with economic performance for all countries and within certain groups,
i.e., small countries, OECD and even the BRICs. We isolate this scale effect from that of
trade openness and further highlight a negative relationship between country size and
volatility.
The fifth chapter sheds light on how an original institutional context – namely, that
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) – makes country size play a particular
role in accounting for economic growth at the business cycle frequency. In other words,
it sketches a “political economy of size” in the EMU and explores the links between
institutional features and economic developments in Member States, in particular how
the common monetary policy of the ECB and the fiscal constraints of the SGP affect
countries differently. We will see how the institutional settings of the EMU provide an
economic framework in which small countries are bound to outperform larger countries.
Using panel data for the fifteen eurozone countries (1998-2008), the “size divide’,’ in
terms of economic performance between small and large eurozone countries, or negative
correlation between demographic size and GDP growth, appears to be a by-product of
the monetary union.
Finally, combining these analyses, we conclude that country size has an incidence on
the economic structures of nations, the effects of their policies and therefore on their pace
of growth. For this reason there is a need to reinstate the importance of country size and
its consequences for the EMU.
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2 Liminary: Making Room for Country Size
and Fiscal Policy in a Monetary-Union
Model
Abstract
This chapter expounds on a micro-founded two-country monetary union model
with New-Keynesian features. The modelling purpose is the analysis of fiscal policies
in the context of a heterogeneous monetary union where countries can differ in
terms of size, openness, price rigidities. To this end, original features are introduced.
First, a debt premium or spread paid to financial intermediaries enforces a no-Ponzi
condition on the evolution of public and private assets. In the context of the eurozone
debt crisis, it is akin to the spread paid by eurozone sovereigns over German bonds.
Second, governments do not resort to budget rules. Fiscal authorities maximise an
objective function increasing in the public expenditure level while abiding by the
implicit debt and deficit limit set by the spread. The steady-state relationships of
the model are detailed, in particular is shown how the debt premium ensures the
stationarity of the model and how a unique equilibrium is pinned down. Impulse
response functions for economic and fiscal policy shocks in both closed and open-
economy settings show dynamics and multipliers comparable to those found in the
related literature. The model will therefore provide a basis for the in-depth study of
fiscal policy spillovers in a monetary union carried out in the next chapter.
Introduction
As Buti, Roeger, and Veld (2001) pointed out, economists have seldom attempted to
capture the institutional features of the EMU in their modelling of its monetary and
fiscal interactions. This, however, is paramount to understanding monetary and fiscal
interactions in a heterogeneous monetary union. This paper provides theoretical insights
into this question, relying on a micro-founded two-country monetary union model, with
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the actual features of EMU (Economic and Monetary Union): a central bank pursuing
consumption price stability and an implicit deficit limit. This monetary-union model
draws and builds on Andres, Ortega, and Valles (2008), Gali and Monacelli (2008) and
Benigno (2004).
The modelling of the government or fiscal authority block differs from this literature to
closer match actual policy-making in EMU. The approach taken is deliberately positive –
as opposed to normative–, so as to describe recent economic policy interactions in the
eurozone. Optimal fiscal policy in a monetary union is therefore not addressed in this
paper. In this model, governments optimise discretionary expenditure under the public
budget constraint and do not abide by fiscal rules as in Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2010)
for instance. More precisely, fiscal authorities maximise an objective function increasing
in the public expenditure level while abiding by the implicit debt and deficit limit set by
the spread.
FollowingSchmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), the stationarity of the model is ensured by
a premium paid on assets to a financial intermediary. It enforces no-Ponzi conditions on
the evolution of public and private assets. The cost of debt is increasing in the level of
indebtedness, making the public debt and deficit limits implicit: the higher the interest
rate and debt premium, the less governments accumulate debt.
There is little agreement on the effects of fiscal policies in the literature. Modelling and
calibration choices account for these discrepancies.Mountford and Uhlig (2009), find –
with vector autoregression techniques on US data – tax cuts to have larger effects on GDP
than deficit-spending expansions in a closed economy. For the EMU, Faia, Lechthaler, and
Merkl (2010) show that, in the presence of frictions in the labour market, income tax cuts
and hiring subsidies are the fiscal measures that yield the largest multiplier effects on GDP
and consumption. The effects of austerity measures on confidence and interest rates can
indeed improve growth prospects, but when consumers are highly indebted and interest
rates already low, such effects may not be forthcoming. In this model, public consumption
is addressed solely to domestic production, increasing government spending has an
immediate one-for-one effect on domestic output. With tax cuts, competition in prices
and trade across countries mitigate the effects of fiscal stimuli. Consequently, impulse
response functions of fiscal policy shocks for closed- and open-economy put forward a
larger positive effect on output and consumption for expenditure-vased expansions than
for tax cuts.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 presents a micro-
founded two-country monetary union model, with a particular emphasis on its original
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features regarding the fiscal authorities and the financial intermediaries. Steady-state
determination and characteristics are fleshed out in Section 2 and 3, before turning to
linearisation in Section 4. Section 5 details parameter calibration and potential robustness
issues. In Section 6 fiscal dynamics of the model are compared to a fiscal rule specification
to check the robustness of ensuing results. Finally Section 7 presents the model dynamics
and effects of fiscal policy with impulse response functions in both closed- and open-
economy settings.
2.1 Model
This section details a two-country monetary union model with sticky prices, no capital in
the production function and in which all goods are traded. We construct a fixed exchange
rate version of Obstfeld (2001) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), in which there are two
countries with a common monetary authority. Its general structure as regards goods,
households, firms, prices and the monetary authority is akin to models of monetary
policy in currency unions that have been developed by Benigno (2004) and Gali and
Monacelli (2008). It thus features two country with a single central bank and two fiscal
authorities. A typical household is both a consumer and a labour supplier. Households
own the firms. The latter produce a single differentiated good that can be traded. There
is no labour mobility.
The original features of this model reside in the characterisation of fiscal authorities
and financial intermediaries. (i) Governments do not solve a social planner’s problem.
They are subjected to an implicit debt limit and finance their expenditures through
consumption (value-added tax) and payroll taxes but they cannot internalise how these
variables impact on households. (ii) Financial intermediaries that incur a cost on house-
holds’ and governments’ assets. While there is no productive capital in the model, there
is an international financial or bond market. Introducing this feature allows to have
differentiated spreads dependent on public indebtedness, a variable that is particularly
relevant in the context of the euro sovereign debt crisis and diverging yield spreads.
A simplified version of this model is presented in the next chapter.
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2.1.1 Goods Aggregation
Aggregation of production within countries
We assume that a continuum of goods of size one is produced in the monetary union.
Goods in [0, n] are produced in country 1, while goods in ] n, 1] are produced in country 2.
In each country, domestic production is aggregated into a domestic good using a Dixit–
Stiglitz aggregator with an elasticity of substitution specific to each country. These
hypotheses yield the following relationship between the demand for goods produced by

























where θi is the elasticity of substitution of goods in country i and Ki a constant of
normalisation1.
Maximising the bundle under the budget constraint or alternatively, minimising the










































Aggregation of private consumption
In both countries, households have access to the aggregated goods produced by each
country; domestic and foreign goods are partial substitutes. Private consumption of good
1We take K1 = nθ1/(θ1−1) and K2 = (1− n)θ2/(θ2−1) to simplify the algebra.
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i is denoted Ci,t. It represents the total consumption of good i in both countries and differs
from private consumption in country i, denoted Cit. We have the following relationships:















where Cit is the private consumption of country i and C
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j,t is the private consumption
in country i of the aggregated goods produced in country j. αi is the import share of







This aggregation yields the following relationships between the demands for domestic
and imported goods and their relative prices. The repartition of consumptions between
locally-produced goods and foreign ones depends on openness degrees (conveyed by

























We see therefore that imported and domestic consumption in country 1 depend on
the terms of trade defined as Tt =
P2t
P1t
, with elasticities α1 − 1 and α1, respectively: as
expected, the dearer are import prices in relative terms, the more households consume
domestically-produced goods. The symmetric holds for country 2.
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2.1.2 Households
In both countries, each agent (τ) maximises her intertemporal CES utility function subject
to her budget constraint (determined by the recursive law of motion of private assets).
Consumption decision
Agents derive utility from consuming the bundle described above and disutility of labour.
Each agent provides a differentiated labour supply that allows her to negotiate her wage.




























Ai(τ, t− 1) + wi(τ, t)Li(τ, t)
− CPIit(1 + νc,it )Ci(τ, t) + Bit,
(2.16)
where E0, β are respectively the expectation at the initial time operator and the discount
factor; Ci(τ) is the consumption of agent τ in country i; σic is the inverse intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. κ is the weight assigned to labour in the utility function; σil
is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. hic, hil are the external habit formation parameters
on consumption and labour. Li(τ, t) is the labour supply of household τ and wi(τ, t)
its wage. Ai(τ, t) is the household’s τ asset holdings at the end of period t while Ait
is country’s i aggregate level of assets (see the atomicity assumption explained in the
following paragraph on private asset dynamics); rt is the interest rate set by the monetary
authority in the union; ψ is an interest premium on debt (whose function is detailed
subsequently). νc,it is the tax rate on consumption or value-added tax (VAT) through
which government expenditure is partially financed. Finally, Bit is the bonus or dividend
paid by the firm to its employees or owner (if negative, it represents a recapitalisation of
the firm).








 = 1, (2.17)
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where Πc,it+1 is the inflation of the consumption price index in country i.
Private asset dynamics
The aggregate budget constraint reads:
Ait =
(









t − CPIit(1 + νi,ct )Cit + Bit. (2.18)
To make the cost of debt increase in the level of indebtedness and also ensure the
stationarity of the model (i.e. rule out unit roots), we include a premium on the interest
rate ψ, which is akin to a transaction cost on holding assets paid to an international
financial intermediary and enforces a “no-Ponzi scheme” condition on the evolution of
assets as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) (see Section 2.1.7). This premium depends
positively on ait =
Ait
Pit Ȳi
, which represents the level of indebtedness of private agents in
country i in real terms, Ȳi being the steady-state value of output in country i.
The premium a household faces depends on the aggregate private asset holdings of the
country (or local financial conditions), not on the household’s private personal financial
position. Thus each household takes the premium as given in its consumption decision
(atomicity assumption). As the model will be linearised, only the value of ψ and its first
derivative at the steady state will impact the model dynamics. We specify ψ such that
ψ(0) = 0 and ∂ψ(x)∂x |x=0 > 0. So that both indebtedness and asset holding incur a cost
paid to the intermediary, and the value of the premium increases with that of debt as




rt − ψ(ait) > rt
rt − ψ(ait) < rt
0 lenderborrower
premium paid on debt
premium paid on asset holding
Figure 2.1: Premium ψ paid on debt or asset holdings
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If at the aggregate level, country i is a borrower (i.e. Ait ≤ 0), resident households have
to pay an interest premium on their debt amounting to ψ(ait). When the country is a
lender, returns are reduced by ψ(ait) captured by the intermediary.
Labour supply decision
As we did for consumption goods, we model labour aggregation with a Dixit–Stiglitz
function. Unlike consumption goods, labour is considered immobile and cannot be
imported or exported. Relationships between labour and wages are therefore similar to
those between consumption and prices. θiw denotes the elasticity of substitution of labour.
Households choose their labour supply. A labour aggregator or employment agency
allocates workers to firms and sets a number of hours worked and an hourly wage as in
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). The relationship between total demand for labour








We assume wage stickiness à la Calvo, with parameter ξ iw denoting the probability not
to adjust wages at each period. There is also partial indexation of wages on past infla-





































Ai(τ, t− 1) + wi(τ, t)Li(τ, t)
− CPIit(1 + νc,it )Ci(τ, t) + Bit,
(2.22)
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and





γi = w̃i(τ, t)ΞT−1w,t , (2.23)
where w̃i(τ, t) is the optimal wage set at time t by household τ and w̃i(τ, t, T) is its
wage at time T when not reset between time t and T; L̃i(τ, t) and L̃i(τ, t, T) are the
corresponding labour demands. γi is the parameter of wage indexation on past inflation






































































is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget
constraint. The rest of the calculus (steady state and linearisation) is detailed in the
subsequent sections.
2.1.3 Firms
We posit that firms hire a share of the aggregate domestic labour supply so that their
labour cost is wit(1 + ν
w,i
t ) in country i at date t. ν
w,i
t is the payroll tax rate levied by the
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government on firms. In each country i, firm ε produces the differentiated good yi(ε, t)
with the following technology:










where ζ i is the total factor productivity in country i modelled as exogenous and α is the
production technology parameter.
Price setting
For price setting, we assume a Calvo process in each country. Firm ε can reset its price
with exogenous probability (1− ξi). Producers know the relationship between their price
and the demand for their product and choose their price to maximise their expected
profit under that constraint. Firm ε chooses its price P̃i(ε, t) to maximise its expected









P̃i(ε, t, T)ỹi(ε, t, T)− wiT(1 + νw,iT )Li(ε, t, T)
)
, (2.32)
















γi = P̃i(ε, t)ΓT−1t , (2.35)
where the Lagrange multiplier λiT =
(CiT−hCiT−1)−σc
CPIiT
is the marginal utility of consumption
in country i in nominal terms.2 ỹi(ε, t, T) is the demand for goods produced by firm ε of
country i at time T when its price was last reset at time t. γi is the parameter of price





γi . So P̃i(ε, t, T) = P̃i(ε, t)ΓT−1t is
the price of good ε of country i at time T when its price was last reset at time t. Note
that Πit is the inflation of goods produced in country i and differs from inflation of the
consumption price index CPIit , which includes inflation from imported goods as well.
2Households own the firms, so logically their utility matters for price-setting.
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The rest of the calculus (steady state and linearisation) is detailed in the subsequent
sections.
Dividends redistribution
Firms cannot save or invest, so they redistribute their profits to households. This distri-
bution can be thought of as bonuses Bit to employees or dividends to firm owners, and





t − wit(1 + νw,it )Lit. (2.43)
At the steady state, firms make zero profit and bonuses are equal to zero.
2.1.4 Market Clearing















































t − Pjt Mit, (2.46)
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where Xit gives the exports sold to country j at the price of the domestic good. Likewise,
the imports Mit are bought from country j at price P
j
t . Because demand for foreign goods





2.1.5 Monetary Authority, Prices and Inflation
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate Rt common to both countries through a
Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), where it reacts to both the average inflation of the consumption


























is the average inflation of consumption
in the monetary union, Yt = Y1t + Y
2
t the total output of the monetary union, R
∗ is the
interest-rate target of the central bank. rπ and ry are the Taylor rule weights assigned to
inflation and the output gap, ρ is the interest-smoothing parameter.
2.1.6 Fiscal Authorities
General approach to the fiscal government block
While most of the previous blocks of the model borrow to the existing DSGE litterature in
open economy, the government block is one of its original features. The approach taken
is positive not normative, as the objective of this chapter (and the next) is to match fiscal
policy interactions as they take place in the EMU, especially to counteract an economic
crisis, and infer their consequences for participating Member States.3
The major difference with the DSGE litterature is that government behaviour is not
described by a spending rule. Instead, the government is assumed to maximize an
objective function. We will nevertheless compare our model to an example of budget rule
with feedback of public debt on public spending as e.g. in Corsetti, Meier, and Müller
(2010) in Section 2.5.
3To quote Drazen (2000): “Positive political economy thus asks the question how political constraints may
explain the choice of policies (and thus economic outcomes) that differ from optimal policies and the
outcomes those policies would imply. To put the same point another way, the mechanisms that societies
use in choosing policies [...] imply that the result will often be quite different than what a benign social
planner would choose.” We thus depart from a normative approach that would spell out optimal fiscal
policy in a monetary union. That could be done by having governments solve a Ramsey problem for tax
levels subjected to the constraints of the different economic agents.
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Three channels for discretionary fiscal intervention
Governments have three possible ways to spur economic activity with one-off discre-
tionary measures: increase public spending or decrease taxes. They can directly stimulate
demand through a positive shock on public spending Gi. Governments purchases are
exclusively addressed to domestic producers as in Gali and Monacelli (2008), so that
their buying price in country i is Pit and not CPI
i
t . Since there is no specific government
production function, the government does not produce any good or employ any labour
force. With this simplification, one assumes that public spending or consumption also
includes public production (public services, amenities, administration, etc.).
Covernments can also decrease the tax level on consumption (Value-Added Tax or
VAT rate) νc,i paid by households or on the payroll tax νw,i paid by firms. In fact, tax
levels are very stable over time in EU countries. According to Eurostat figures reported
in Commission (2010), from 2000 to 2010 VAT rates average in the EU fluctuated very
limitedly, between 19.2% and 20.2%. The average implicit tax rate on labour in eurozone
countries did not change between 2000 and 2008 at 34.4% of GDP.
So to replicate as closely as possible these facts on tax policy-making, taxes are assumed
to be constant and exogenous in the model. Nevertheless, in times of crisis, they may
be exogenously modified by the government, mimicking the implementation of one-off
special fiscal packages.
Objective function of the government
The objective of the government is to stimulate domestic production and labour, to
provide collective good and services, as well as individual consumption, all these di-
mensions of public intervention are embedded into the variable G as explained earlier.
Moreover, the overall level of government spending is assumed to be persistent, as
welfare state systems cannot be dramatically reshaped overnight, hence we model the
objective function of the government as a CES function of public spending with internal
habit formation. Governments maximise their objective function with respect to public
spending G, subject to the public budget constraint:





























t − Pit Git. (2.49)
where PAit denotes the nominal public assets of country i at the end of period t (negative if
the government is a borrower). Note that the atomicity assumption made for households
does not hold for governments, the latter are subjected to the public debt premium ψg
and accordingly habit formation on government consumption is internal. This yields the
































and law of motion for public asset holdings,
PAit =
(

















t − Pit Git. (2.51)
Debt control in the government budget constraint
For governments, ψg captures the marginal cost of debt (mechanisms are identical to
the ones described for the private sector in the ‘Private asset dynamics’ paragraph in
2.1.2). This premium paid by the governments on their debt (or assets) ensures that the
governments’ assets will not permanently depart from their steady state. In other words,
the spread paid on sovereign bonds sets an implicit limit on public debt by making credit
more expensive as indebtedness level rises. This cost is internalised by the government:
it keeps the debt level under check through changes in public expenditure levels. In
the context of the eurozone sovereign-debt crisis, this premium may be interpreted
as the spread on sovereign yields compared to Germany. The implicit deficit limit on
debt enforces indirectly a deficit limit so the model tallies with the Maastrict criteria
capping deficit and debt in the countries of the monetary union (at 3% and 60% of GDP
respectively).
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2.1.7 Financial Intermediation
As explained by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), the stationarity of an open economy
model is not straightforward. It can be ensured by some modelling elements, which
are usually not microfounded (and akin to habit parameters that ensure the hump-
shaped response of consumption to shocks). To ensure the stationarity of this open-
economy model, we microfound one of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe’s proposal and introduce
a simplified international financial market. The financial intermediaries capture the
private and public debt premia ψ and ψg, whose effects on public and private debt are
described in the previous subsections of the model on households and fiscal authorities.
We assume that there exists an international financial market for assets (private or
public). On the financial market, intermediaries can borrow money from the central bank
to finance public or private credit, and conversely borrow money from agents to deposit
it at the central bank. Through financial intermediaries, agents can purchase other agents’
and governments’ assets. The interest rate for the exchange between the central bank and
the financial intermediary is the interest rate set by the central bank. The aggregate cash
needs financial intermediaries borrow from the central bank are:
CNt = −(A1t + A2t + PA1t + PA2t ). (2.52)
The turnover, costs and profit of financial intermediaries are






































PAit − Ξ(A1t , A2t , PA1t , PA2t ); (2.55)






t ) gives the
intermediation and management costs. We assume that financial intermediaries evolve
on a perfect competition market with quadratic intermediation and management costs4
such that profits are equal to zero. Financial intermediaries do not re-inject the cashed-in
fees back into the union economy. Therefore developments on the financial market do not
affect the rest of the system. As a consequence, the optimisation programme of financial
intermediaries is not needed to close our model. One could for instance assume that
4Contracts between the financial intermediaries and households or government are embedded in the
function ψ and ψg. There is no moral hazard, default or collateralisation in our model.
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financial activities are based strictly out of the monetary union, for instance in England or
in Switzerland. Moreover, we suppose that, at each period, the financial intermediaries
clear their position towards the central bank, so that:
CNt = −(A1t + A2t + PA1t + PA2t ) = 0. (2.56)
This last condition imposes that in equilibrium, private and public debts or assets held
in the monetary union cancel each other out. This condition may be found restrictive;
it is nevertheless comparable to the interbank overnight markets, where banks clear
their daily position towards the central bank by lending or borrowing according to the
refinancing rate set by the central bank. This ensures that the debt market is Walrassian,
i.e. that the laws of motions for three out of four of the assets (public and private in both
countries) implies the law of motion for the fourth one (see 2.2.1).
2.2 Steady State
2.2.1 Determination of a Unique Steady State
From the model, we have the following four asset dynamics:
PAit =
(

















t − Pit Git (2.57)
Ait =
(









t − CPIit(1 + νi,ct )Cit + Bit. (2.58)
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where the last four terms are second order terms since at the steady-state private and
public asset are equal to zero. The preceding ones cancel out, noticing a classic GDP
decomposition (i.e. total revenue minus total demand in both countries). Taking first-
order terms and the definition of cash needs, the sum yields:
CNt = (1 + rt−1)CNt−1. (2.61)
Assuming the nullity of either initial or final conditions of private and public asset in
both countries, i.e. CN0 or CN∞ = 0 is sufficient to have financial intermediaries clearing
their position vis-à-vis the central bank at each period.
Any three of the four asset dynamics and the condition of zero cash needs is enough to
fully determine the financial market – that is pinning down a unique steady state – while
verifying the fourth one. On the contrary, resorting to the four asset dynamic equations
would introduce a unit-root in the model (verifying CN0 = (1 + rt−1)CNt−1).
2.2.2 Steady State Properties
At the steady state, we assume there is no inflation and that the law of one price holds
(T̄ = 1), which induces that all prices (production and consumption) are equal in both
countries and across countries at the steady state. In addition, we posit that private and
public assets are equal to zero.
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Assuming that the law of one price holds at the steady state, the different consumptions
are linked as follows:5





C̄22 = (1− α2)C̄2 (2.65)
C̄21 = T̄C̄
1
2 ⇒ α1C̄1 = α2C̄2 (2.66)
C̄1 = C̄1 and C̄2 = C̄2. (2.67)
The last two equalities mean that at the steady state, the trade balance is zero even if
countries are asymmetric, i.e. imports equal exports and satisfy the demand for variety.
At the steady state, we have from the market clearing equation








We note cyi = C̄i/Ȳi and gyi = Ḡi/Ȳi, the share of private and public consumption in
each country’s GDP and θ = Ȳ1
Ȳ2
, the relative size of production of country 1 and 2. Since
consumption in both countries cannot exceed total production, we have:







From the production function we have:
Ȳi = (L̄i)1−α. (2.72)
From the Phillips curve on prices:






where PPNRi = w̄
i
CPIi(1+ν̄c,i)
is the purchasing power of the net revenue in country i. At
the steady-state, the value of gross wages equals the marginal productivity of labour.
5 X̄ is variable X’s steady state value.
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CPI(1 + ν̄c,i), (2.74)












so that the PPNR equalises the marginal disutility of labour with the marginal utility of
consumption.




i.e. the ratio of consumption on GDP equals that of wages on GDP because at the steady
state dividends are worth zero.
From the budget constraint of governments:
ν̄w,i
PPNRi L̄i(1 + ν̄c,i)
Ȳi
+ ν̄c,icyi = gyi (2.77)




meaning that tax intake equals spending and that the government has no asset at the












= β(1 + r̄) = 1. (2.80)
From the Taylor rule
r̄ = r̄∗, (2.81)
i.e. the central banker set the interest rate at its target level at the steady-state.
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And finally, from the bonuses
Ȳi = PPNRi(1 + ν̄c,i)(1 + ν̄w,i)L̄i (2.82)
which is the definition of GDP as the sum of gross total income.
2.3 Linearisation
2.3.1 Goods Aggregation
Linearising the relationships in Section 2.1.1 gives:6
Ĉ11,t = α1T̂t + Ĉ
1
t (2.83)
Ĉ12,t = (α1 − 1)T̂t + Ĉ1t (2.84)
Ĉ21,t = (1− α2)T̂t + Ĉ2t (2.85)
Ĉ22,t = −α2T̂t + Ĉ2t (2.86)
2.3.2 Output
Production

































6X̂ is variable X’s log-deviation from its steady state value X̄.
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Ȳ2θ = α1cy1, and so:
Ŷ1 = (1− α1)cy1Ĉ11,t + α1cy1Ĉ21,t + gy1Ĝ1t (2.91)
Ŷ2 = α2cy2Ĉ12,t + (1− α2)cy2Ĉ22,t + gy2Ĝ2t . (2.92)
Dividends
Since profits and dividends are equal to zero at the steady state, we infer that in the
linearisation, they represent only a small fraction of output in real terms. Dividends equal





t − wit(1 + νw,it )Lit. (2.93)
Dividing both sides of the equation by Pit :
Bit
Pit






= Yit − wit(1 + νw,it )
Lit
Pit
(1 + νc,it )















= Yit − wit(1 + νw,it )
Lit
Pit
(1 + νc,it )




The linearised equation for dividends is:
Bit
Pit Ȳi





















We assume that the fluctuations of private and public assets are small with respect to
the steady-state output of the country i.e. Ait/(P
i
t Ȳ









34 Olfa Alouini – Country Size, Growth and the Economic and Monetary Union – 2011
2.3 Linearisation
Households








 = 1. (2.98)








Ĉit+1 − (1 + hc)Ĉit + hcĈit−1
))
(2.99)(


















R̂t − ψÂ1t − Π̂c,1t+1 −
ν̄c,1
1 + ν̄c,1












R̂t − ψÂ2t − Π̂c,2t+1 −
ν̄c,2
1 + ν̄c,2
(ν̂c,2t+1 − ν̂c,2t )
)
(2.102)
where ψ = ∂ψ(x)∂x |x=0 is such that ψ(0) = 0 and
∂ψ(x)
∂x |x=0 > 0. The debt premium ψ and
the VAT rate νc,i affect consumption in the same manner as the real interest rate R̂t− Π̂c,it+1,
or in other words add up to the real interest rate borne by households.
Governments
Proceeding like for households’ Euler equations, we get:
Ĝ1t
(












































t−1 − Π̂2t ).
(2.104)
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As with private consumptions, public consumptions display persistence because of
the internal habit formation parameter hg. Setting β = 0 in the former equations would
make habit formation external. The real interest rate for governments differs from that
of households because their consumptions are priced differently, governments buying
exclusively domestic production. Also the atomicity hypothesis made for households
relative to the asset market does not hold for governments and their debt premia differ
(ψ versus ψg). Comparing the terms of Euler equations shows that governments are twice
as sensitive to the spread on financial markets as households are.
2.3.3 Asset Dynamics
Again, assuming that the fluctuations of private and public assets are small with respect
to the steady-state output of the country (i.e. Ait/(P
i
t Ȳ
















Using the steady state relationships 1 + r = β, and w̄i L̄i = (1 + ν̄c,i)C̄i the households’

























and the definitions of parameters cyi the shares of consumption in GDP, gives:
Â1t−1 = βÂ
1




t − ĉ1t )− βB̂1t (2.107)
Â2t−1 = βÂ
2




t − ĉ2t )− βB̂2t (2.108)
The law of motion of private assets thus depends on net revenue minus consumption.
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Governments









































Thus public wealth increases with wages, worked hours and consumption and it de-
creases with public spending or tax cuts.
2.3.4 Phillips Curves
Wages































ˆδw̃t + P̂PNRt − P̂PNRT +
ν̄c,i
1 + ν̄c,i




















ˆδw̃t + P̂PNRt +
ν̄c,i
1 + ν̄c,i
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(1− βξ iw)P̂PNRt + (1− βξ iw)
ν̄c,i
1 + ν̄c,i






































ˆδw̃t − βξ iw ˆδw̃t+1
− βξ iw
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And the Calvo process induces:





































t − γiwΠ̂c,it−1) +
ν̄c,i
1 + ν̄c,i
(ν̂c,it − ν̂c,it−1) =
β
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So the level of inflation on wages hinges positively on future anticipated inflation, past
inflation, taxes. The larger the discount factor β, the more sensitive is wage inflation to
inflation expectations. The larger the probability to adjust prices 1− ξ i (i.e. the more
flexible are prices and wages), the less inflation depends on expectations. Inflation
depends also positively on labour demand and consumption: households demand a
higher wage to work more and consequently consume more.
Prices




























We also know that P̃i(ε, t) is independent from ε since all firms solve the same program,








Plugging this in into the equation above, and differentiate between time t and time






(1− βξ i)(1− ξ i)
ξ i
α





















where inflation depends positively on past indexed inflation, future anticipated inflation,
relative prices and wages, taxes, total output in country i and negatively on productivity.
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2.3.5 Monetary Policy, Relative Prices, Inflations
The linearised Taylor rule reads:



























































And the terms of trade depend on inflation differentials between countries:
T̂t = T̂t−1 + Π̂2t − Π̂1t . (2.130)
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2.3.6 Model Sequence
We can sum up the sequence of decisions of our model with the help of Figure 2.2. At the
beginning of the period, shocks occur. Then, all agents interact on the different markets:
the central bank chooses the interest rate, households and governments choose their
consumption and firms set their production and agree on wages and labour supply with
households. Finally, firms pay dividends from their profits. Households and governments
are left with their end-of-period asset holdings, for which they will pay or receive an
interest rate in the next period (minus intermediation costs).




wage, labour, interest rate...
Firms distribute bonuses and dividends.
Households and government buy
bonds with their remaining cash
Interest rate rt minus inter-
mediation costs is paid on
end of period asset holdings
Figure 2.2: Model sequence
42 Olfa Alouini – Country Size, Growth and the Economic and Monetary Union – 2011
2.4 Parameters Calibration
2.4 Parameters Calibration
We calibrate the model as follows:
Parameter Description Value
α Production technology parameter 0.7
β Discount factor 0.99
h1c , h1c Habit formation on consumption 0.7
h1g, h2g Habit formation on public expenditure 0.7
h1l , h
2
l Habit formation on labour 0.7
σ1c , σ2c Inverse of intertemporal elasticity 1
of substitution of private consumption
σ1l , σ
2
l Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 2
σ1g , σ2g Inverse of intertemporal elasticity 1
of substitution of public expenditure
κ Weight of labour in utility see Model
α1, α2 Import share 0.45
ξ1, ξ2 Calvo parameter on prices and wages adjustment 0.75
γ1, γ2 Price and wage indexation on past inflation 0.2
θ1, θ2 Elast. of sub. of domestic products and labour 6
yielding a markup of 20% on prices and wages





2 Financial premium on government debt 0.05
ν̄c,1, ν̄c,2 Tax level on consumption 20%
ν̄w,1, ν̄w,2 Tax level on wages 19%
rπ Central Bank reaction to inflation 1.7
ρ Taylor rule smoothing parameter 0.8
ry Central Bank reaction to output gap 0.25
θ Economic size ratio Ȳ1/Ȳ2 1
C̄1/Ȳ1 = cy1, Relative shares of private consumption in GDP 0.7
C̄2/Ȳ2 = cy2 0.7
Ḡ1/Ȳ1 = gy1, Relative shares of government spending in GDP 1− cy1
Ḡ2/Ȳ2 = gy2 1− cy2
Table 2.1: Parameters calibration
Our calibration of some classical parameters such as the discount factor, habit forma-
tion, monetary policy and elasticities of substitution (between goods θ, between periods
σc, σg or inverses of the Frisch elasticities σl), are usual eurozone quarterly estimates (as
in Smets and Wouters (2003) or Ratto, Roeger, and Int’Veld (2009) and the European
Commission QUEST Estimates (2001)). For the habit parameters on private consumption,
labour and government consumption, we chose to follow Darracq Pares, Adjemian, and
Moyen (2007) and set them all at 0.7.
The value of the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private consumption
in the CES utility functions of households, σc, determines the prevalence of the substi-
tution or income effect and so how tax cuts impact on output and consumption. We set
σc = 1, so that the wealth and substitution effects neutralise one another, and so biased
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results regarding the relative effectiveness of different fiscal policies are avoided. (In the
next chapter, we discuss alternative values for σc and the differences they lead to in terms
of policy and spillover effects.)
The value of σl (set at 2 as in Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2010)), the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of the labour supply, captures the sensitivity of agents to changes in their
labour supply and wages and also has an impact on the discrepancies observed in the
effects of fiscal policy in different monetary-union configurations (detailed in the next
chapter).
Parameter αi denotes the import share of private consumption (and, indirectly, the
degree of openness of both economies) and is calibrated at 0.45 on averages of openness
ratios (exports and imports as a share of GDP) in the eurozone.
The economic size ratio is captured by θ. In the baseline scenario, countries are suppos-
edly symmetric, so θ = 1.
Price rigidities are captured by ξi, the Calvo parameter. This is linked to the average
duration of contracts through E(duration) = 1/(1− ξi). In line with the values commonly
found in the literature (which assign contract durations from nine months to a year and
a half), we choose ξi = 0.75. This value yields a price contract duration of one year.
The two tax rates in both countries are linked to each other to ensure the budget
constraint of governments at the steady state. We have chosen a tax level on consumption
of 20%, which corresponds to the average (normal) VAT rate in the European Union in
2010.7 The payroll tax level derived from this choice is also approximately 20% in the
baseline calibration.
Due to the structure of our model, once the share of private consumption in GDP –




Ȳ1 or gy1 and
Ḡ2
Ȳ2 or gy2 are determined by the relationship
cy1
cy2
= α2α1θ and the
fact that cy1 + gy2 = cy1 + gy2 = 1, i.e. in each country the share of private and public
consumption in GDP add up to one.
Parameters ψi and ψ
g
i capture the reaction of financial markets to an increase in debt
or asset holdings of households and governments, respectively. For instance, with our
calibration, if households increase their debt (respectively asset holding) by 1% of their
country’s GDP, the financial intermediary will apply a spread 5 basis points higher (resp.
lower) on this contract. Our calibration of the elasticity of the bond spread to public
(or private) debt roughly replicates the relative volatility of the debt-to-GDP ratio and
7As of 2011, VAT rates in the euro-area are ranged from 15% in Luxemburg in to 23% in Finland and
Portugal.
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the spread of the 10-year government bond with that of Germany. Indeed, the standard
deviation of debt-to-GDP ratio fluctuations in the eurozone between 1999 and 2007 equals
2.85 (source: Eurostat), while that of variations of the spread with the German 10-year
bond is 0.64. The ratio of the two is 0.22 on a yearly basis, so we use 0.05 for our quarterly
calibration.
With the exception of σc and σl (as explained in the following chapter), our results do
not crucially hinge on the calibration. For example, we could set the habit formations
(h, hl , hg) and price and wage indexation (γi) at 0 and use constant returns to scale
production functions and our model would exhibit features similar to the ones detailed
subsequently.
2.5 Objective Function for Expenditure versus Government
Spending Rules
In an attempt to replicate discretionary fiscal policy making in the monetary union, the
features of the government block depart from standard modelling.(That is, governments
maximise an objective function increasing in the public expenditure level subject to the
government budget constraint, and taxes are assumed to be exogenous.) Comparing
the effects of fiscal policies with other models is therefore difficult, if not impossible. To
check that this will not lead to spurious results, we compare fiscal variables’ responses
to shocks in our model to those in a model with a government spending rule such as in









where ψg, ψy, ψd denote respectively the responsiveness of government spending to the
past level of government spending, to the output gap and to public asset holdings.
We set ψg = 0.7 to be equal to the external habit formation parameter on government
spending from our model. Corsetti, Meier, and Müller’s calibration does not always fulfil
the rank condition with our model, in which tax rates are constant and not lump-sum.
We had to increase the sensitivity of public expenditure to public assets to compensate
for the fact that the tax level does not increase with public assets (ψy = +0.15 instead of
0.02).
In Figure 2.3, we plot the impulse response functions (IRF) of government spending
and government asset holdings in country 1 in reaction to the following usual shocks:
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(i) a positive 1% monetary policy shock;
(ii) a positive 1% productivity shock;
(iii) a 1% intertemporal preference shock i.e. a 1% shock on β, the discount factor
affecting households’ Euler equations.
And also in reaction to the following fiscal policy shocks:
(iv) a 1% increase in government spending;
(v) a 1-point cut in the VAT;
(vi) a 1-point cut in the payroll tax.
The different curves represent the following modelling options for fiscal behaviour of
the government:
• government spending defined by our Euler equation without external habit forma-
tion,
• government spending defined by our Euler equation with external habit formation,
• government spending following the rule suggested by Corsetti, Meier, and Müller
(procyclical, ψy = +0.04),
• government spending following the rule suggested by Corsetti, Meier, and Müller
(contracyclical, ψy = −0.04),
• government spending following the rule suggested by Corsetti, Meier, and Müller
with increased sensitivity (procyclical, ψy = +0.2),
• government spending following the rule suggested by Corsetti, Meier, and Müller
with increased sensitivity (contracyclical, ψy = −0.2).
We find that the responses to the different shocks in the economy are quite similar
across models – except for the effect of monetary policy shocks on asset holdings. As
expected, habit formation induces more stickiness in the government’s reactions, and
higher sensitivity in the budget rule increases the magnitude of these reactions.
Counter-intuitively, setting a procyclical or a contracyclical spending rule does not
induce much change in the government’s reactions to various shocks. The difference is
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only noticeable when procyclicality (or contracyclicality) is enhanced in the reaction of
public expenditure to a shock on preferences or government spending.
With our government spending model, public expenditures are slightly more impacted
by fiscal stimuli shocks, and public asset holdings recover from the expansionary policy
more quickly. Thanks to external habit formation, the magnitude of the fiscal policy effect
is very similar under the different spending rules. Under the spending rule of Corsetti,
Meier, and Müller, government spending and assets tend to be more persistent, but using
a smaller premium on public assets with our specification of public expenditure tends
to increase the persistence of the government’s reactions, which are then closer to those
with Corsetti, Meier, and Müller’s rules.
With our specification, we observe an increase in public assets in reaction to a positive
monetary policy shock. Indeed, as interest rates rise, governments will try to issue less
debt. Corsetti, Meier, and Müller’s approach and ours differ on this. We deem this reaction
of sovereign debt to an increase in interest rates to be relevant, especially in the eurozone,
where governments cannot monetise their debt. We thus contend that our modelling
approach of the fiscal authority better matches currency-union features.
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Government spending IRFs in country 1
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CMM 5x more proc.
CMM 5x more contrac.
Figure 2.3: Comparing government spending rules
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2.6 Model Dynamics and Fiscal Policy: From a Closed Economy
to a Monetary Union
This section is devoted to the analysis of the model dynamics with the help of impulse
response functions in a closed-economy setting and in a symmetric monetary union. The
simulations for the closed economy provide a benchmark or control experiment against
which the effect of openness, fiscal spillovers and the common monetary policy can be
assessed for the two-country setting.
We generate the following traditional shocks in the closed economy and country 1 of
the monetary union:
(i) a positive 1% monetary policy shock;
(ii) a positive 1% productivity shock;
(iii) a 1% intertemporal preference shock i.e. a 1% shock on β, the discount factor
affecting households’ Euler equations.
Additionally, we compute the IRFs to three fiscal policy shocks:
(iv) a 1% increase in government spending;
(v) a 1-point cut in the VAT;
(vi) a 1-point cut in the payroll tax.
All shocks have an autocorrelation factor φ = 0.75. Responses are expressed in percentage
deviations from steady-state values.
2.6.1 The Closed-Economy Case
Economic shocks in a closed economy
Figure 2.4 displays impulse response functions of economic variables following 1%
monetary, preference and productivity shocks in a closed one-country model. The model
allows for a strong transmission channel of monetary policy onto the the rest of the
system. Indeed, the monetary shock has a strong depressive effect on the economy, with
output and consumption down 3% at the trough of the curve. CPI inflation is driven
down and so is government spending as the raise in the interest rates makes debt dearer.
The effects of the other shocks are more subdued. The productivity shock has mainly a
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positive impact on dividends and so on households’ assets, other economic variables
do not react strongly because the increase in productivity translates into more leisure
and not more labour supply from the households. Likewise, the preference shock only
changes slightly the dynamics of assets that is dependent on intertemporal discounting












































































Figure 2.4: IRFs after 1% monetary, preference and productivity shocks in a closed economy
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Policy shocks in a closed economy
The increase in government spending are as much purchases directed at home production,
driving output (+1%) and labour up (hours worked follow the evolution of output
because there is no productive capital in the model). The crowding-out effect on home
consumption (only +0.15%) that cannot be fully compensated by imports. Households
save their additional income. Inflation is kept under check by the response of the central
bank. Finally, following this rise in government expenditure, the evolution of public
assets reflects the implicit debt limit enforced by the premium on debt. The effects of
tax cuts are less strong on output (+0.1% for the VAT cut) and labour because mediated
through prices and wages. Because of the deflationary impact on prices (directly for
the VAT and through second-round effects for the payroll tax), the positive reaction of
consumption is substantial, especially for the VAT cut (+0.6%). The smaller tax intake
has to be made up by the government which decreases its spending and assets.
In a closed-economy setting, government spending proves most efficient in spurring
output, and expectedly a VAT cut yields the largest increase in private consumption.
These results are consistent with the empirical analysis of Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari
(2010). Relying on a VAR model, they find that a 1% spending shock is on average
associated with a 1% increase in GDP in EU countries, and a 1% tax cut generates a
response of +0.2 percentage points of steady-state output. They also corroborate the small
effect of government spending on inflation, as the latter increases only by 0.02% after a
positive government spending shock.
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Figure 2.5: IRFs after 1% policy shocks in a closed economy
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2.6.2 The Monetary-Union Case
Economic shocks in a monetary union
In the case of a monetary policy shock (see Figure 2.6), symmetric countries are impacted
in the same way, so the trade channel is not relevant in this case. The interest-rate hike has
a very strong adverse effect on outputs, consumption and public spending. Accordingly,
CPI inflation is lowered. As firms sell at a lower price, they hire fewer workers, and
employment plummets.
A positive productivity shock in country 1 (see Figure 2.7) drives output, labour and
consumption up and eases fiscal consolidation as tax revenues soar. These expansionary
effects are muted by the fact that firms hire less as wages increase and consequently,
households save more. This shock adversely affects country 2 in terms of output as it
loses market share to its more price-competitive neighbour. The reaction of the central
bank is accommodative: as the union-wide CPI inflation decreases, so does the interest
rate, fuelling overheating in country 1 but allowing the economy in country 2 to bounce
back a little faster. To this extent, the central bank restores the economic balance between
countries in the monetary union.
A positive preference shock in country 1 (see Figure 2.8) has the larger spillover effects
as output levels in both countries are equally affected (+0.2% at the peak). However,
the dynamics of the other variables differ; while the consumption boom is short-lived
in country 1, it is protracted in country 2, where consumers have not changed their
discount factor. More precisely, in country 1, households are less patient and increase
their present consumption of domestic and foreign products. As a consequence, labour
demands increase in both countries, and because wages do not decrease in country 2,
households experience an increase in their disposable income and also consume more.
Finally, higher consumption and labour supply translate into a larger tax intake, which
finances the increases in public spending and assets.
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Figure 2.6: IRFs after a 1% monetary shock in the union
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Figure 2.7: IRFs after a 1% productivity shock in country 1
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Figure 2.8: IRFs after a 1% preference shock in country 1
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Fiscal policy shocks in a monetary union
Figure 2.9 and 2.10 compare the impulse response functions of key selected variables to
a 1% increase in government expenditure, a one-point cut in the VAT and a one-point
cut in the payroll tax in country 1. While agents are forward-looking and anticipate the
dynamics of government spending, there are no anticipations regarding the future level
of taxes so that the Ricardian effect is not at play: output and consumption in country 1
are positively affected by the shock (+0.8% and +0.2% respectively). As in the closed
economy case, the rise in government expenditure boosts domestic output and labour,
but crowds out domestic consumption which switches in part to imports (depending
on the openness degree αi). The increase in aggregate demand pushes domestic prices
relative to foreign ones, so that there is a small terms-of-trade advantage to country 2. The
central bank reacts to the evolutions of union output and CPI inflation by slightly raising
the interest rate. To a lesser degree, output also rises in country 2, showing the existence
of positive fiscal spillovers in the context of a monetary union. The leakages onto the
foreign country remain small (+0.05% of steady-state deviation for output) because the
expansion in country 1 is affected by country 2’s reaction only through second-round
effects; the increase in the interest rate has a depressive effect on the foreign country;
and as put forward by Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2010) in a currency union there is no
exchange rate channel so adjustments through relative prices and wages are smaller than
in a classical open-economy framework.
Impulse response functions of output and consumption variables to cuts in VAT and
in the payroll tax exhibit the same patterns. In contrast to an increase in government
spending, tax cuts have a more muted effect on the output of the domestic country (+0.2%
after the VAT cut) and foster that of the foreign country through relative prices and
wages (+0.25% on foreign GDP following the VAT cut). (As discussed in the calibration
section, this ordering largely depends on the value of σc, the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.) Consumptions are pushed up by +0.4-+0.6% because of lower relative
prices. Contrary to a pure fiscal expansion that triggers changes in quantities produced
and consumed, adjustments now are largely nominal. The deterioration of the terms
of trade proves stronger when the government lowers taxes because of the additional
nominal effect.
Also, by decreasing tax levels, the government generates disinflation, which in turn
affects the consumption-leisure trade-off. As labour costs are reduced by a cut in the
payroll tax in country 1, country 2 imports more and contributes to demand-pull inflation
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that drives prices and wages back up. The second-round effects of the tax cut do not
stimulate production (captured by labour).
Public spending and tax cuts also have a differentiated effect on government variables.
Because of the smaller tax intake, the domestic government lowers its expenditure level
to meet its budget constraint, while the foreign country enjoys larger tax intake (through
the consumption and labour) and can afford to increase its spending. The fiscal basis for
the VAT cut represents 75% of GDP (consumption at the steady state), whereas that of the
payroll tax is 100% (total revenue equals total output, which is total wages at the steady
state). This explains the stronger adjustment of public assets, government spending and
of the interest rate after a cut in the payroll tax. Likewise the downward adjustment of
the interest rate to the deflationary pressures of the tax cuts is larger in the case of the
payroll tax.
We can briefly assess the effect of openness on fiscal policy. Openness to international
trade generates leakages: home output increases by 0.2% less after a positive 1% gov-
ernment spending shock than in a closed-economy. That does not hold for consumption
as imports compensate for crowding-out by the government. The effects of tax cuts
on home output and consumption are slightly larger than in the closed-economy case
because of the competitive edge in terms of prices they give to the country. The foreign
country’s output benefits also from the tax cuts (up to 0.25%) through higher addressed
demand but not so much from government spending (+0.05%). Openness thus preserves
the ordering – if not the magnitude – of fiscal policies’ impact on home output, but it
introduces a strategic asymmetry between the country implementing fiscal policies and
its trade partner. We will delve deeper into the analysis of these spillovers in the next
chapter.
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Figure 2.9: Policy shocks in a monetary union – 1 of 2
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Figure 2.10: Policy shocks in a monetary union – 2 of 2
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Comparison of fiscal multipliers with relevant studies
Empirical studies usually highlight a short-term positive effect of an increase in govern-
ment spending on output but there is no consensus on the size of the fiscal multipliers.
Our simulation results for government spending and tax cuts are in the same order of
magnitude than those presented by Kumhof, Muir, Freedman, Mursula, Erceg, Furceri,
Lalonde, Lindé, Mourougane, Roberts, Snudden, Trabandt, Coenen, Laxton, deResende,
Roeger, and intVeld (2010). Mountford and Uhlig (2009) found for the US, that a 1%
deficit spending has an effect on output ranged between +0.6% and 1.4%, but contrary
to us they find a higher effect of tax cuts, between 2% and 5%. Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (2009) show that the fiscal multiplier effect is large when the interest rate
does not respond to increases in government spending. In our model, however, interest
rates do respond because, in a monetary union, higher levels of public spending generate
inflationary pressures. Regarding the effect of fiscal policies on consumption, Mountford
and Uhlig (2009) or Cwik and Wieland (2009) find almost no reaction to deficit spending
because of fiscal expansions’ crowding-out effects and the anticipation of tax increases.
While our theoretical model predicts also a crowding out effect, there is no anticipation
of future tax increases.
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Conclusion
This chapter detailed the construction of a micro-founded two-country monetary union
model apt to show the effects of different fiscal policies with cross-country heterogeneities
in terms of size and openness. The model is built such that the relative size and openness
of countries impact on trade flows and monetary policy as the central bank considers
union-wide output and inflation to set the interest rate. The fiscal authority block departs
from traditional New-Keynesian modelling so as to better replicate real policy-making in
times of crisis in heterogeneous countries of a monetary union. Governments maximise
an objective function increasing in their expenditure level under their budget constraint.
Under rational expectations, agents anticipate the normal behaviour or spending of the
government, but do not anticipate one-off fiscal stimulus measures.
Since the criteria of the Stability of Growth Pact were seldom respected for a protracted
period by EMU Member States, there is no strict fiscal rule but rather a “loose” limit
on deficit and debt. This limit is enforced by a debt premium on private and public
assets, that makes the cost of debt rise with the level of indebtedness and also ensures the
stationarity of the model. A unique equilibrium is pinned down by clearing the position
of the financial intermediary towards the central bank at each period.
Impulse response functions put forward the transmission mechanisms at play in the
model and the effects of fiscal policy. First, in a closed economy setting, there are no
leakages, explaining the larger fiscal multiplier of fiscal measures. The multiplier is higher
in the case of government spending than for tax cuts as first-round effects on demand
are immediate while the effects of tax cuts are mediated through price adjustments.
Second, in a two-country setting, increased government spending proves more efficient in
spurring domestic output than consumption or payroll-tax cuts. As public consumption
is addressed solely to domestic production, increasing government spending has an
immediate one-for-one effect on domestic output. Government spending generates a
crowding-out effect and leads to volume adjustments of consumption towards imports,
whereas tax cuts have a stronger nominal effect on relative price competitiveness. So
with tax cuts, competition in prices and trade across countries mitigate the effects of fiscal
stimuli.
The analysis of fiscal policy effects in a monetary union is furthered in the next chapter.
The model developed is used to run fiscal policy simulations starting from a recession
scenario, with particular emphasis on fiscal spillovers between different-sized countries.
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Times of Crisis and Spillovers in the EMU
with Aurélien Poissonnier
Abstract
Using a two-country micro-founded model of a monetary union with debt (de-
tailed in the previous chapter) and allowing for cross-country heterogeneities in
terms of size, openness and nominal rigidities, we simulate an increase in govern-
ment spending as well as tax cuts in response to a crisis and comparatively assess
their effectiveness. We find that increasing government spending is more effective
in spurring output compared to tax cuts on consumption or on the payroll. We also
detail the cross-border spillovers in a monetary union of these policies and explain
how they depend on asymmetries between countries. We find that countries always
benefit from their partner’s fiscal stimuli (increase in public spending or tax cuts),
especially small open ones. We put forward a strategic asymmetry: the home (or
policy-making) country benefits more from an increase in public spending in terms
of output and consumption, but its partner benefits from larger positive spillover
effects in the case of tax cuts. Finally, we determine that in a monetary union “inter-
nal devaluation” is a less expansionary supply-side policy response to a crisis than
increased public spending and it bears externalities on foreign public debt (+0.5% of
induced debt than for other measures on average).
Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008-9 and in its wake, the eurozone sovereign debt crisis unfolding
in 2010-11 have revived research on fiscal policies, their effects and costs, and exit
strategies out of pricey stimulus packages. Indeed, governments of the eurozone face
contradictory policy pressures. On the one hand, large-scope stimulus packages that were
implemented to buoy up consumption and growth cannot be phased out too quickly lest
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it triggers a double-dip recession. On the other hand, guaranteeing affordable sovereign
financing with a common currency requires reigning in public finances (or deleveraging)
and abiding by the debt and deficit limits set in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
In this paper, we focus on different fiscal measures –increase in public spending or
tax cuts on consumption or on the payroll –, their short-term domestic impact and
spillover effects onto other monetary-union members. We rely on the Neo-Keynesian
model detailed in the previous chapter, linearised around its steady-state to simulate
fiscal stimuli after a crisis. Allowing now for asymmetries between countries in terms of
size, openness and price rigidities, we see how these discrepancies affect the within- and
cross-country fiscal spillovers.
From a union-wide perspective, we find that countries always benefit from their
partner’s fiscal stimulus (be it an increase in public spending or tax cuts). These positive
spillovers are larger in the case of a cut in the consumption tax. We will see however that
such a policy – because of its deflationary effects – may be problematic for the stance of
the central bank if the interest rate is already close to the zero-lower-bound. We will also
detail how spillovers depend on country size, openness and price rigidities. Finally, we
determine that an “internal devaluation” policy is less effective than increased public
spending as a recovery policy response to a crisis in a monetary union and, moreover, is
detrimental to foreign public finances.
As regards the impact of heterogeneity between countries, the spillovers are greater for
a small open country, and to a lesser extent, dependent on price rigidities. For example,
when a larger country increases its public spending, the smaller one benefits more from
the crowding-out effect in the large country. Or when the large country lowers its tax
level, the pressure on the central bank to lower the interest rate is larger, and the small
country benefits from a lower real interest rate. Additionally, if prices and wages are
more flexible, the small country can compete in prices with its partner and reap greater
benefits from the foreign tax cut.
Finally we find that “internal devaluation” may be a viable policy to regain competi-
tiveness while keeping public financing in check for small and open economies but may
also bear negative externalities for their neighbours’ public finances.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 1, we present a simplified version of
the two-country monetary union model previously developed. We run deterministic
simulations of different fiscal shocks (after a simulated crisis) and explain their effects in
Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of cross-border spillovers in an asymmetric
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monetary union. In Section 4, we assess whether “internal devaluation” is a viable exit
strategy for monetary-union members in crisis before concluding with our main findings.
3.1 Model
For the sake of clarity, we expound here a simplified version of our micro-founded
monetary-union model. The augmented model and its linearisation are detailed in the
previous chapter.1 2
3.1.1 Goods Aggregation
Aggregation of production within countries
We assume that a continuum of goods of size one is produced in the monetary union.
Goods in [0, n] are produced in country 1, while goods in ] n, 1] are produced in country 2,
where 0 <n< 1. In each country, domestic production is aggregated into a domestic
good using a Dixit–Stiglitz aggregator with an elasticity of substitution specific to each
country. These hypotheses yield the following relationship between the demand for goods



















where θi is the elasticity of substitution of goods in country i.















1The augmented version of the model includes CES utility functions on private and public consumptions,
a convex disutility of labour, external habit formation on private consumption and labour, internal habit
formation on public expenditure, partial indexation of prices and wages on past inflation and decreasing
returns to scale in the production technologies.In this chapter, for simplicity CES are transformed into
log, productivity has constant return to scale, indexations are set to zero.
2A number of explanations on the model blocks are repeated here to allow for independent chapter reading.
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and also serve as numéraires in our model. The resulting relationships between aggre-













Aggregation of private consumption
In both countries, households have access to the aggregated goods produced by each
country; domestic and foreign goods are partial substitutes. Private consumption of good
i is denoted Ci,t. It represents the total consumption of good i in both countries and differs
from private consumption in country i, denoted Cit. We have the following relationships:















where Cit is the private consumption of country i, and C
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j,t is the private consumption
in country i of the aggregated goods produced in country j. αi is the import share of
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This aggregation yields the following relation between the demands for domestic and


























In both countries, each agent (τ) maximises her intertemporal utility function subject to
its budget constraint (determined by the recursive law of motion of private assets).
Consumption decision
Agents derive utility from consuming the bundle described above and disutility of labour.
Each agent provides a differentiated labour supply that allows her to negotiate her wage.






















+wi(τ, t)Li(τ, t)− CPIit(1 + νc,it )Ci(τ, t) + Bit.
(3.17)
where, E0, β are respectively the expectation at the initial time operator and the discount
factor; Ai(τ, t) is the household’s τ asset holdings at the end of period t; ψ is an interest
premium on debt (whose function we detail in the paragraph on private asset dynamics);
Li(τ, t) is the labour supply of household τ and wi(τ, t) its wage. νc,it is the tax rate on
consumption or VAT through which government expenditure Git is partially financed. σ
i
l
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is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. hic, hil are the external habit formation parameter on
consumption and labour. Bit is the bonus or dividend paid by the firm to its employees or
owner (if negative, it represents a recapitalisation of the firm). rt is the interest rate set by
the monetary authority in the union; CPIit is the consumption price index in country i
and κ is the weight assigned to labour in the utility function.
The Euler equation for this programme is identical across households:
Et
β CitCit+1









 = 1, (3.18)
where Πc,i is the inflation of the consumption price index in country i.
Private asset dynamics
The aggregate budget constraint reads:
Ait =
(









t − CPIit(1 + νi,ct )Cit + Bit. (3.19)
Labour supply decision
As we did for consumption goods, we model labour aggregation with a Dixit–Stiglitz
function. Unlike consumption goods, labour is considered immobile and cannot be
imported or exported. Relationships between labour and wages are therefore similar to
those between consumption and prices. θiw denotes the elasticity of substitution of labour.
Households choose their labour supply (a labour aggregator or employment agency
allocates workers to firms and sets a number of hours worked and an hourly wage as in
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000)). The relationship between total demand for labour
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We assume wage stickiness à la Calvo, with parameter ξ iw, the probability not to adjust
















(ν̂c,it − ν̂c,it−1) =
β
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We posit that firms hire a share of the aggregate domestic labour supply so that their
labour cost is wit(1 + ν
w,i
t ) in country i at date t. ν
w,i
t is the payroll tax rate levied by the
government on firms. In each country i, firm ε produces the differentiated good y1(ε, t)
with the following technology:












where ζ i is the total factor productivity in country i modelled as exogenous and α is the
production technology parameter.
Price setting
For price setting, we assume a Calvo process in each country. Firm ε, can reset its price
with exogenous probability 1− ξi. Producers know the relationship between their price
and the demand for their product and choose their price to maximise their expected
3Note: X̂ is variable X’s log-deviation from its steady-state value X̄
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profit under that constraint. Firm ε chooses its price P̃i(ε, t) to maximise their expected





























is the marginal utility of consumption in country i in nominal terms.
ỹi(ε, t, T) is the demand for goods produced by firm ε of country i at time T when its
price was last reset at time t.




















where RPCi = CPIit/P
i
t is the relative price of consumption with respect to the price of














Firms cannot save or invest, so they redistribute their profits to households. This distri-
bution can be thought of as bonuses Bit to employees or dividends to firm owners, and





t − wit(1 + νw,it )Lit. (3.31)
At the steady state, firms make zero profit and bonuses are equal to zero.
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3.1.4 Market Clearing























t − Pjt Mit, (3.33)
where Xit gives the exports sold to country j at the price of the domestic good. Likewise,
the imports Mit are bought from country j at price P
j
t . Because demand for foreign goods






The central bank sets the nominal interest rate Rt common to both countries through a
Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) where it reacts to both the average inflation of the consumption


























is the average inflation of consumption
in the monetary union, Yt = Y1t + Y
2
t the total output of the monetary union, R
∗ is the
interest-rate target of the central bank. rπ and ry are the Taylor rule weights assigned to
inflation and the output gap, ρ is the interest-smoothing parameter.
3.1.6 Fiscal Authorities
As detailed in the previous chapter, governments can take three possible discretionary
fiscal measures: change the level of public spending or the VAT rate, or the payroll
tax. Otherwise, governments maximise their objective function the utility function with
respect to public expenditure subject to the public budget constraint.
4Reacting to the (VAT-included) CPI inflation makes the central bank also react to changes in the VAT level
set by the government. Indeed VAT increases have inflationary effects.
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Objective function of the government
The objective of the government is to stimulate domestic production and labour, to
provide collective good and services, as well as individual consumption, all these di-
mensions of public intervention are embedded into the variable G as explained earlier.
Moreover, the overall level of government spending is assumed to be persistent, as
welfare state systems cannot be dramatically reshaped overnight, hence we model the
objective function of the government as a CES function of public spending with internal
habit formation, in the simplified version of the model exposed here, this objective is the
logarithm of government spending. Governments maximise their objective function with























t − Pit Git, (3.36)
where PAit denotes the nominal public assets of country i at the end of period t (negative if
the government is a borrower). Note that the atomicity assumption made for households
does not hold for governments, the latter are subjected to the public debt premium ψg
and accordingly habit formation on government consumption is internal. This yields the



















and law of motion for public asset holdings,
PAit =
(

















t − Pit Git. (3.39)
Debt control in the government budget constraint
For governments, ψg captures the marginal cost of debt. This premium paid by govern-
ments on their debt (or assets) ensures that the governments’ assets will not permanently
depart from their steady state. In other words, the spread paid on sovereign bonds sets
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an implicit limit on public debt by making credit more expensive as indebtedness level
rises. This cost is internalised by the government: it keeps the debt level under check
through changes in public expenditure levels. In the context of the eurozone sovereign-
debt crisis, this premium may be interpreted as the spread on sovereign yields compared
to Germany. The implicit deficit limit on debt enforces indirectly a deficit limit so the
model tallies with the Maastrict criteria capping deficit and debt in the countries of the
monetary union (at 3% and 60% of GDP respectively).
3.1.7 Financial Intermediation
As explained by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), the stationarity of an open economy
model is not straightforward. It can be ensured by some modelling elements, which are
usually not microfounded (and akin to habit parameters that ensure the hump-shaped
response of consumption to shocks). In order to substantiate the introduction of spreads
at the micro level, we detail the following financial market mechanisms.
We assume that there exists an international financial market for assets (private or
public). On the financial market, intermediaries can borrow money from the central bank
to finance public or private credit, and conversely borrow money from agents to deposit
it at the central bank. Through financial intermediaries, agents can purchase other agents’
and governments’ assets. The interest rate for the exchange between the central bank and
the financial intermediary is the interest rate set by the central bank. The aggregate cash
needs financial intermediaries borrow from the central bank are:
CNt = −(A1t + A2t + PA1t + PA2t ). (3.40)
The turnover, costs and profit of financial intermediaries are






































PAit − Ξ(A1t , A2t , PA1t , PA2t ); (3.43)






t ) gives the
intermediation and management costs. We assume that financial intermediaries evolve
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on a perfect competition market with quadratic intermediation and management costs5
such that profits are equal to zero. Financial intermediaries do not re-inject the cashed-in
fees back into the union economy. Therefore developments on the financial market do not
affect the rest of the system. As a consequence, the optimisation programme of financial
intermediaries is not needed to close our model. One could for instance assume that
financial activities are based strictly out of the monetary union, for instance in England or
in Switzerland. Moreover, we suppose that, at each period, the financial intermediaries
clear their position towards the central bank so that:
CNt = −(A1t + A2t + PA1t + PA2t ) = 0. (3.44)
This last condition imposes that at each period, private and public debts or assets held
in the monetary union cancel each other out. This condition may be found restrictive
it is nevertheless comparable to the interbank overnight markets, where banks clear
their daily position towards the central bank by lending or borrowing according to the
refinancing rate set by the central bank. This ensures that the debt market is Walrassian,
i.e. that the laws of motions for three out of four of the assets (public and private in both
countries) implies the law of motion for the fourth one.
3.2 Fiscal Stimuli in a Monetary Union after a Crisis
3.2.1 Simulation Strategy
In this section, our goal is to simulate the recovery from a global recession in a monetary
union and to determine the type of fiscal measure that best counteracts the depressive
effects of a crisis. In an attempt to replicate the extraordinary conditions of European
countries hit by the 2008-9 subprime crisis, we compute deterministic simulations of the
model and calibration detailed in the previous chapter with two symmetric countries
starting off the-steady-state. Fiscal expansions are usually a response to negative exoge-
nous shocks. These particular circumstances induce a “simultaneity downward bias” in
the assessment of fiscal multipliers because fiscal expansions are usually implemented
when the economy is depressed. The scope of the variables’ reactions is therefore bound
to be lower than in the previous chapter where simulations started from the steady-state.
We take the following assumptions for the starting point:
5Contracts between the financial intermediaries and households or government are embedded in the
function ψ and ψg. There is no moral hazard, default or collateralisation in our model.
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• GDP in both countries is 5% below its steady state for the second quarter at the
beginning of the simulation;
• government expenditures are still at their steady state at the beginning of the
simulation;
• prices have not responded to the crisis at the starting point; hence, inflation, relative
prices and terms of trade are at their steady state;
• governments and households have not adjusted their savings behaviour at the
starting point, so asset holdings are at their steady state;
• other real quantities at the beginning of the simulation are deduced from the
model’s equations.
As discussed by Mountford and Uhlig (2009), fiscal shocks encompass a wide array of
measures (from discretionary spending to tax cuts) and effects (revenue versus spending
shocks, for instance). We select the following shocks as policy responses implemented in
the wake of the crisis:
(i) a positive discretionary expenditure shock in the home country;
(ii) a cut in the VAT in the home country;and
(iii) a drop in the labour tax levied on domestic firms.
We compare the recovery of both countries from this crisis with respect to the different
measures undertaken by the government. We also compute simulations for the case
where the government takes no measure as controls. For the purpose of comparability,
we specify that the cost of any of these measures must equal 3% of the country’s GDP.
This figure is roughly in line with European Commission estimates of fiscal packages
implemented by national governments in the eurozone (which amounted to 1.5% of GDP
in 2009). More precisely, this amounts to a 10% increase in public spending, or a 2.8%
VAT cut or a 2.4% payroll tax cut for a period of four quarters.6
In this chapter, we focus on the cross-country externalities fiscal policy shocks generate.
We first rely on a perfectly symmetric framework – i.e., both countries making up the
union are identical in all aspects and will introduce asymmetries in a subsequent section.
6These amounts are computed as follow: respectively ∆Gi = 3%
Ḡi
Ȳi
, ∆νc,i = 3%
C̄i
Ȳi




at the steady-state we have the following equality between the wage and consumption: w̄i = (1+ νc,i)C̄i.
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3.2.2 Differentiated Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks
Figures 3.1 to 3.3 display the simulations of our model’s recovery from a crisis with the
baseline calibration. We compare the effects of our three alternative fiscal policies. The
reactions are measured in percentage-point deviations from the steady state. We rely on
the simulations when no fiscal measure is undertaken to comparatively assess policy
effects.
The crisis unfolding with passive fiscal authorities
When there is no fiscal shock following the recession, the central bank lowers the interest
rate by 50 basis points to stimulate economic activity. As demand is low, households
have little bargaining power, and the hourly wage falls below its steady-state level by
more than 3%. By rapidly increasing their labour supply,7 households manage to cushion
the drop in their consumption and increase their savings. The governments, facing a
drop in tax intake, so that they cut expenditures by more than 1% lest the public debt
soar. However, both governments partially resort to debt – a 2.5% increase – in order to
smooth out their consumption.
For domestic activity, the best policy is to increase government consumption
From the viewpoint of country 1, which initiates a fiscal stimulus, resorting to government
spending yields the largest positive effect on domestic activity. Indeed, by increasing
its demand for domestic goods, the government’s purchase of domestic production has
a direct effect on output, buoying it to roughly 2% over that of the recovery without
fiscal measures. As the stimulus is worth 3% of the GDP, our fiscal multiplier is about
0.66, which is in line with the figure reported by Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2010).
This increase in public demand pushes wages up, which in turn spurs private savings as
well as home and imported consumption. Indeed, as the labour supply goes up with the
shock, so does household income. The government, by adjusting its spending, will in the
long run satisfy the no-Ponzi-scheme condition.
7If the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private consumption, σc < 1, this increase in hours
worked will be even more abrupt as the substitution effect prevails over the income effect.
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Tax cuts have less expansionary effects on output
Comparatively, tax cuts have a mediated impact on production through prices – directly
on domestic and imported goods for the VAT cut and indirectly, through a cross-border
deflationary pressure for the payroll tax – , explaining their more muted effect on output.
This hierarchy of fiscal measures according to their effect on output differs from that
of Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2010). Notwithstanding differences in the modelling
of the labour block, they find that the effects of increasing public spending or tax cuts
– in an open economy calibrated to the EMU – are nearly zero, while that of hiring
subsidies (comparable to a cut in the payroll tax in our setting) helps the economy
recover substantially.
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the effects of tax cuts depend on the
value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. In the Appendix
(see Figures A-1 to A-2), we show the same policy simulations with different values
for this parameter. If the value for the elasticity of substitution is high (i.e. σc < 1),
the substitution prevails. This spurs the labour supply of households at the expense of
consumption smoothing as households work more to earn more (as leisure has become
relatively more expensive) and drives the recovery. Conversely, if it is low (i.e. σc > 1),
with σc = 2 for instance, the income effect dominates. The drop in prices and wages
drives the labour supply down so that tax cuts depress output and consumption more
than fiscal inactivity would. However, only with a very high elasticity of substitution
(σc = 0.2), would VAT cuts and public spending-based expansions have comparable
effects on domestic GDP.
All fiscal stimuli produce positive externalities for the other country
In our model, increasing public spending in country 1 crowds out the domestic market
and thus boosts imports from country 2. This is in line with the empirical results of
Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Klaassen (2005): they show that in the EMU, an increase in
government in one country spending translates into more foreign exports (+2%) from its
EMU neighbours.
Tax cuts in country 1 force country 2 to be more price-competitive. The mechanisms at
play are the following: a cut in the VAT also impacts on imports (+3%) and so on prices
(−0.45%) and quantities in country 2. There, labour and the real wage are pushed up, as
is country’s 2 output. The transmission channel for the spillover effect is the interest rate,
hence the strong positive effect on domestic consumption with an increase of 2% more
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than in a passive government scenario. Indeed the central bank reacts to VAT-included
consumption prices and cuts the interest rate by 80bp.
By decreasing the payroll tax, country 1 generates disinflation of domestic production
that spreads to country 2 through the Phillips curve and stimulates its production.
Reactions of economic variables to the payroll tax cut are generally more muted because
there is no direct reaction of the central bank to this measure, indeed the interest rate
curve almost superposes with that in the case of a government spending.
Thus, for all policy measures taken in country 1, there are positive spillover effects for
country 2. So for country 2, it is always better to have its neighbour undertake any fiscal
expansion measure than none.The positive deviation of foreign output ranges between
+1% for a spending-based expansion and +1.4% for a VAT cut. This partially debunks the
tenet of the Stability and Growth Pact by which fiscal expansion is held to be detrimental
to other eurozone members: such an effect is not obvious in the short term.
Parameters calibration and the size of spillovers
The size of the spillovers depend on the reactivity of country 2 and its capacity to
compete on prices. In a symmetric union, the positive effect on GDP equals ranges in
[+0.2%,+0.6%] deviation from its steady-state value according to the policy measure. For
country 2 to free ride propitiously on the expansion of country 1, the nominal adjustments
induced by the Phillips curves must not translate into large adjustments in quantities of
goods and labour. This ability hinges on price flexibility captured by the Calvo parameter
ξi but also on two other parameters – σc the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and to a lesser extent σl the inverse of the Frisch elasticity – present in the wages and
prices Phillips curves. The smaller these two parameters are, the less agents will adjust to
changes on prices and wages through quantities and the larger the fiscal spillovers will
be in terms of output.
More precisely, for higher values of σl , the labour supply sensitivity (or convexity of the
disutility of labour) is stronger, and asymmetries in the monetary union are less reflected
in the size of fiscal spillovers. Indeed, agents adjust more swiftly to policy shocks, and
this downplays the effects of the other differentiated fiscal policy channels.
Figures A-1 to A-2 in the Appendix compare policy simulations with different values
for σc. The ordering of policies in terms of positive spillovers varies. In our baseline
calibration, the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the CES utility function,
σc = 1. In this case, the VAT cut provides about +0.5% on home output and about
+0.8% on foreign output compared with a passive government. The spillover effects of
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a spending-based expansion and a VAT cut are comparable. However, with σc = 0.5
for instance, country 2 will benefit more from a VAT-cut than from a spending-based
expansion in country 1, with a deviation of GDP worth +3%.
Fiscal policy as an unconventional tool for monetary policy
By increasing demand, the government prevents the central banker from having to lower
the interest rate too much in the wake of the crisis (offering a 10 to 20 basis point ease
on the central banker). On the contrary, by decreasing tax levels the government – while
stimulating activity – also generates disinflation, which forces the central banker to
decrease nominal interest rates even more. This may prove a perilous exercise when
interest rates are already close to their zero lower bound. The interest cut is the largest
(−80bp) after a VAT cut and reaches its maximum four quarters after the tax cut as the
central bank reacts to year-average CPI inflation (tax included).
For the central banker, buying public assets when the national governments increase
their spending yields a larger boost to the economy with a smaller nominal cut in the
interest rate. Such an efficient non-conventional use of monetary policy could result from
cooperation between monetary and fiscal authorities but is not foreseen in the settings of
the currency area.
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Figure 3.1: Output variables following fiscal stimuli in country 1
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Figure 3.2: Consumption variables following fiscal stimuli in country 1
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Figure 3.3: Nominal variables following fiscal stimuli in country 1
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3.2.3 Robustness of the Simulations
We now check that these results do not crucially hinge on the off-the-steady-state start-
ing point of the simulations and how we specified it. We thus compare the previous
simulations (Figures 3.4 to 3.6) first with simulations of fiscal shocks starting from the
steady-state and second with a crisis induced by shocks on productivity and prefer-
ences. In this case, we generate a supply shock of −5% on productivity and a confidence
shock of −5% on β, the discount factor affecting the households’ Euler equations, shocks
have an auto-correlation factor φ = 0.75. As a consequence of these shocks, households
become more risk-averse and postpone their consumption, which lowers demand imme-
diately. Overall, fiscal shocks affect economic variables in the same direction and with
the same comparative magnitude regardless of the starting point of our simulations.
More precisely, our simulation choice is always in line with at least one of the alternative
simulation (from the steady-state or after a productivity shock) and never displays an
amplitude of reaction that is significantly greater than the other two options. In particular,
reactions of foreign variables are greater following crises simulated with shocks showing
that the magnitude of our spillover effect is not overestimated.
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after a simulated crisis
 from the steady state
after a productivity shock
Figure 3.4: An increase in public spending in country 1
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after a simulated crisis
 from the steady state
after a productivity shock
Figure 3.5: A VAT cut in country 1
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after a simulated crisis
 from the steady state
after a productivity shock
Figure 3.6: A payroll tax cut in country 1
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3.3 Fiscal Spillovers in a Monetary Union
3.3.1 Country Size and Asymmetries in the EMU
In a symmetric monetary union, a country always benefits from its partner’s fiscal
stimuli. These benefits depend on the structural parameters of the utility function of
households. In the euro area, countries differ not only in their price rigidities but also,
more importantly, in their size and their degree of trade openness. In this section, we
assess the effects of country size on fiscal shocks, cross-country spillovers and subsequent
adjustments.
Country size matters in the monetary union because the effects of monetary and fiscal
policies are different between small and large countries. On the monetary side, Romer
(1993) and Sanchez (2006) show that because of their higher openness and consequently
higher exchange-rate pass-through, small countries tend to have steeper Phillips curves
so that the inflationary effects of real depreciations are usually larger in small, open
economies. The conservative stance of the ECB regarding price stability increases in-
centives to carry out an active demand-side fiscal policy, and all the more so among
countries that are large and thus have domestically driven economies. On the fiscal side,
for instance, non-Keynesian effects tend to be observed in smaller economies because
they do not rely as much on internal demand. Consequently, it may be easier for them to
abide by the 3 % deficit limit of the Stability and Growth Pact. In other words, growth
strategies of small countries (or economic policies emphasising external competitiveness)
are accommodated by the general features of the EMU. In a recent review on the topic,
Afonso and Sousa (2009) find that country size is negatively correlated with discretion
(i.e., the unsystematic response of fiscal policy to output developments) and positively
with persistence (i.e., the degree of dependence of present fiscal policy on its past values).
Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Klaassen (2005) find that fiscal expansions abroad are propitious
to small economies of the monetary union: according to their calculations, a 1% increase
in Germany’s government expenditures resulted in a 2.3% increase in European partners’
exports to the country over a period of two years.
However, let us from the onset add nuance to our picture: the inverse relationship
between country size and openness that is the underlying tenet of our theoretical model
and economic reasoning by no means holds perfectly. For starters, on a world scale,
the three “large” members of the EMU, Germany, France and Italy, are middle-sized
economies driven both by internal demand and external competitiveness. Germany, the
largest country by – with roughly 40% of the eurozone’s GDP and 30% of its population
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– is an export champion (8.2% of world merchandise trade in 2008, according to the
WTO) and thus displays a very high openness rate (the sum of imports and exports
represented 89% of GDP in 2008, according to Eurostat). Conversely, Greece, for instance,
is a peculiarly closed economy for its size, with a 60% openness ratio. With these nuances
in mind, we select benchmark countries, namely France and the Netherlands, as they
match the average figures of large and small countries, respectively, of the EMU lumped
together and allow us to reproduce the best actual data8 while fulfilling our steady-state
restrictions9. Thus, France and the Netherlands provide a good fit calibration-wise.
To evaluate how asymmetries influence spillovers, we consider the following alterna-
tive settings for the two-country monetary union:
• symmetric countries as our benchmark configuration;
• a "France-versus-Netherlands" configuration with the fiscal shock occurring in
France (openness degrees α1 = 0.2, α2 = 0.7, θ = Ȳ
1
Ȳ2 = 3.5);
• the same configuration with the shock occurring in the Netherlands, (in this case
the Netherlands is country 1);
• the same asymmetric setting, to which we add nominal rigidities, assuming that
France is more rigid, with ξ1 = 0.83, and the Netherlands flexible, with ξ2 = 0.66.
We thus rely on the following alternative calibration:
We introduce allow for national differences in the values of parameters αi, θ and ξi.
Parameter αi denotes the import share of private consumption (and, indirectly, the
degree of openness of both economies) and is calibrated on averages of openness ratios
(exports and imports as a share of GDP) over the last decade in Germany and France (for
large countries) and Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands (for the small countries). We
thus adopt an average value of 0.45 for αi in the baseline scenario, using 0.2 for the large
country and 0.7 for the small country in the asymmetric case.
8The Netherlands displays an import share of 68% of GDP and a government consumption share of 25%
of GDP; these figures are 28% and 23%, respectively, for France. The French GDP of 2 trillion euros
represents roughly 3.5 times the Dutch GDP of 600 billion euros (Source: Eurostat, 2008). If both countries
display similar levels of government consumption, their private consumption levels differ significantly,
constituting 45% of GDP in the Netherlands and 57% in France. As we do not include investment in this
model, we cannot account for these differences.
9Indeed, as explained in the section on calibration, we have to respect the feasibility relationship between
the relative sizes of countries, their relative import shares (or openness) and government/private
consumption shares. Bearing this in mind, we cannot plug in data for any pair of countries, as larger
countries in terms of GDP, for instance, would have to be more closed than smaller ones by a factor
roughly equal to their relative size.
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Parameter Description Value Alternative value
α Production technology parameter 0.7 -
β Discount factor 0.99 -
h1c , h1c Habit formation on consumption 0.7 -
h1g, h2g Habit formation on public expenditure 0.7 -
h1l , h
2
l Habit formation on labour 0.7 -
σ1c , σ2c Inverse of intertemporal elasticity 1 2, 0.5
of substitution of private consumption
σ1l , σ
2
l Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 2 -
σ1g , σ2g Inverse of intertemporal elasticity 1 -
of substitution of public expenditure
κ Weight of labour in utility see Model -
α1, α2 Import share 0.45 0.2, 0.7
ξ1, ξ2 Calvo parameter on prices and wages adjustment 0.75 0.83/0.66
γ1, γ2 Price and wage indexation on past inflation 0.2
θ1, θ2 Elast. of sub. of domestic products and labour 6 -
yielding a markup of 20% on prices and wages





2 Financial premium on government debt 0.05 -
ν̄c,1, ν̄c,2 Tax level on consumption 20% -
ν̄w,1, ν̄w,2 Tax level on wages 19% -
rπ Central Bank reaction to inflation 1.7 -
ρ Taylor rule smoothing parameter 0.8 -
ry Central Bank reaction to output gap 0.25 -
θ Economic size ratio Ȳ1/Ȳ2 1 3.5
C̄1/Ȳ1 = cy1, Relative shares of private consumption in GDP 0.7 -
C̄2/Ȳ2 = cy2 0.7 -
Ḡ1/Ȳ1 = gy1, Relative shares of government spending in GDP 1− cy1 -
Ḡ2/Ȳ2 = gy2 1− cy2 -
Table 3.1: Parameters calibration with alternative values
The economic size ratio is captured by θ. In the baseline scenario, countries are suppos-
edly symmetric, so θ = 1. In the asymmetric case, θ = 3.5, so the large country (country 1)
is 3.5 times bigger than the small one (country 2), which roughly reflects the size ratio in
terms of GDP between France and the Netherlands.
Price rigidities are captured by ξi, the Calvo parameter. This is linked to the average
duration of contracts through E(duration) = 1/(1− ξi). In line with the values commonly
found in the literature (which assign contract durations from nine months to a year and
a half), we choose ξi = 0.75. This value yields a price contract duration of one year. We
allow for heterogeneity across price rigidities and use an alternative duration of 1.5 years
for a more rigid country and nine months (ξ1=0.83) for a more flexible country (ξ2=0.66)
as suggested by Benigno (2001).
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3.3.2 Passive Government and Spillovers
When the government abstains from fiscal actions in the wake of the crisis (see passive
government curve in Figures 3.7 to 3.9), the recovery path of each country’s output will
not depend on the relative sizes of the countries but on their prices and wage rigidity.
Logically, the less flexible the country is, the longer it will take to recover from the crisis.
There is obviously no policy-induced cross-border spillover.
3.3.3 Spillovers from an Increase in Government Spending
In the case of a fiscal expansion (Figures 3.7 to 3.9), policy effects are real as public con-
sumption affect quantities. Fiscal spillovers in terms of output are larger when countries
differ in terms of size and openness degree. As expected, adding a size bias increases
the fiscal externalities exerted by the large country on the smaller one’s output and has a
much larger effect on spillovers than differences in price rigidities do. Indeed, the more
open the small country is, the more its exports are impacted by the crowding-out effect
of country 1’s fiscal expansion.
As for price and wage flexibility, the more flexible country may in principle have an
advantage over the rigid one, yet wages are also flexible upwards, hindering firms from
competing in prices because wages increase more rapidly in country 2. Therefore, the
level of nominal rigidities does not change the magnitude of the spillovers.
The central bank lowers the interest rate less sharply when fiscal expansion takes place
in the large and rigid country because it is assigned more weight in its reaction function.
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Figure 3.7: Effects and spillovers of an increase in public spending – 1 of 3
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Figure 3.8: Effects and spillovers of an increase in public spending – 2 of 3
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Figure 3.9: Effects and spillovers of an increase in public spending – 3 of 3
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3.3.4 Tax-Cut Induced Spillovers
Tax cuts are passed on to the economic variables of our model through nominal channels.
The VAT cut has a direct deflationary effect, prompting an accommodating reaction of
the central bank (decrease in the interest rate), which translates into a lower real interest
rate in country 2, where this spurs economic activity (labour, output). The cross-border
spillovers for output of a VAT cut (see Figures 3.10 to 3.12) are stronger when the cut is
implemented in the larger country because the deflationary effect is stronger (nearly a
1-point higher deviation of output 2 from the steady-state level). The size effect is indeed
at play. Additionally, should the small country be more flexible, it is apt to become cost-
competitive than the large economy and benefit even more from the spillover. Moreover,
if the small country is flexible, the trade-off between savings and consumption for its
government is tempered by the steeper deflation path. In the short run (about two years),
public consumption deviates positively from the steady state, whereas the deviation is
negative otherwise (the real interest rate channel).
The cross-border effects of a cut in the payroll tax (see Figures A-3 to A-5 in the
Appendix) are similar to those of a VAT cut. The effect on prices is weaker as there is no
direct nominal pass-through, and the reaction of the central bank is thus more muted.
Spillover effects are again larger when the cut is made in the large country because the
small country exports a larger share of its production. Should the large country be less
flexible, it generates half as much disinflation and puts less pressure on the central banker,
which is less beneficial to the smaller country.
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Figure 3.10: Effects and spillovers of a VAT cut – 1 of 3
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Figure 3.11: Effects and spillovers of a VAT cut – 2 of 3
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Figure 3.12: Effects and spillovers of a VAT cut – 3 of 3
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3.4 Internal Devaluation in a Monetary Union
Calmfors (1998) argued that countries competing in a monetary union should engage in
internal devaluation policies so as to regain lost competitiveness without jeopardising
the stability of the currency area. The issue regained momentum with the 2009-11 Greek
and Irish crises and the turmoil that ensued in peripheral eurozone countries faced
with higher bond spreads over Germany. Without the ability to devaluate and thereby
inflate away public debt, real depreciation can be achieved in a monetary union through
a combination of higher taxes on consumption (to make imports more costly), lower
payroll taxes and wage moderation (to decrease labour costs). Calmfors (1998) described
it as a policy aimed at decreasing labour costs in real terms. To this aim, fiscal policy
(also encompassing tax policy) should take up the function of “switching expenditures
between foreign and domestic output, just as an exchange-rate change does”. By this
token, a cut in the employers’ payroll tax would decrease labour costs, and thus, af-
fect exports, output and employment like a currency devaluation would. The loss in
government income (from the tax cut) can be recovered by an increase in other taxes,
such as the VAT. To a certain extent, Germany followed this strategy in the 2000s and
made great gains in terms of labour unit-costs compared to its neighbours10. Embattled
peripheral economies of the eurozone have been emulating this strategy to regain export
competitiveness. For instance, Greece and Portugal have increased their VAT rate in 2009-
2010, frozen increases in civil servants’ paychecks and encouraged wage moderation in
export-oriented industries. The “Euro Plus” or “Competitiveness Pact” for the eurozone
tentatively launched by Germany and France in 2011 also advocated wage moderation.
3.4.1 Internal Devaluation in a Symmetric Union
The main problem with such an economic policy (consisting of wage moderation coupled
with fiscal austerity) is that it shifts national economies away from domestic demand,
a recurrent problem in Germany in the 2000s, for instance. However, if all eurozone
members, which trade intensively with one another, followed suit, this could trigger
a cross-country drop in aggregate demand i.e. a beggar-thy-neighbour situation. One
could therefore argue that internal devaluation is a supply-side response to a crisis that
could be detrimental to demand in the eurozone because Member States trade primarily
within the monetary union. It is thus relevant to evaluate whether the benefits of such an
10According to European Commission estimates, unit-labour costs in Germany fell to 15% below the
eurozone average between 1999 and 2009.
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economic strategy outweigh its costs and actually provide a viable way out of a crisis.
In Figures 3.13 to 3.15, we compare the effects of a simultaneous hike of the VAT rate of
about 5 percentage points and a drop of the payroll tax of 4 percentage points in country 1
after a global crisis (as previously, GDP in both countries falls by 5%). Both measures
are worth 3% of GDP and thus cancel out in the government budget. We compare this
internal devaluation policy to the four fiscal policy alternatives presented previously.
By resorting to internal devaluation, country 1 succeeds in boosting its output and
consumption by 0.3% more than with simple tax cuts, but less than with public spending.
The effect on domestic public finance is mild because the cut in the labour tax is financed
through the VAT increase, and public assets go up. The government is able to engage
in fiscal consolidation because, on one hand, the tax intake is fostered by the VAT
increase, and on the other hand, the cut in the payroll tax makes firms in country 1
more competitive (the real wage remains below its steady-state level), so they hire and
produce more and, consequently, end up contributing more to the tax intake. From this
perspective, internal devaluation seems an appropriate option to stimulate demand
while abiding by the SGP deficit limit. The positive spillover it generates on the output
of country 2 is in line with those of traditional fiscal measures (+0.3% in comparison
with the passive government scenario). However, on inspection of the cross-country
spillovers, internal devaluation appears detrimental to the public finances of the foreign
country: the government of the foreign country has to face an adverse competitiveness
shock which translates into a higher public debt level than the one induced by the other
policies (+0.5% of induced debt than for other measures on average). As foreign labour
and consumption decrease, the foreign government must make up for lost tax intakes
and keep its debt level in check by lowering public expenditure. The terms of trade are
this time in favour of country 2 and mitigate the negative spillovers through increased
exports. Indeed, holding the costs of fiscal measures constant, relative prices are more
sensitive to VAT than to payroll tax fluctuations. Internal devaluation prompts a rise in
the nominal interest rate as an initial reaction to the inflationary increase in VAT. As a
consequence consumption is adversely affected in both countries (though not more than
in the case of other policies), and governments consolidate their public finances, which
triggers the later interest-rate cut by the central bank.
The difference between the traditional fiscal stimuli we analysed in the previous
sections and internal devaluation in terms of spillovers is not clear-cut in a symmetric
monetary union. From a demand-side perspective, this strategy does not outperform
fiscal expansion. However, in this case, the dynamics and repartition of public and private
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assets are different. The government of the foreign country bears a larger cost associated
with its neighbour’s policy with plummetting public assets.
Let us now see how the repartition and scope of spillovers differ in an asymmetric
monetary union.
























































































































Figure 3.13: Internal devaluation in country 1 – 1 of 3
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Figure 3.14: Internal devaluation in country 1 – 2 of 3
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Figure 3.15: Internal devaluation in country 1 – 3 of 3
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3.4.2 A Stay-In Strategy for Small Countries?
We now investigate which type of country should undertake internal devaluation, and
consider whether it is an appropriate stay-in strategy for small ailing peripheral countries
to gain back competitiveness and alleviate sovereign financing concerns. In Figure 3.16,
we compare the effect of internal devaluation on output variables when it is undertaken
by a small open economy (upper graphs) or by a large closed one (lower graphs). In
an asymmetric monetary union (we apply the same size and openness degree as in the
previous sections), internal devaluation proves an efficient policy measure for a small
open economy. The benefits in terms of output are only second to those of the public
spending option, while the costs are lower. Also it exerts slightly larger positive spillovers
on the foreign country as the VAT increase shifts consumption from home production
towards imports.
Conversely for a larger and more closed country, the benefits associated with internal
devaluation in terms of output and consumption are smaller than a those of a public
spending increase or VAT cut. In this respect, internal devaluation is less attractive than
in a symmetric monetary union setting. By the sheer country-size effect, the spillovers on
foreign output and consumption are barely larger than in the case of a passive govern-
ment. Looking at the evolution of total union output gives a clear ranking: government
spending yields the largest boost to output when countries are symmetric or when the
larger one implements the fiscal measure. Internal devaluation is best for the union as a
whole, when the onus is on the small country to take action. Internal devaluation is a
supply-side policy with externalities on public debt. It thus seems a reasonable stay-in
policy for regaining competitiveness and avoid the deterioration of public finance figures
provided the country implementing it is relatively a small and open.
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Figure 3.16: Internal devaluation undertaken by a small (above) vs. large (below) country
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Conclusion
What type of fiscal policies cushion best a monetary union economy hit by a crisis? What
are the spillovers of these policies, and to what extent do they depend on asymmetries
between Member States? After a loss in competitiveness, what are the alternatives to
a currency devaluation? To answer these questions, we developed a micro-founded
dynamic model of a two-country monetary union with public debt to include the main
features of the EMU. We relied on deterministic simulations to further the understanding
of the workings of heterogeneous monetary unions, fiscal externalities and their implica-
tions for national economic policies. Country size is an important aspect of the analysis:
because large economies rely more on domestic demand than small and open ones do,
they react differently to fiscal stimuli.
Comparing fiscal policies, in the wake of a crisis, an increase in government spending
better remedies the drop in consumption and output than VAT or payroll tax cuts do. We
find that, starting from a recession scenario, fiscal policy can be counter-cyclical, with
non-negligible multipliers even with forward-looking agents. These results are robust
to alternative parameterisation and modelling of government spending behaviour. The
cross-border effect of fiscal expansion is always positive. Spillovers can be considerable
(up to +1% deviation from steady state for foreign output), especially when countries
differ in terms of size and openness and expansion is undertaken in the large country.
Conversely, asymmetries in nominal rigidities have a weaker impact on the size of fiscal
spillovers. However there is a strategic asymmetry between the country undertaking
the policy and its neighbour: the home country benefits more from an increase in public
spending in terms of output and consumption, while its partner benefits from larger
positive spillover effects in the case of tax cuts.
We have looked into the effects of internal devaluation policies, combining an increase
in the VAT with a decrease in the payroll tax to sharpen the price-competitiveness
of production. The boost to domestic consumption is lower than with an increase in
government spending but larger than in the case of a tax cut. This supply-side policy
proves conducive to public finance consolidation in the home country. However, public
finances of the foreign country are more negatively affected by this policy than by other
fiscal measures. Implementing internal devaluation may thus be worth considering when
small, open countries face supply-side problems coupled with high public debt. The
unfolding of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis makes further research in this area all the
more relevant.
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What are the relationships between country size, growth and business cycle volatil-
ity? To investigate this question, previously asked by Rose (2006) and Furceri and
Karras (2007), we developed an original country-size index with principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA). Traditional analysis of this topic usually equates country size
with population. Our methodology enables us to simultaneously consider several
factors determining constitutive of country size: population, GDP and arable land.
The inclusion of these additional variables allows us to analyse different components
of country size and to control for more than a merely demographic effect. Using a
panel data set of 163 countries for 1960–2007, we find, contrary to Rose (2006), that
country size has a significant and negative correlation with economic performance.
Our results for output volatility extend the negative and significant relationship
found by Furceri and Karras (2007). In addition, we present differentiated results
for small and large countries, OECD members, eurozone countries and the so-called
BRIC countries. These results are robust for different country and time samples and
several control sets.
Introduction
Does the size of a country influence the pace and volatility of its growth? The existence
of a so-called “scale effect” on economic growth is a recurring question in economics.
The answer to the first part of this question seems to depend on the economic context
and phenomena of the time. The impressive development of small East Asian economies
in the 1970s and 1980s was hailed by the motto “small is beautiful” and fuelled a new
branch of literature documenting these economic miracles. The latest fad in the field of
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economic growth describes the success of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China),
i.e., a new type of rapidly growing juggernauts in the world economy. Different aspects
of a country’s size may impact positively or negatively on its growth as shows the work
of Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005) on the costs and benefits of size. The first
question addressed by this research is whether some endowments and characteristics
linked to size outweigh the others. For instance, a large land area is prone to provide
more natural resources but may also prove difficult and costly to manage for public
services and transportation means. Likewise, a large population provides labour force
and a wide domestic market with scale economies but may incur larger administrative
costs if it is heterogeneous. A high GDP may be associated with slower growth rates
as income and development levels are already high, but also with better infrastructure,
greater human capital and so a higher growth potential. In this paper, our aim is to test
whether we can indeed point out a relationship between size and GDP growth rates at
the cross-country level.
The relationship between country size and volatility is more clear-cut. Intuitively, small
and very open economies should be more sensitive to abrupt business cycle fluctuations,
incurred for instance, by changes in terms of trade or in capital flows. These countries
cannot rely on a large domestic market to even out economic turbulences. Thus, our
second research question is whether, we can confirm empirically that GDP growth
volatility and the size of a country are negatively related.
Let us first define “country size”. One way of understanding the size of a country that
is often used in economics is to consider that, in the world economy, small countries are
price takers, whereas large ones are price makers. As Salvatore (2001) notes, however, this
definition does not always hold; some small countries may be price makers if there is a
limited number of suppliers. Ivory Coast and Ghana, for example, affect the price of cocoa.
In addition, country size includes several dimensions: political, economic, geographic
and demographic. The political dimension of country size, including the weight and
power of countries in international institutions is obviously important, but difficult
to quantify. GDP is easily quantifiable and makes rankings based on economic size
straightforward, but in regressions analysing growth determinants, it causes endogeneity
problems. The geographic dimension of country size bears the least clear-cut relationship
to the other variables, as a large population may densely occupy a small territory and
vice versa. Such cases include the Netherlands on one side and Russia or Australia on the
other. Population provides the easiest proxy for country size and has been widely used
as such. Several authors, including (Kuznets (1960), Demas (1965), Salvatore (2001) and
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Lloyd and Sundrum (1982) ), use arbitrary demographic limits to differentiate between
small and large countries.
Relying also on population as a proxy for size, Rose (2006), searching for this “scale
effect”, finds no relationship between country size and growth. He only confirms the
higher degree of openness of small countries, which had also been documented by Rodrik
(1998) and Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005). The multiplication of the number
of independent countries from 51 in 1945 to 195 today in 2010, notwithstanding the
political reasons behind state creation, suggests that small countries may be more viable
in a globalised world economy with liberalised international trade. Trade-openness is
certainly one of the links between country size and business cycle volatility. Furceri and
Karras (2007) document a clear inverse relationship between country size and volatility
and Furceri and Karras (2008b) show it holds, focusing only on the OECD countries.
Our contribution to the literature is to develop an original measure of country size:
a multidimensional index of size generated using principal component analysis (PCA)
that includes population, GDP and arable land. This indicator enables us to avoid the
shortcomings of either a purely demographic measure or one based on GDP rankings.
This PCA Size index captures the underlying patterns between three important com-
ponents of country size: population, GDP and arable land. The interactions of each of
these variables on growth are presumably complex and not exclusively related to size.
Instead of including them individually in our regressions,our PCA index serves as a
proxy for country size. By construction, it captures the common variation of the three
size components and so increases the likelihood that we focus on the size factor and do
not pick up “parasite” effects. We may thus provide a richer analysis of the relationships
between country size and economic performance and business cycle volatility. To make
our work more easily comparable with previous studies, we also conduct our analysis
using population as a proxy for country size. We also use this as a robustness test for our
results.
We then proceed to the empirical investigation of the relationship between country
size and short-term growth and its volatility for 163 countries over 1960–2007. We
rely on a multivariate panel regression analysis to assess the direct and indirect effects
of country size on economic performance. Indirect effects can be caused by volatility.
In our analysis, we also isolate the scale or country-size effect from those of several
economic variables, especially that of trade openness. Our empirical findings suggest that
over 1960–2007, for the whole panel, there is a negative relationship between economic
performance and size (contradicting Rose (2006)). This relationship is more marked for
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certain groups (small countries, OECD and BRICs) and opposite for eurozone countries
underlying the specificities of the European integration. We then show that there is a
negative relationship between country size and business cycle volatility independent of
trade openness, extending Furceri and Karras’s results, especially for small countries. A
complementary finding of our analysis is that trade is a strong positive determinant of
GDP growth but not of its volatility. Our results are robust to the inclusion of several
control sets, country size specifications and detrending methods.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We sum up relevant theoretical con-
siderations in Section 2. Section 3 presents our empirical methodology, the construction
of our country-size index, volatility measures and estimation strategy. In Sections 4 and
5, we interpret our results with regard to existing theories for the relationship between
country size on growth and growth volatility , respectively, before concluding.
4.1 Theoretical Considerations
What may account for the non-neutrality of country size with respect to GDP growth
and cyclical volatility? Country size encompasses a number of dimensions and so, as
shown by Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005), costs and benefits associated with
it are diverse. As, we mentioned, a large area may provide more natural resources but
also incur larger transportation and management costs. A large population may swell
the ranks of human capital but also the food and administration needs for instance ,
explaining fertility control policies in developing economies. A large GDP hints at the
fact that a country may be close to its steady-state and will thus witness a slower pace
of growth, or the other way around, that it possesses a capital or technology-intensive
industrial base capable to generate endogenous growth.
In a closed-economy neoclassical growth framework, like that used by Solow (1956),
country size – usuallly captured by population or endowment size – has indeed no effect
on growth. Supposing increasing returns to scale, however, Rodrik (1998) showed that
because of scale effects and the larger resources at their disposal, large countries are
more efficient in the provision of public goods. Milner and Weyman-Jones (2003) also
empirically documented that smallness was a hurdle for efficient economic development
in developing countries over the 1980–1989 period. In an endogenous growth model,
like that described by Aghion and Howitt (1998)), a larger country size means a large
endowment and scale effects drive economic growth. The argument is straightforward;
the larger the country, the larger its workforce and resources – especially in terms of
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human capital and R&D – to be engaged in industries with increasing returns to scale.
This also implies a larger domestic market to sustain growth and that the aggregate
catch-up will be quicker. Conversely, Kuznets (1960) and Lloyd and Sundrum (1982)
underlined that the concentration of output in a few industries and commodities, and
the limited scope of national industries and agricultural markets, weakened growth in
small economies. Regarding the ability to borrow in its own currency on international
markets, Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003) noted that very large countries
may be the only emerging economies able to escape from the “original sin”. The high
growth rates displayed by China and other BRICs in the 2000s empirically suggest the
existence of a “scale effect” for growth in a liberalised economic context.
Another theoretical question of relevance for our analysis is whether small economies
tend to benefit more from trade. In an open-economy framework, Mill’s (1844) reciprocal
demand theory already hinted at the larger gains made by small countries in international
trade. These gains are proportional both to the unsatisfied internal demand in autarky
and to the external demand addressed to them. Katzenstein (1985) and Schiff (1996)
confirmed that “small nations obtain greater gains per unit of international trade than
do large nations”(Lloyd (1968)) and also highlighted that small countries reap greater
benefits from preferential trade agreements and greater integration of international
markets. The multiplication of the number of independent countries from 51 in 1945 to
195 today in 2010, notwithstanding the political reasons behind state creation, suggests
that small countries may be more viable in a globalised world economy with liberalised
international trade. Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005), show that in this context
benefit more, in relative terms, from openness to trade than do large countries. Following
Verdoorn’s law export-led growth increases the productivity of the tradable sector and so
its international competitiveness, fuelling smaller more open economies’ GDP growth.
Beyond trade openness the relative internal efficiency of small and large countries
may also account for the discrepancies observed in their growth rates. Robinson (1960)
conducted a detailed analysis of the “economic consequences of the size of nations” and
suggested that the adaptive capacities of small economies and their higher degree of
homogeneity can help overcome the narrowness of their domestic markets. This may
also be grounded in the more physical dimensions of a countries economic structures.
Countries are a collection of regions with different growth rates, one could argue that
because of diseconomies of scale in managing larger territories and more numerous
administrative entities, larger countries will have a higher proportion of slower-growing
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regions than smaller countries, hence their lower average national growth rates. In the
subsequent chapter this territorial efficiency aspect is the object of further analysis.
Regarding country size and volatility, the intuition that large countries will have
more inertia in their growth rate and smaller ones, sharp fluctuations is theoretically
substantiated. Imbs (2007) builds a theoretical model to explain the inverse relationship
between country size and output volatility: the larger number of sectors present in the
economies of large countries accounts for the lower volatility of output. Considering a
large panel of countries, Easterly and Kraay (1999) found that the greater openness of
smaller states induced both higher growth and higher volatility. The higher sensitivity to
external shocks and greater volatility of small countries is a consequence of their more
specialised economies. Indeed, large domestic markets mean that the covariance between
world and domestic growth is higher, whereas small, specialised economies are more
likely to face both idiosyncratic and common shocks. Using a real business cycle (RBC)
model and Monte Carlo simulations, Crucini (1997) found that even after controlling
for market structures and development levels (in terms of investment, savings, trade,
and consumption), small economies experience higher output volatility than large ones.
This phenomenon may also be linked to the relationship between openness and inflation;
Romer (1993) found evidence for a higher trade-off between output and inflation in small
and more open countries, as the real depreciation effect hinders monetary stabilisation.
Furthering the argument made by Katzenstein (1985) that small states in world markets
aim to achieve “domestic compensation”. Furceri and Poplawski (2008) highlight an
inverse relationship between country size and the volatility of government consumption.
They suggest that this is a consequence of higher exposure to external shocks. Similarly,
Rodrik (1998) argues that governments play an income-stabilising role in the face of
global uncertainties. This “exposure mitigation” mechanism explains why more open
economies tend to have larger governments. Finally, it may be asked whether volatility
hurts growth in the long run; Aghion and Banerjee (2005) and Ramey and Ramey (1995)
contend that it does.
The economic rationalisation of an absolute size effect on either real GDP growth
or growth volatility is therefore a priori not clear-cut and remains an open empirical
question.




Our data set includes the 163 countries for which the relevant annual data series, i.e., GDP,
population and arable land, were available1 for the 1960–2007 period.2 Our computation
of output volatility measures required a complete data set over the 1960–2007 time
span, hence the exclusion of countries with interrupted GDP series (Fiji, Kuwait, Libya,
Myanmar and Somalia). We interpret our results bearing in mind this possible “survivor
bias”; however, the list of countries in our panel is comparable to those of our main
references Rose (2006) and Furceri and Karras (2007).3 We rely on annual data and decade
averages of volatility indicators.
Turning to the data, our explained variable is either the GDP growth rate (%) or a
measure of output volatility computed using GDP levels ($ 2000 constant).4 Explanatory
variables include three possible measures of country size, detailed below, among which
population (millions) is measured in logarithm to test for a proportional (and not lin-
ear) correlation. Standard economic variables are included as controls: trade openness,
measured by the ratio of the sum of the values of exports and imports divided by GDP;
inflation (%).( Descriptive statistics of our dataset are in Table B-3 in the Appendix.)
4.2.2 An Original Index of Country Size
Our contribution lies in the country size index we developed using PCA. In their anal-
ysis of the interaction between country size, trade and growth, Alesina, Spolaore, and
Wacziarg (2005) take alternatively population and GDP as a proxy for country size in
1Our data source is the World Bank. Our panel included 177 countries , but the data on the GDP, population
and arable land to compute our PCA size index and Jalan’s size index were only available for 163
countries (listed in Table B-1 in the Appendix). We included the additional 14 countries in the regressions
with population as a proxy for country size to test for the robustness of our results across size indicators.
2For the sake of precision, there are 195 sovereign states in the world, 192 of which are United Nations
members. The 2009 CIA World Factbook lists 245 entities, including 195 “politically organized into a
sovereign state with a definite territory” and 54 dependencies and areas of special sovereignty affiliated
with another country.
3Rose (2006) lists 208 “countries” but refers to them as “populations” because of the inclusion of a number
of micro states and islands. The data set used by Furceri and Karras (2007) include 167 countries.
4Our focus is to explain the effect of size on the pace of growth of countries not on their wealth or on
the income level of its inhabitants. Thus, taking GDP per capita by normalising GDP with respect to
demographic size would make our analysis meaningless. GDP per capita as a dependent variable would
endogenise country size and lead to spurious econometric results, as both sides of our equation would
include the effect of size. By the same token, GDP per capita is a proxy for the wealth of a country, not its
size and so does not qualify an appropriate component for our PCA size index.
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their regressions. However, we want to pinpoint a more global “size effect”, not just a
population of GDP effect. The PCA Size index captures the underlying patterns between
three important components of country size: population, GDP and arable land. It is
therefore a more complete indicator of country size and so avoids the shortcomings of
either a purely demographic measure or one based on GDP rankings. The interactions of
each of these variables on growth are presumably complex and not exclusively related to
size. Instead of including them individually in our regressions,our PCA index serves as a
proxy for country size. By construction, it captures the common variation of the three
size components and so increases the likelihood that we focus on the size factor and do
not pick up “parasite” effects. This size index is therefore better suited to assess properly
the unique and overall effect of size on GDP growth and its volatility. For the purpose
of comparability with other studies and robustness, we test the log of population as a
proxy for country size in our estimation procedure. We also use the country size index
developed by Jalan (1982). We run our analysis using his measure because to substantiate
the claim that country size encompasses more than just demographic dimensions. Jalan’s
index is a weighted average of demographic (population), territorial (arable land) and
economic (GDP) sizes. Each component is measured against the largest value of the
sample in a given year. Indeed, country size should be understood in relative terms as
countries are categorised as small or large only in comparison with others. Jalan’s size














This index, therefore, takes values in [0; 100]. Assessing country size this way is sometimes
problematic, as Jalan’s size index allows for linear compensation across size dimensions;
for instance, a country with a very large territory but small population and economy
may qualify as large, even when it would intuitively never be described as such.
We overcome the linearity problem by relying on our own country size index. We use
PCA to account for the demographic, economic and geographical dimensions of country
size. PCA can be interpreted as a fixed effects factor analysis, as it enables us to identify
patterns in the data and emphasise their common trends. We take the three country-
size variables in log because we assume they are linked proportionally (not linearly)
and that they are not originally expressed in commensurable units. Whereas PCA, as
a linear transformation of the data, does not require the compliance of the data with a
given statistical model, the high correlation of our variables as shown in Table 4.1 makes
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resorting to PCA sensible.5 PCA performs an eigen decomposition of the correlation
Table 4.1: Correlation table of our three variables of interest for the size
Variable Population, log GDP, log Arable land, log
Population, log 1
GDP, log 0.77 1
Arable land, log 0.81 0.54 1
matrix. We chose to retain only the first component, the only one that has an eigenvalue
over one. This unit-length linear combination of the variables contains maximal variance,
i.e., 83% of the common variance, as detailed in Table 4.2, minimising information loss.
Thus, the PCA Size index we compute allows us to operate a practical data reduction
of three variables into one. The index is generated for each country in a given year,
has a mean of zero, and is expressed in terms of the contributions of population, GDP,
and arable land to country size. This also makes subsequent interpretation simpler; our
PCA Size index captures the internal structure linking the three variables. If one of the
variables departs from the overall pattern linking it to the other two, it will be assigned
a lower weight. The loadings (see the component column in Table 4.2) that relate the
observed data to the components in the eigenvectors are roughly equal so that the three
components of our PCA index have a similar role in capturing country size. Data to carry
out such a construction was available for 163 countries.
Table 4.2: Detailing our principal component analysis
Principal Component Analysis
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 2.493 2.100 0.831 0.831
Comp2 0.393 0.279 0.131 0.962
Comp3 0.114 0.000 0.038 1.000





Number of obs 163 Number of comp. 1 Trace = 3
Rotation:(unrotated = principal) ρ = 0.831
We consider a country to be large if its PCA Size index scores in the top 10 %, the others
are considered small. For simplicity, we do not include a medium-sized category. In this
5 Additionally, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures of sampling adequacy of 0.72 for the GDP
component, 0.59 for population, 0.66 for arable land and 0.64 overall make our PCA size index statistically
acceptable given the degree of commonality found in the data.
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study, a country was considered large if the PCASizeIndex > 1.9853 (corresponding
to the 90% percentile of the sample), and small if the PCASizeIndex ≤ 1.9853. To get a
better sense of what PCA scores capture, we summed up the qualifying thresholds for
large countries according to population, GDP and arable land in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Thresholds for large countries
Index PCA 1.9853 Quantile 90%
Equivalent to Population 49.22 millions
GDP 315.96 billion $
Arable Land 576.94 th. km2
In our sample, 17 countries qualify as large and are listed in Table B-2 in the Appendix.
An increase of one PCA unit corresponds, on average, either to an area wider of 244,000
km2 (equivalent to the UK’s area), a GDP greater of $151 billion (equivalent to Finland’s
GDP) or a population that has 31 million people (equivalent to Morocco’s population)
more.
4.2.3 Measuring Volatility
Following Furceri and Karras (2007), we compute the cyclical component of the business
cycle volatility from the log of real GDP ($ 2000 constant, so as to neutralise inflation and
exchange rate fluctuations) using the following techniques:
• (i) simple standard deviation (SD) of the GDP growth rate (decade averages), which
yields the most volatile series;
• (ii) standard deviation of the cyclical component of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter
(highpass filter) applied to GDP in levels with a smoothing parameter set at 6.25
(as argued by Ravn and Uhlig (2002)) for annual data;
• (iii) standard deviation of the cyclical component of the Baxter-King (BP) filter
(lowpass filter), which approximates a moving average of infinite order and drops
data at both ends of the series with cut-offs at 2 and 8. The lead-lag length of the
filter is set to 3.
4.2.4 Estimation Strategy
To estimate our model (see equation 4.1), we first checked for common statistical issues
of panel data econometrics. Hausman tests run over the whole sample, and on different
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country groupings (small, large, OECD, eurozone), indicated that the individual effects
and our explanatory variables were systematically related, so that the fixed effects (FE,
also called within) estimator was the most appropriate choice. As noted by Durlauf, John-
son, and Temple (2005), the FE estimator, which allows for varying intercept terms across
countries, deals efficiently with unobserved heterogeneity, as time-invariant omitted
variables do not bias the regression results.6 This proves especially important when we
use hard-to-measure or -quantify variables, such as political situation and institutions.
An FE estimator has the advantage of controlling for different national effects of stable
unobserved variables. The appropriateness of our FE estimation was also confirmed
by an F-test for the significance of fixed effects. Running a Wald test for group-wise
heteroscedasticity confirmed its presence in both data sets. Likewise, the Wooldridge test
for autocorrelation in panel data indicated a first order correlation. In addition, following
Drazen (2000), country size was assumed not to be an important source of endogeneity
and so the IV estimator was not used.7
Heeding the results of these tests, we selected the FE estimator because it addresses
all the statistical issues of our sample, including links between individual effects and
regressors, heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. We employed robust standard er-
rors clustered at the country level because clustering at the panel data level produces
consistent estimates of standard errors even in the presence of autocorrelation.
We estimate bivariate and multivariate models with a set of economic controls. Controls
or Zit are economic variables that are important in distinguishing country-size effects
from other economic effects, including trade openness (as suggested by Rodrik (1998)
and Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005)), the real interest rates and the inflation
rates. Indeed, we want to isolate possible trade and price competitiveness effects from a
country-size effect on growth and volatility. Furthermore, a theoretical justification for





(it − Etπt+1) + Etxt+1 + gt,
where xt is the output gap, σ is the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of private consumption, it is the nominal interest rate, Etπt+1 is the expexted inflation
and gt is a demand shock. We therefore try to isolate those effects of expected inflation
6Indeed, the within-estimator eliminates panel heterogeneity by demeaning variables and performing OLS
on the generated data. This linear FE estimator is consistent, even when controls are correlated with the
fixed effects.
7The Dickey-Fuller test indicated the absence of panel unit root, so that co-integration was not necessary.
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(proxied by inflation in our regression) and the interest rate on GDP growth from those
from country size.
In summary, we estimate the following regression model:
Yit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2Zit + β3Ui + εit (4.1)
where
• Yit stands for either GDP growth or a measure of output volatility (according
to whether we are testing the relationship between country size and economic
performance or volatility);
• SIZEit is a measure of country size (either our PCA size index, Jalan’s index or
population)
• Zit is a set of economic variables (trade openness, real interest rate, inflation; all are
expressed as percentages);
• Ui is the fixed- or country-effects term;
• and εit is the error term.
For each of our three estimations with the three size measures used, we run:
• a bivariate regression;
• a regression adding variable set Zi;
for a total of six regressions for our FE estimations. The correlation structure of the
variables is displayed in Table 4.4. The strong negative correlation between country size
indicators, especially population and PCA size index, and trade openness confirms our
intuition that small countries are more open than large ones.
4.3 Country Size and Growth
4.3.1 Preliminary Analysis
Before we detail our statistical results, we would like to illustrate an intuition for the
relationship between country size (as measured by our PCA size index) and GDP growth
for different groups with the scatter plots in Figure 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. When all countries
of our data set are taken together (Figure 4.1), the flatness of the regression line indicates
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Table 4.4: Correlation structure of variables
Variable GDP growth PCA Jalan’s Population Trade Real interest Inflation
size index size index openess rate
GDP growth 1
PCA size index -0.04 1
Jalan’s size index 0.02 0.56 1
Population, Log -0.01 0.95 0.51 1
Trade openness 0.13 -0.56 -0.33 -0.55 1
Real interest rate, % 0.1 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 1
Inflation, % -0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.3 1
no clear relationship between country size and GDP growth as in Rose (2006). This
somewhat blunt result of sample averages is to be qualified when we consider different
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Figure 4.2: Country size and GDP growth in
high income countries
(Figure 4.4), the bivariate plots show a negative correlation between how large a country
is and by how much it grows. Conversely, for low-income countries (Figure 4.3) do not
display a marked positive or negative correlation, so the level of economic development
might be a driver of this inverse relationship.
4.3.2 Estimation Results
Table 4.5 displays the results of our FE regressions. Keeping in mind that our estimator
controls for all stable national characteristics, both the PCA size index and population
have negative and significant coefficients for all countries of the sample over the 1960–
2007 period. As the PCA size index captures changes in population, GDP and arable
land, these components are negatively correlated with the pace of growth. As a reminder,
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each additional unit in the PCA corresponds on average to either an area increase of
244,000 km2, an increase in GDP of $151 billion or a population increase of 31 million.
Because the coefficients measure semi-elasticities, we can compute precise quantitative
correlations using the values of the standard deviations (see Table B-3 in the Appendix).
For instance, a one-standard-deviation increase in population lowers the growth rate on
impact by 2.68 change in the GDP growth over the whole period. The coefficient on Jalan’s
size index is comparatively small and not significant, confirming that the relationship
between country size and growth is proportional and not linear. Following the values
of the t-statistics, our results are more precise when economic controls are included in
the regression, confirming their relevance in our analysis of a size effect on growth. The
negative conditional correlation between growth and country size is indeed robust to the
inclusion of economic variables. This means that we can identify a country-size effect on
growth independent of the fact that small countries are, on average, more open. It is also
worth noting that the coefficient of trade on GDP growth is very large and significant;
0.1 additional standard deviation of trade increases growth by 3.8%, confirming the vast
body of literature on the benefits of trade that we quoted previously.
For small countries (which represent 90% of our sample), the results shown in Table 4.6
are similar. All country-size indicators concur first on the negative conditional correlation
between country size and growth and second on the positive relationship trade openness
and growth. Among large countries (listed in Table B-2 in the Appendix), there is no
clear-cut relationship between size and performance.
8The effect on GDP growth of a one-standard-deviation increase in one of the control variable is computed
as such: σdepvar ∗ coe f fdepvar/σgdpgrowth.
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Table 4.5: Country size and GDP growth – All countries, 1960–2007
Fixed Effects with correction for heteroscedasticity (cluster)
bivariate controls bivariate controls bivariate controls
PCA Size index -3.447*** -4.738*
[-6.01] [-1.87]
Jalan’s Size index 0.494 0.346
[1.46] [0.92]
Population, log -1.896*** -2.586***
[-4.46] [-3.09]
Trade Openness 5.297*** 4.990*** 5.456***
[3.33] [3.01] [3.61]
Real Interest Rate, % 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.049***
[3.15] [2.95] [3.11]
Inflation, % -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[-0.89] [-0.96] [-0.95]
Constant 3.938*** 0.190 3.583*** -0.601 7.061*** 3.926**
[809.67] [0.13] [16.00] [-0.43] [10.11] [2.07]
N 6566 3237 6566 3237 6638 3273
R2 within 0.012 0.047 0.000 0.041 0.007 0.047
t-statistics in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data source: World Bank.
Table 4.6: Country size and GDP growth – Small countries, 1960–2007
Fixed Effects with correction for heteroscedasticity (cluster)
bivariate controls bivariate controls bivariate controls
PCA Size index -3.467*** -4.604*
[-6.01] [-1.68]
Jalan’s Size index -1.901 -9.644*
[-0.74] [-1.74]
Population, log -1.864*** -2.465***
[-4.27] [-2.90]
Trade Openness 5.533*** 5.381*** 5.758***
[3.39] [3.17] [3.48]
Real Interest Rate, % 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.056***
[3.66] [3.51] [3.68]
Inflation, % -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[-0.79] [-0.86] [-0.82]
Constant 2.957*** -2.030* 4.352*** 1.124 6.385*** 2.192
[18.56] [-1.64] [7.35] [0.69] [11.04] [1.19]
N 5903 2815 5903 2815 5903 2815
R2 within 0.012 0.053 0.000 0.050 0.007 0.054
t-statistics in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data source: World Bank.
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Table 4.7 displays the results of our FE estimation for OECD countries (i.e. small
and large rich countries). The conditional correlation between our PCA index and GDP
growth is negative and significant but this is less so when economic controls are included.
When country size is proxied by population, its relationship with GDP growth is negative
and significant over the 1960–2007 time span. Indeed, among OECD countries with
comparable development levels, heterogeneity in terms of population is much larger than
in terms of GDP. The negative scale effect on growth seen here is most likely demographic.
The correlation between growth and trade is not as strong as in previous cases, possibly
because most of the OECD countries were already industrialised economies at the start of
the period and did not use trade as a strategy to launch their economic take-off but rather
as a tool for the continuation of their development. Economic performance appears to be
better determined by cyclical factors, as indicated by the significance of the inflation and
interest rates. More precisely, inflation is negatively associated with growth, confirming
the importance of macroeconomic stability for growth as in Baldwin (2003). The real
interest rate also has a negative correlation with growth, underlining the importance of
the ease of obtaining credit for growth.
Table 4.7: Country size and GDP growth – OECD countries, 1960–2007
Fixed Effects with correction for heteroscedasticity (cluster)
bivariate controls bivariate controls bivariate controls
PCA Size index -5.271*** -4.077
[-3.30] [-1.00]
Jalan’s Size index 0.687* 0.282
[1.97] [1.06]
Population, log -5.441*** -12.59**
[-4.45] [-2.87]
Trade Openness 1.465 1.377 4.436***
[0.88] [0.78] [2.99]
Real Interest Rate, % -0.105** -0.129*** -0.074**
[-2.52] [-3.61] [-2.30]
Inflation, % -0.118*** -0.125*** -0.141***
[-3.14] [-3.09] [-3.93]
Constant 9.627*** 8.922 2.454*** 3.115* 17.62*** 36.25***
[5.24] [1.55] [4.39] [1.85] [5.57] [3.10]
N 1302 786 1302 786 1302 786
R2 within 0.044 0.116 0.005 0.110 0.052 0.202
t-statistics in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data source: World Bank.
Strikingly enough estimates in Table 4.8 for the eurozone countries tell a different
story, notwithstanding the size of the sample (1999-2007). While we highlight a strong
negative and significant conditional correlation between population and GDP growth and
a large positive coefficient on trade, turning to our PCA and Jalan’s indexes, coefficients
are less significant and positive. Nonwithstanding the possible small sample bias, it
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seems that European integration through the single market and the monetary union
has largely benefited its least populous Member States. The effects of our three size
dimensions (population, GDP and arable surface area) thus seem strongly differentiated
in the eurozone: that of population considered alone is negative, whereas the effects of
the level of national GDP and arable land are positive. Both effects might be specific to
the Eurozone and the construction of the European Union (EU). A possible explanation
why arable land has been propitious to growth is that some countries like Spain, Ireland
and, to a lesser extent, Finland, which have benefited a lot from EU structural funds,
have engaged in rapid economic catch-up processes over this period, with considerable
territorial effects (shift from agricultural and industrial to new services and real estate
activities) and so GDP gains. Another explanation for the positive effect of national GDP
refers to the positive externality of being big within the institutional framework of the
Eurozone and European Union. Monetary policy, EU policies or the allocation of EU
funds are more focused or better designed for important members than small members.
For instance, there has been more tolerance for the non-respect of the 3% deficit rule of
the SGP for big countries than small ones.
Table 4.8: Country size and GDP growth – Eurozone countries, 1999–2007
Fixed Effects with correction for heteroscedasticity (cluster)
bivariate controls bivariate controls bivariate controls
PCA Size index 4.931* 14.28***
[1.84] [7.23]
Jalan’s size index 0.132 11.22**
[0.06] [2.59]
Population, log -14.67** -44.53***
[-2.49] [-5.41]
Trade Openness 6.493*** 7.789*** 5.221**
[5.24] [3.69] [2.49]
Real Interest Rate, % -0.099 -0.032 -0.104
[-1.04] [-0.28] [-1.00]
Inflation, % -0.270* -0.132 -0.222
[-1.75] [-0.93] [-1.50]
Constant 0.444 -11.65*** 3.031** -12.11*** 32.74** 95.36***
[0.31] [-7.66] [2.42] [-3.16] [2.75] [4.88]
N 134 75 134 75 134 75
R2 within 0.024 0.328 0.000 0.232 0.063 0.366
t-statistics in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data source: World Bank.
We have previously mentioned the so-called BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China)
phenomenon of rapidly-growing, large, emerging economies. Table 4.9 shows that trade
(without distinction between manufactured goods or natural resources) is associated
with their growth. For these four countries, size is again negatively associated with
growth. Besides the economic factors that we control for, these countries also benefit from
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an infrastructure boom9 and a higher attractiveness of foreign investment compared to
countries with comparable development level but smaller domestic markets and less
political clout.
Table 4.9: Country size and GDP growth – BRICs, 1980–2007
Fixed Effects with correction for heteroscedasticity (cluster)
bivariate controls bivariate controls bivariate controls
PCA Size index -6.592 -7.847*
[-0.62] [-5.30]
Jalan’s size index -0.763 -2.691***
[-0.60] [-32.75]
Population, log 2.323 -2.193*
[1.10] [-4.15]
Trade Openness 12.23** 15.41** 10.05*
[6.72] [11.12] [3.49]
Real Interest Rate, % -0.112** -0.106** -0.128**
[-6.62] [-7.17] [-5.92]
Inflation, % -0.00822 -0.0138 -0.00511
[-1.15] [-2.48] [-0.51]
Constant 25.95 28.58* 10.2 21.34*** -8.922 18.19*
[0.77] [5.58] [1.22] [24.96] [-0.70] [5.30]
N 102 72 102 72 102 72
R2 within 0.0238 0.51 0.00555 0.557 0.00445 0.493
t-statistics in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data source: World Bank.
4.3.3 Discussion
According to our results, the relationship between GDP growth and country size appears
negative correlation between size and GDP growth is robust to different measures of
country size. Considering all countries, small countries, OECD ones and even BRICs,
there is a negative conditional correlation between country size and the pace of growth.
Negative effects of size thus seem to outweigh positive ones. The Eurozone displays the
opposite outcome and this might be due to its specific institutional framework and pecu-
liar integration mechanisms (as well as a potential small sample bias). Notwithstanding
possible misspecification and small size sample issues for certain country groups, how
do our results on the non-neutrality of a country size on its growth dynamics dovetail
with existing theories (mentioned in Section 2)?
Our results are at odds with both classical and endogenous growth theories. Indeed,
the size effects might simply be an artifact of the Solow growth model. Both the PCA
and Jalan’s indexes contain contemporaneous GDP, and the growth literature (Barro
and i Martin (2003)) predicts that conditional GDP per capita growth of countries with
9As reported by The Economist, investment in infrastructures represented 6% of GDP in the BRICs in 2008,
double the figure usually found in developed economies.
124 Olfa Alouini – Country Size, Growth and the Economic and Monetary Union – 2011
4.3 Country Size and Growth
higher GDP per capita is lower (the so-called β convergence). Since, the log of GDP
per capita equals the log of GDP minus the log of population, this implies that the
dependence of GDP per capita growth on log GDP should also be negative ceteris paribus.
The Solow model also predicts that higher population growth rates lower GDP growth
rates per capita, so if larger countries have higher population growth on average in
the sample, then the sign of the coefficient on population in a reduced form regression
should be negative too. This line of reasoning is based on two assumptions: first, that
in our sample country size is positively correlated with population growth rates, and
second that country size is positively correlated with GDP per capita. The following two
tables report evidence of the opposite and therefore support that the empirical evidence
provided in this section is not an artifact of the Solow growth model. Furthermore, a
parallel comparison of previous estimates with regressions with GDP per capita growth
as a dependent variable shows that country size has a significant negative correlation
with GDP per capita growth, though the correlation between country size and population
growth is negligible. This suggests that the country size effect previously detailed is
indeed on GDP growth.
Table 4.10: Correlations between country size and population growth
Variable PCA Jalan’s Population Population
size index size index growth
PCA size index 1
Jalan’s size index 0.538 1
Population 0.959 0.510 1
Population growth -0.033 -0.087 -0.047 1
Table 4.11: Correlations between country size and GDP per capita
Variable PCA Jalan’s Population GDP per capita GDP per capita
size index size index growth
PCA size index 1
Jalan’s size index 0.538 1
Population 0.959 0.510 1
GDP per capita 0.165 0.239 0.017 1
GDP per capita growth 0.002 0.048 -0.003 0.054 1
One could also claim we do not put forward a large country advantage for scale-
intensive growth because of the lower prevalence of industries with increasing returns
to scale documented by Antweiler and Trefler (2002). We could further argue that the
costs associated with large size – transport, transaction, heterogeneity – or conversely, the
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Table 4.12: Robustness versus Solow model artifact: GDP per capita growth as a dependent
variable
Fixed Effects with correction for heteroscedasticity (cluster)
PCA size index -0.0386*
[-1.75]




Trade Openness, % 0.0508*** 0.0483*** 0.0503***
[3.97] [3.63] [4.09]
Real Interest Rate, % 0.000480*** 0.000458*** 0.000475***
[3.20] [3.04] [3.04]
Inflation, % -0.000003 -0.000003 -0.000003
[-1.03] [-1.08] [-1.08]
Constant -0.0149 -0.0218* 0.00276
[-1.24] [-1.94] [0.17]
N 3237 3237 3273
R2 within 0.0485 0.0445 0.0460
t-statistics in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01.
benefits of small size –homogeneity, density, higher efficiency and adaptability – prevail
in accounting for the effect of country size on GDP growth. The coefficient borne by
trade openness is always very positive and all the more for smaller countries. This is
in line with theories explaining export-led growth of smaller economies in a free-trade
environment,which has been the most successful paradigm for development of emerging
economies. Higher growth rates of small countries may be in part explained by their
greater openness to trade. Comparing coefficients borne by the PCA size index and by
population suggests that population may be more negatively associated with growth
than GDP and land area are.
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4.4 Country Size and Growth Volatility
4.4.1 Preliminary Analysis
Considering the relationship between country size and output volatility, scatter plots of
sample averages excluding outliers10 in Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 highlight an even
stronger negative correlation. This holds for the whole sample (Figure 4.5) and is more
acute after 1980 (Figure 4.6), reflecting more turbulent development in the world economy.
Small countries (Figure 4.7) and eurozone members (Figure 4.8) illustrate the negative
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Figure 4.8: Country size and volatility in the
eurozone
10Observations were excluded when the standard deviation of the HP 6.25 cyclical component exceeded 0.1.
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4.4.2 Estimation Results
We now focus on the relationship between our size indexes and growth volatility and
still rely on the fixed effects estimation robust to heteroscedasticity (with clustering of
errors at the country level). We use the HP filter measures of volatility as our benchmark
specification. According to the results reported in Table 4.13, estimated coefficients for
the PCA size index and population are negative and significant for all countries, with a
tenfold decrease in magnitude in comparison with effects on GDP growth. Small countries
are statistically more prone to exhibit volatile growth rates than large ones. Strikingly,
the coefficient for trade openness is never significant, contradicting the expectation that
it should be correlated with output volatility. Following Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz
(2000), financial exposure and capital movements may be a more important source of
macroeconomic volatility.
Table 4.13: Country size and HP volatility – All countries, 1960–2007
11
Fixed Effects with correction for heteroscedasticity (cluster)
bivariate controls bivariate controls bivariate controls
PCA Size index -0.017*** -0.020**
[-3.17] [-2.01]
Jalan’s Size index -0.005 -0.002
[-1.30] [-1.70]
Population, log -0.012*** -0.020***
[-2.98] [-3.08]
Trade Openness 0.001 -0.003 0.004
[0.03] [-0.27] [0.34]
Real Interest Rate, % -0.001 -0.001* -0.001
[-1.45] [-1.67] [-1.16]
Inflation, % 0.000 0.000 0.000
[1.54] [1.38] [1.42]
Constant 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.046*** 0.058***
[154.95] [3.74] [11.82] [4.05] [7.32] [6.00]
N 733 447 733 447 743 452
R2 within 0.024 0.056 0.001 0.046 0.031 0.072
t-statistics in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source: World Bank.
For small countries, the results in Table 4.14 are very similar to those for the whole
sample. Quantitatively, a 1 unit PCA (or 1% population) decrease in size brings on
average about 0.02% more growth volatility, confirming the vulnerability to cyclical
fluctuations.
In the eurozone (see Table 4.15), country size seems to have a more stabilising effect on
output as the negative and significant coefficients generated by the PCA size index and
population are about twice as large as those found for the whole sample (between −0.05
versus −0.02 for all countries). Indeed, as the level of trade and investment integration is
very high, large countries which experience less volatility may have a greater influence
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Table 4.14: Country size and HP volatility – Small countries, 1960–2007
Fixed Effects with correction for heteroscedasticity (cluster)
bivariate controls bivariate controls bivariate controls
PCA Size index -0.017*** -0.021**
[-3.09] [-1.96]
Jalan’s Size index -0.048** -0.043
index [-2.02] [-1.52]
Population, log -0.015*** -0.020
[-3.92] [-3.02]
Trade Openness 0.001 -0.001 0.006
[0.09] [-0.12] [0.47]
Real Interest Rate, % -0.001 -0.001* -0.001
[-1.51] [-1.70] [-1.22]
Inflation, % 0.000 0.000 0.000
[1.34] [1.16] [1.25]
Constant 0.023*** 0.023** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.048*** 0.052***
[13.24] [2.27] [7.17] [4.49] [9.52] [5.61]
N 662 393 662 393 662 393
R2 within 0.024 0.059 0.004 0.051 0.042 0.076
t-statistics in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source: World Bank.
on their counterparts and decrease their volatility. In addition, once again the Eurozone
is particular as trade openness is now significant and negative in accounting for output
volatility.
In the context of the single market, trade seems to play an anchoring role for business
cycles, rather than acting as a source of volatility.12 We now check the robustness of our
Table 4.15: Country size and HP volatility – Eurozone countries, 1999–2007
Fixed Effects with correction for heteroscedasticity (cluster)
bivariate controls bivariate controls bivariate controls
PCA Size index 0.03 -0.048***
[1.35] [-2.89]
Jalan’s Size index 0.004 -0.014**
[1.52] [-2.00]
Population, log -0.047** 0.034
[-2.54] [1.09]
Trade Openness -0.028*** -0.021** -0.024**
[-3.84] [-2.07] [-2.08]
Real Interest Rate, % 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[5.28] [4.90] [7.03]
Inflation, % 0.001** 0.001** 0.001
[2.36] [2.27] [1.19]
Constant -0.005 0.065*** 0.009*** 0.038*** 0.105*** -0.043
[-0.41] [4.39] [4.93] [2.64] [2.86] [-0.71]
N 30 26 30 26 30 26
R2 within 0.069 0.815 0.002 0.746 0.143 0.747
t-statistics in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source: World Bank.
results obtained with the HP filter by testing the country-size effect on volatility with
12For BRICs, we could not find a relationship between size and output volatility.
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simple differencing or standard deviation (SD). Using SD detrending, the coefficients are
larger, as expected, and confirm a strong negative and significant conditional correlation
between country size and business cycle volatility (see Table 4.16). The insignificance of
trade in accounting for volatility is confirmed, supporting the assumption that the higher
volatility of small countries is driven by other factors.
Table 4.16: Country size and SD volatility – All countries, 1960–2007
Fixed Effects with correction for heteroscedasticity (cluster)
bivariate controls bivariate controls bivariate controls
PCA Size index -3.547*** -3.087*
[-3.52] [-1.82]
Jalan’s Size index -0.715 -0.283*
[-1.32] [-1.75]
Population, log -2.383*** -2.634***
[-3.12] [-2.62]
Trade Openness -1.174 -1.660 -0.769
[-0.87] [-1.23] [-0.60]
Real Interest Rate, % -0.029 -0.04* -0.019
[-1.28] [-1.72] [-0.82]
Inflation, % 0.002 0.001 0.001
[1.13] [0.97] [1.00]
Constant 4.128*** 5.329*** 4.713*** 5.662*** 8.085*** 9.334***
[115.36] [4.95] [13.55] [5.12] [6.68] [5.14]
N 729 446 729 446 739 451
R2 within 0.047 0.052 0.001 0.037 0.056 0.069
t-statistics in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data source: World Bank.
4.4.3 Discussion
Notwithstanding different significance levels according to estimation specifications, we
have put forward a negative conditional correlation between country size and business
cycle volatility. Other factors implicitly included such as market size (through GDP) or
not included in this analysis as the diversification of production or financial linkages
may also explain why country size is negatively associated with business cycle volatility.
Several theoretical considerations can explain the negative correlation we find between
country size and business cycle volatility. Besides the theories mentioned in Section 2, the
intuitive notion that larger countries exhibit greater growth rate inertia can be accounted
for by Hicks’ aggregation theorem: returns to scale in a country’s production are a
weighted average (according to relative GDP shares) of returns in heterogeneous regional
productions. This implies a higher volatility in smaller collection of regions or countries.
In contrast, a complementary finding is that trade openness does not appear to be as
a source of vulnerability to international economic fluctuations as it is not associated
with greater output volatility. Thus, the higher sensitivity to external shocks and greater
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volatility of small countries most likely stems from their higher specialisation degree.
Indeed, the smallness and insignificance of the coefficients generated by trade indicate
that a higher openness to trade does not necessarily mean more vulnerability to external
shocks.
4.5 Conclusion
What are the relationships between country size, economic performance and business
cycle volatility? To answer this question, we used principal component analysis to de-
velop an original country-size index that includes not only the demographic component
of country size as in other papers on the topic but also the GDP and surface area. We
thus capture a more complete size effect that goes beyond population.
Using a panel of 163 countries with annual data for the 1969-2007 time span, we put
forward, contrary to Rose (2006), a significant negative conditional correlation between
country size and GDP growth for all countries. The relationship is even more marked for
certain groups such as small countries, OECD and even the BRICs. For eurozone countries,
interpreting the relationship proves more complex as the demographic component of
country size is negatively correlated with GDP growth but our size index displays a
positive and significant coefficient. We suspect peculiar effects of European integration
to be at play, which will be the focus of the next chapter.
We confirm the negative conditional correlation between country size and growth
volatility described by Furceri and Karras (2007). These results are statistically significant
and robust to several specifications of country size and output volatility. The estimations
for the PCA size index that we introduced support our assumption that, when accounting
for growth and its volatility, there is more to a country than its population figures.
Moreover, we corroborate that trade openness is conducive to long-term growth, but
find no evidence that it increases growth volatility. These findings implicitly support that
industrial specialisation and financial exposure are stronger factors for growth volatility.
Furthering the analysis of country size and economic performance may require looking
into less quantifiable factors such as institutions and policies. Rodrik (1998) argues that
government plays an income-stabilising role in the face of global uncertainties. This
phenomenon, called “exposure mitigation”, explains why more open economies tend
to have larger governments. Fatas and Mihov (2009) showed that fiscal policy with
less discretion reduces volatility and enhances growth. The eurozone, in which we
highlighted strong negative relationships between country size, economic performance
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and volatility, showcases the peculiar interactions at play with country size in the context
of a monetary union.
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5 Country Size, Economic Performance and
the Political Economy of the Eurozone:
an Empirical Study1
Abstract
How country size influences economic performance is an area that has received
renewed interest lately, especially with Rose (2006), who found no clear pattern
between a country’s size and its economic performance at the world level. However,
when assessing the economic performance of euro-area countries, a “size divide”
appears between small, and fast-growing economies and larger laggard ones. I
explain this phenomenon by examining how the institutional settings of the eurozone
– namely, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the European Central Bank (ECB)
policy – suit the economic structures and policies of the eurozone smaller economies
and hinder those of the larger economies. I test these “political economy” hypotheses,
using panel data for the fifteen eurozone countries (1998–2008). Robustness checks
are run using data for the pre-monetary union period (1960–1998) and for countries
that opted out of the monetary union. The econometric analysis confirms that to
some extent, the “size divide” in terms of economic performance is a by-product of
the monetary union.
Introduction: Stylised Facts on the Eurozone and the “Size
Divide”
The topic of how country size influences a country’s economic performance has received
renewed interest lately, especially with Rose (2006) and before him Armstrong and Read
(1998), who found that size (taken as population) did not influence economic performance.
1 An abridged version of this chapter was published in French under « Taille des pays, performance
économique et économie politique de la zone euro » in Revue de l’OFCE, No 112, Janvier 2010.
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However, when assessing the economic performance of euro-area2 countries, a “size
divide” appears between small and fast-growing economies and larger laggard ones. This
phenomenon motivates this paper and can be illustrated by stylised facts on economic
performance and country size in the eurozone. The indicators retained to measure
economic performance are: the growth rate, the inflation rate, the unemployment rate,
and the external balance. These are also the components of Kaldor (1971)’s magic square
and represent four objectives of economic policies not all attainable at once, as there
exist a number of trade-offs between them. (The negative one between unemployment
and inflation, also captured by the Phillips Curve, being the best known.) Government’s
general structural balance was also included, as one of the Maastricht criteria focuses on
this variable. The timeframe that is covered encompasses 1998–2008 and so starts one
year before the launch of the final phase of the monetary union.
As a proxy for country size, I use population (as in Rose (2006) and Alesina, Spolaore,
and Wacziarg (2005)). Out of the 15 countries under study, Germany, France and Italy
qualify as big; while all others are considered “small” (other rankings and determinants
of country size will be discussed in the following section). Figures 5.1–5.6 display inverse
relationships between country size (measured by population) and GDP growth, inflation,
external balance and general government balances, as well as a positive relationship
between country size and unemployment, so that one can talk of a “size divide” in the eu-
rozone on all dimensions of economic performance. More specifically, Figure 2 illustrates
the relationship between country size and the differential with average eurozone growth,
and so highlights how small countries overperform and larger countries underperform,
compared to the eurozone average. To quote Buti and Pench (2004) “a strong negative
correlation can be observed between the size of euro-area economies and growth rates”.
2 In this paper, euro area, eurozone and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) all denote the fifteen
countries of the eurozone as of January 1st 2008 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Finland,
France, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain), and will be
used interchangeably. Confusingly enough, all members of the European Union are part of the Economic
and Monetary Union, but at different adhesion stages. Therefore, when referring to the EMU, we mean
the countries in the final stage (or the euro adoption stage).
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The aim of this study is not to claim that the relationship between sound economic
performance and country size is perfectly inverse. It would be foolish to draw a black
and white picture, especially when such complex interactions between politics and
economics are at play. Indeed, Figures 5.1–5.6 display various regression fits, and so
provide a nuanced snapshot of the “size divide” in the EMU. The within country variance
is sometimes larger than that between different countries. Undeniably, each country is a
peculiar case per se; however, it is possible to identify groups. Outliers are, in the first
place, the new eurozone entrants: Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. These small countries are
still in a phase of catching up and so are bound to differ from their Benelux counterparts,
or Ireland. To a lesser extent, Greece and Portugal do not fit the ”size divide” picture, as
these small countries are still in the process of overcoming the competitiveness drop that
the euro parity entailed.
Literature Overview
The literature on the size of countries and its “economic consequences” was launched
by Robinson (1960), who pinpointed the vulnerability of small countries but also their
greater adaptive capacities. Katzenstein (1985) furthered these findings by characterising
the industrialisation and trade integration strategies of small countries that proved
especially propitious in Western Europe in a context of trade liberalisation. Rodrik (1998)
and Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005) accordingly emphasized the strong inverse
correlation between country size and economic openness.
This paper focuses on the economic consequences of different country sizes – or sources
of structural heterogeneity – in the framework of the monetary union and so fits into the
literature on heterogeneous monetary unions and economic divergence in the European
Union (EU). Even before the launch of the monetary union, Armstrong and Read (1995)
discussed the better performance of micro states within the EU and attributed it to their
economic specialisation in financial services or tourism. Among studies highlighting
this “size divide” in the eurozone, that of Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006) underlines a
systematic negative correlation between large size and sound economic performance
(in regard to growth, inflation, the public deficit and unemployment) between 1996 and
2004 in the eurozone. Napoletano and Gaffard (2009) used parametric estimation to
show that large Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries have economically
fared worse than their smaller counterparts in the decade following the launch of the
monetary union and that this was partly due to their heavier reliance on domestic
rather than external demand. Similarly, Feldmann (2006) showed that country size in the
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EU and unemployment were positively correlated. Saint-Paul (2004) noted that given
the incentives structure in the EMU, larger Member States were less likely to reform
their labour markets than their smaller counterparts. Buisan and Restoy (2005) detailed
how country size and economic divergence were linked in the monetary union. These
discrepancies also take root in the settings of the EMU. As documented by the studies by
Barbera and Jackson (2006) or Thorhallsson (2006), institutional and economic incentives
for small and large countries of the EU and the EMU differ. Using a new economic
geography model with economies of scale, Casella (1995) predicted a larger gain from
the union’s enlargements going to small countries. Buti and Pench (2004), Fitoussi and
Le Cacheux (2005) and Chang (2006) all stressed the asymmetry created by the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP) between small and large countries. And finally, the works of
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2005) and Bonnaz (2003) focussed on the impact of the
common monetary policy led by the European Central Bank (ECB) on countries of
different sizes, with a special focus on inflation differentials.
This paper furthers the analysis of the interactions between country size and economic
performance in the eurozone. To this purpose, I describe different specifications for
country size and detail the structures and benefits determined within the EU and the
EMU (Section 1). I then sketch a brief political economy of size in the eurozone, that
is, I examine how country size impacts the conduct of economic policy, focussing on
the SGP and the ECB (Section 2). I subsequently test the “size divide” hypothesis by
running a thorough econometric analysis using dynamic panel estimation (Section 3)
before concluding.
5.1 Country Size in the EMU: Definitions, Structures, Benefits
5.1.1 Country Size: Definitions and Relativity
The EU is composed of countries of very different demographic and economic sizes.
Populations vary from 400.000 inhabitants (Malta) to some 82 million (Germany) in
2007, whereas GDP varies from roughly 5000 million (Malta) to 2500 billion euros (Ger-
many). Country size encompasses a large number of dimensions: territory, demography,
economic and political power. One of the core difficulties of the analysis is that the
relationships between these dimensions are not linear. Large national territories may be
sparsely populated and vice versa. Consequently, one may rank countries in almost as
many ways as there are indicators. While GDP is a good measure of economic power (and
not necessarily of economic development, which is better captured by GDP per capita),
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explaining economic performance by resorting to GDP is somewhat tautological and
bound to create endogeneity problems. As the relationship between GDP and population
– economic and demographic size – is roughly linear, population proves to be a better
proxy for country size for this analysis.
A crucial point highlighted by Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006) state that country size
and its impact in the eurozone are to be understood in relative terms. Indeed, in absolute
terms, Germany, France and Italy are medium-sized countries. Only in the eurozone, or
the EU, are they considered “big”. Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006) adopted the following
size classification: countries with a population of up to a quarter of the most populated
Member State falls into the small category, countries up to a half into the medium and
countries over half into the large category. By this token, the eurozone has three large
countries – Germany, France and Italy, making up for 70% of the eurozone’s GDP – ,
one medium country – Spain – , and 11 small countries. The recent adhesion of Cyprus
and Malta also prompts the question of whether an additional “extra small” category
should be added. However, in terms of population, Luxembourg would fall into that
“extra small” category, despite a large economic size. For the purpose of clarity, I will only
consider these three different sized groups as specified by the Laurent and Le Cacheux
(2006) study.
5.1.2 Country Size and Economic Structures
Following Salmond (2006), one can define large countries as countries accounting for a
large part of the EMU economic activity, tending to act as price makers in this market. Con-
versely, small countries represent a low proportion of the EMU economy and behave as
price takers. By and large, small countries tend to be more open to trade (Rodrik (1998) and
Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005)), while large ones rely more on the internal demand
for growth. It follows that small countries are more vulnerable to external developments
and more prone to lead competitiveness strategies in order to expand exports. In larger
countries, policy makers must address internal stabilisation. Figures 5.7 and 5.2 illustrate
the structural differences between the small and large countries of the eurozone in terms
of openness (the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP) and domestic demand
(as a percentage of GDP) as components of the economy. Small countries display indeed
higher openness ratios and more often than not, domestic demand represents a higher
share of GDP in large countries. The inverse relationship is however much more evident
for trade openness than it is for domestic demand. This is one of the core structural differ-
ences between the two groups, but this is a somewhat blunt picture: on the international
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Figure 5.8: Country size and domestic demand
level, large eurozone economies are only mid-sized economies coping simultaneously
with what I defined as small and large country challenges. They can neither neglect their
competitiveness, nor care only about competitiveness and sacrifice internal stabilisation.
In addition, to detail the argument developed by Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005),
if small countries are more open to trade, it is because they benefit more, in relative terms,
from the openness than do large countries under a liberalised trade regime; as also noted
earlier by Lloyd (1968), p. 4: “small nations obtain greater gains per unit of international
trade than do large nations”. Not only do small and large countries differ in their degree
of openness, their trade specialisations mirror their different economic structures. Small
countries may not be able to ensure the viability of industries with large scale effects
as noted by Martins M.G.P (2004), and Torstensson (1997) found empirical evidence for
this comparative advantage pattern in trade flows with large domestic market countries
being net exporters in scale intensive industries.
These disparities between small and large countries translate into different exposure
to shocks and policy transmission mechanisms, and so account for diverging economic
performance as illustrated by Buisan and Restoy (2005). The origin of shocks may induce
a “size-conditioned” reaction. For instance, the sensitivity to external demand shocks
depends on openness, which is strongly and negatively correlated to size. In the eurozone,
the less open countries include France, Italy, Portugal and Greece, while the more open
are Belgium, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands. Likewise, oil price shocks affect
the three big countries according to similar dependency ratios, ratios that are higher in
small countries like Greece, Portugal, Belgium and Spain. Export specialisation is also
an important source of heterogeneity in reactions to external shocks, but identifying a
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size pattern here proves difficult. Germany, for instance, has an export specialisation that
differs significantly from those of its French or Italian counterparts.
5.1.3 Vulnerability and Efficiency
The small countries’ greater vulnerability to international conditions may actually be a
blessing in disguise. The smallness of their own domestic market does not permit them to
decrease their export share, and so they are bound to produce and implement economic
change in a more efficient manner. One has also argued that smaller countries, having a
more homogeneous population and smaller territories to control, have better institutions
and are more prone to reach a political consensus, as documented in Robinson (1960).
Following more recent work by Persson (2002),countries where parliamentary coalitions
prevail 3 are also countries where a higher legislative cohesion and efficiency is observed.
The problematic of country size thus urges us to include consider national efficiency.
To this end, I have computed measures of output or productivity per square kilometer.
This provides a picture of what I refer to as “territorial efficiency”. The importance of
territory effects has indeed been highlighted by the new economic geography approach
(Krugman (1991)). While it posits the importance of increasing returns to scale, and thus,
a priori bestows an advantage to large countries, it also takes into account the location,
structure and density of economic activity (usually higher in smaller countries). As stated
earlier, country size encompasses several dimensions and however convenient it may
be to limit country size to population, a population alone does not make an economy.
Key economy ingredients also include material resources and a territory. Hence, the need
to sophisticate my analysis by adding two additional size rationales – GDP and surface
area – as the ratio of economic size over geographic size. With this “territorial efficiency”
measure, I intend to depart from a mono-variable representation of country size and
include physical aspects in my analysis. Again, because countries are differently ranked
along the population, GDP and territory dimensions, this measure does not provide as
straightforward a “size ranking” (as population or GDP for instance do), and so should
not be understood as such. Instead, it is meant to capture country structural differences
in terms of the economic organisation over a given territory. Figures 5.9 and 5.10 offer a
snapshot of “territorial efficiency”. According to the indicators chosen (productivity or
output per 1000 km2, for an alternative measure see Figure C-1 in the Appendix), rankings
between countries differ. However, one may note the relative territorial inefficiency of
3Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany,Ireland,Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, so both large and small
countries in the monetary union
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small southern and new Member States, the medium territorial efficiency of the big three
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Figure 5.10: Territorial efficiency relative to output
For this analysis, I retained a rather simple ratio of GDP over land area (output per
1000 km2) as the measure for territorial efficiency.4 This measure is far from perfect, and
one should be aware that it can be driven up or down by a relatively small, or respectively
large, territory (as compared to the size of the economy), as the polar cases of Malta and
France illustrate. But it offers a relevant picture of the density of economic activity, and
of where there is still room and potential for improvement.
Figure 5.11 displays national GDP growth rates and territorial efficiency ratios. Three
groups may be distinguished. First, those with high territorial efficiency consist of the
Benelux countries and Malta. The Benelux countries are indeed located at the very heart
of the Blue Banana (or the European economic core that spans from Southern England
to Northern Italy via the Rhine region) and are typically very open and efficient small
economies. It goes without saying that their smallness does not leave much room for
territorially extensive growth. At the other end of the spectrum, the least territorially
4Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) developed a similar indicator coined “GDP density”, calculated by
multiplying GDP per capita by the number of people per square kilometer.
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efficient group is primarily made up of countries that are either new and less developed
entrants (Cyprus and Slovenia) or still catching up in terms of economic structures
(Greece, Portugal, and Spain). Germany performs well in terms of territorial efficiency,
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Figure 5.11: Territorial efficiency and GDP growth
The middle group is comprised of Austria, France, Ireland and Italy. France and Italy,
the two large countries in this group have different territorial structures. France still
furthers devolution policies to overcome Paris’ macrocephaly, while Italy displays a
denser network of industrial centres and is struggling with obsolete industrial structures
(especially in the South). Ireland and Austria are two small countries with intermediate
territorial efficiency: Austria lies at the heart of continental Europe and has based a
development strategy that fully takes advantage of its geographical situation, as it
became a hub for exchanges and investment with the new Eastern European Members.
Ireland internalised its insularity, as it overcame its relative remoteness and isolation by
leading attractive fiscal policies for multinationals and outsourcing service centres. There
remain two peculiar outliers, however, Malta is pushed up by its very small territory,
and conversely, Finland pulled down by its large one, so that one cannot correctly assess
their respective territorial efficiency with this GDP to territory ratio.
As for how territorial efficiency is related to GDP growth, Figure5.11 reflects the
topic’s complexity as a number of variables interacting at the national and eurozone
levels explain national discrepancies in economic performance. However, if a country
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experiences a protracted period of GDP growth, the ratio of GDP to surface area will rise
over time. Because GDP is not a cyclical indicator but an economic aggregate with inertia,
the ratio of GDP to surface area offers a more structural or long term oriented picture of a
country’s economic evolution. Strikingly enough, over the decade covered (1998–2008), a
majority of countries stagnate in terms of territorial efficiency and only small economies
(the Benelux countries, Ireland and Malta) see it increase, with the notable exception
of Germany (that phenomenon being possibly explained by the catching up of the new
Bundesländer).
To better fathom the interactions at play between territorial efficiency and the repar-
tition of economic activity, I have computed correlations with population density and
the percentage of the population living in the largest city (a proxy for centralisation of
economic activity) in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Correlation structure of territorial variables







Output per 1000 km2 −0.2094 1
Population density −0.1934 0.9192 1
Population in largest city, % −0.1701 −0.1508 −0.2127 1
Thus it appears that density is highly correlated with territorial efficiency (+0.9192),
confirming the assumption that small denser countries make efficient use of their territory,
whereas the opposite goes for centralisation, though the negative correlation is not as
high (−0.1508). In addition, the fact that the relationship between territorial efficiency
and country size (taken as population) is neither evidently positive nor negative is an
asset for my analysis (see Figure C-2 in the Appendix), as it will prevent the occurrence
of simplistic or caricatured results in regard to the economic effects of country size.
Now that we have seen how country size impacts on national economic structures, it
is time to focus on the institutions of the EU and the EMU and how they favour small
countries.
5.2 A Political Economy of Size in the Eurozone
The EU, or for that matter, the EMU, cannot be considered as a solely economic organisa-
tion. Their political essence makes the sheer economic analysis of their functioning obtuse.
The creation of the monetary union was mostly motivated by political reasons, not by
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optimality in the economic theory sense. As European policies are based on the premise
of institutional equality between sovereign states and economic convergence, they are
often so called “one-size-fits-all” policies. This non-acknowledgement of size within the
EU and EMU mars economic outcomes, hence the need to sketch a political economy
of size in the eurozone. In other words, examine how country size as a non-internalised
source of heterogeneity predetermines the way national economies will fare within the
EMU. To this end, I first focus on the general institutional frameworks of the EU, before
dealing with the economic policy settings of EMU.
5.2.1 The EU and EMU Frameworks Bestow Small Countries with Institutional
Advantages, . . .
Because of their greater vulnerability to external developments, the institutions of the
EU and the fear they be smothered by larger countries, smaller countries were granted a
number of advantages and protections upon joining the EU. Interestingly enough, at its
creation, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) included the“three big” and
three small countries, a configuration in which smaller countries obviously needed extra
guarantees and protections against the power of the three big. These original six countries
have mechanically had more opportunities to influence the institutional system in their
favour; and while there was only one large European country left (the United Kingdom
(UK)) to join the EU, there were still plenty of small ones. The institutional protections
(Thorhallsson (2006)) bestowed to small countries are unanimity ruling; the generalised
search for consensus, even if it is not legally necessary; overrepresentation in voting
rights granted relative to population figures; the possibility to form blocking minorities
(and with each enlargement automatically increasing the number of possible coalitions,
and so augmenting the likelihood that small countries have an impact on collective
decisions); the Commission’s logistical help and the recognition of special interests (e.g.,
Luxembourg in banking and Cyprus in shipping). Consequently, in terms of political
and decision-making power, EU membership enables these small states to punch above
their weight. Following Keohane (1969), a small state is by definition no great political
power in the sense that “[its] leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small
group, make a significant impact on the system”. To some extent the EU and later the
EMU changed this hard fact of international relations. Rose (2006) highlighted the new
sovereignty scale for small countries within the EU. The overrepresentation of small states
detailed by Barbera and Jackson (2006), and conversely, the “shrinkage” of large ones, can
be precisely assessed. The ratios of GDP and population between Germany and Malta are
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roughly 1 : 400 and 1 : 160, whereas the ratios of their numbers of European Parliament
representatives and voting rights in the Council of Ministers are 1 : 20 and 1 : 10! Creel,
Laurent, and Cacheux (2007) also showed that 70% of the economic size of the EU was
represented by 40% of its political size, this discrepancy holding paradoxically for the
EMU, where political cooperation is sizeably deeper.
5.2.2 . . . Which Turn into Economic Gains
Casella (1995) asks the question of whether “there are systematic forces such that coun-
tries of different sizes participating in a free trade bloc gain differently from the entry of
new members”. Assuming increasing economies of scale, she showed that small coun-
tries, whose internal market and competitiveness increases with enlargement, benefit
more from enlargement, as opposed to large countries whose domestic markets propor-
tionally shrink with each enlargement. In fact, the increase in the internal market is more
significant for firms in small countries than for firms in large countries, and the same goes
for competitiveness. The EU, as it plays down the importance of the size of the domestic
market in offering its members access to a very large single market, clearly favours the
development of small countries (for which domestic market size was the weakness to
overcome) over that of larger ones (for which domestic market size used to be one of the
main assets). Furthering Casella’s analysis, Badinger and Breuss (2006), argued that this
small country bonus is not significantly larger than the advantages large countries have
in terms of high-market power, trade, market size, group ties, endowments in human
capital and technologies, product varieties, and scale economies. Thus, different eco-
nomic forces are at play in the distribution of the gains of trade bloc enlargement without
one dominating the others, leaving the outcome in terms of country size undetermined.
Furceri and Karras (2008a) also underlined that small size was positively correlated with
business cycle volatility, which explains part of the small Member States’ vulnerability, but
also their larger gains from the EMU, as business cycles are anchored in the monetary
union.
All in all, small protected states gain economic and political power in entering the EU
and the EMU, while the contrary is true for large states. For instance, before adopting
the euro, no small country had a currency that they could use as a “monetary weapon”.
Conversely, Germany gave up a lot with the deutschemark: not only an international
currency, but also the ability for the German government to borrow at lower rates than its
European peers. With the euro, Germany lost this exclusive comparative advantage, while
small countries gained lower interest rates, greater credibility on financial markets and the
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shelter of an international currency. As Robinson (1960) remarked, in terms of the public
good provision (for instance defense), large countries hold a comparative advantage but
only as long as they do not share it. In short, one may contend that in joining the EMU,
larger countries, such as Germany, traded monetary weapons (the deutschemark against
the euro) and economic advantages (undisputed monetary leadership against reinforced
economic stability outside German borders) while small countries made net gains in
terms of economic power and protection.
5.2.3 Country Size and the Economic Government of the Eurozone
Now that we have seen the adverse effects of the EMU institutional setting on the policies
of large countries, let us now carry a more thorough analysis, with regards to the two
main devices of economic policy in the eurozone, namely, the SGP, and the ECB.
The SGP and the global demand externality
The SGP was designed with the launch of the monetary union on the tenet that fiscal
externalities had to be contained, so as not to jeopardise the conduct of a common mon-
etary policy (through a raise in the common interest rate caused by inflated national
debt ratios or default). The retained criteria included the threshold limits of respectively
3% and 60% of GDP for the public deficit and the public debt, respectively, as it fitted
the figures of the time. The SGP has received numerous criticisms and was reformed in
March 2005 to better take into account the cyclical position and national peculiarities
when assessing the deficit, but its essence did not change. Obviously the containment
logic behind the pact addresses the fiscal externalities large countries may impose on
others as a consequence of their fiscal policy: a public debt default of Italy would put the
monetary stability of the zone in much greater jeopardy than one in Greece or Ireland.
What about the ease of abiding by these fiscal limits? According to Persson (2002), the
proportional parliamentary systems found in most eurozone countries are empirically
proven to induce excessive public spending by governments seeking reelection. However,
since larger and less open countries tend to have a greater fiscal multiplier – that is a higher
return of government expenditures and tax cuts in terms of growth – ,abiding by the
SGP’s fiscal limits represents a greater loss in terms of efficient policy instruments them.
The benefits that larger countries may reap from enhanced fiscal credibility are also
relatively smaller, because their position on financial markets and notation agencies
grades are less sensitive to the evolution of their debt and deficits ratios. We have seen
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that smaller countries have rose up in arms against the alleged fiscal laxness of their
larger counterparts. However fiscal consolidation is not necessarily easier for smaller
countries. It is easier for countries enjoying high growth rates (most often small ones, as
illustrated previously), as the play of automatic stabilisers alleviates the fiscal effort. As
noted by Bonnaz (2003), the relative easiness of fiscal consolidation only applies to very
open small economies, such as Ireland, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands, since
their public finances Keynesian multiplier is lower. But small countries, such as Greece,
Finland or Spain, experience conditions similar to those of France and Germany.
The fiscal containment logic behind the SGP holds water but it does not take into
account all relevant externalities in a monetary union. Bonnaz (2003) emphasized the
need to consider “global demand”. Indeed, through their higher inflation, small countries
are responsible for more negative externalities as their larger counterparts through their
“lax” fiscal stance. Small countries benefit from an asymmetry in real interest rates within
the monetary union. They also generate a sizeable inflation externality5 (Spain and
Ireland are among the countries with higher inflation rates), which is not internalised by
way of sanctions and is a real burden for the larger countries of the eurozone, as they
have to put up with less favourable real interest rates.
The ECB and country size
The ECB is no exception to the overrepresentation of small countries that characterises
European institutions. The mismatch between the political and economic weights of
regional governors in the ECB’s decision instances is obvious because of the “one country,
one vote principle”. This has led to larger degrees of misrepresentation, than in the Federal
Reserve and the Bundesbank (Berger (2006)). The enlargement of the EMU will further
this trend. The 2003 reform established the vote limitation to 15 national central bankers
and 6 board members and will only limit this effect but not reverse it. Rotation will
also help check misrepresentation, but will cause discontinuities in voting frequencies
between large and small countries. Even if the earlier economic definition of small
countries as price takers, respectively large as price makers may hold here: developments
in large countries are closely monitored by the ECB, while those in small countries are
unlikely to change its policy stance (Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2005)). The underlying
5 Bonnaz (2003) calculated that between 1999 and 2002, small countries generated, on average, 1% more
inflation than the big three, which, given their weight in the eurozone, translated into an additional
0.3% to the inflation of the zone. Following a Taylor rule, and all other things being equal, the author
computed that this pushed interest rates 50 base points over their original level, had the small countries
had similar inflation rates as the large ones.
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tenet that a national representative will systematically push its own country’s interest
(as is assumed in Dixit and Lambertini (2003)) is debatable. As a consequence, the
representation and governing system of the ECB does not tell us much about the impact
of the central bank’s policies on countries of different sizes, as the decisions processes are
not public and one can only speculate about what goes on behind closed doors.
To analyse how country size and the policy led by the ECB interact, one should consider
the impact of country size in the classical output/inflation trade-off, or the Phillips Curve.
That trade-off is affected by openness and so by country size (as the three big economies
are relatively more closed and a number of small economies, including Benelux, are
significantly more open). Sanchez (2006) documented that small countries, because of
their greater openness and larger inflation effects, have a steeper supply curve, and
conversely, larger countries have a flatter supply curve. Because of this, monetary union
is more propitious to small countries with steep supply curves, while for larger countries,
monetary autonomy outperforms monetary union. The outcome in terms of welfare costs
for small and large countries is however disputed. Indeed, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba
(2005) reach the opposite conclusion: using a two-country partial-equilibrium model
calibrated to the EMU, they find that because the ECB pays less heed the inflation in
small countries, the latter bear four times higher welfare costs in terms of price and wage
rigidities than their larger neighbours.
5.3 Econometric Analysis
Let us now see whether the incidence of country size on the workings of the eurozone
can be empirically confirmed.
5.3.1 Model
I examined the correlation between country size (using population as a proxy) and GDP
growth for the 15 countries of the eurozone, controlling for economic variables that are
size-dependent (trade openness, domestic demand, and territorial efficiency), eurozone
economic government variables (inflation and deficit differentials), and a time-invariant
omitted bias effect (fixed effect). I estimate the following equation:
GDPgrowthit =β0 + β1 Populationit + β2 TradeOpennessit/DomesticDemandit+
β3 Output per 1000 km2it + β4 ∆Inflationit + β5 ∆Deficitit + ui + δt + εit.
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And additionally, in a dynamic panel setting, I further estimate the following equation:
GDPgrowthit = β0 + β1 GDPgrowthit−1 + β2 Populationit + β3 TradeOpennessit/
DomesticDemandit + β4 Output per 1000 km2it + β5 ∆Inflationit + β6 ∆Deficitit + ui + δt + εit.
Where: i indicates the countries (panel variable), t is time, ui, δtand εit respectively
denote country effects, time dummies and the error term. Population is the population
in millions of inhabitants for a given country in a given year. TradeOpenness is the ratio
of the sum of exports and imports over GDP. Alternatively, for large countries, I control
for DomesticDemand as a percentage of GDP. Trade openness and domestic demand, as I
explained earlier, are the economic engine of small respectively, large economies. Output
per 1000 km2 is the ratio of GDP (in billions of euros) over surface area (in thousands
of square kilometers) and is my measure of territorial efficiency. ∆Inflation and ∆Deficit
(both in percentages of GDP) are the two measures of inflation and deficit in relation to
the policy of the ECB and the Maastricht criterion that I used to assess the impact of the
eurozone “economic government”.
5.3.2 The Data, the Variables and their Correlation Structure
Two data sets are used. The first covers the 1998–2008 period for the fifteen countries
of the eurozone (though the three latest entrants Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia did not
necessarily fit the “size divide” as I previously explained) and comes from Eurostat.
The second dataset covers the 1960–2007 time span and comes from the World Bank.
As it includes the pre-monetary union period and Member States that opted out of the
EMU, the regressions ran will be akin to robustness checks or “placebo” tests. Both
data sets were normalised with the same units and provided consistent estimates when
regressions were run with data for the same countries and years. Some data, especially
for the domestic demand and deficit gap variables, is missing, hence, the fluctuating
number of observations. (See Table C-1 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics of both
data sets.)
To measure economic performance, I focussed on GDP growth. One could argue that
the GDP indicator is only quantitative and does not necessarily capture the quality and
repartition of growth (possibly better captured by GDP per capita or less quantitative
indicators such as the Human Development Index for instance); however, my purpose is
to assess the impact of the EMU on national economic performance in quantitative terms
and so I will use GDP growth as the dependent variable. In the following correlation
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structure analysis (see Table 5.2), I also include unemployment, the external balance as a
percentage of GDP (Bal_pro) and inflation (i.e., the three other components of Kaldor’s
magic square) so as to provide a more complete picture of economic performance. Using
the 1998–2008 data set, I find negative correlations between the indicators of country
size (population and GDP) and all economic performance indicators (GDP growth and
unemployment being respectively negatively and positively correlated with population).
Country size is as previously noted, measured by population or GDP. To test for a
quadratic relationship between country size and economic performance, population
squared is added to the correlation analysis, but as shown in Table 5.2, it does prove very
conclusive. The correlation between domestic demand (taken as a percentage of GDP) –
supposedly, the economic engine of large economies – and economic performance was
negative. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 cast some light on the fact that openness seems to be
a better economic engine for growth than domestic demand in the EMU, thus, partly
explaining the discrepancies in terms of economic performance along the “size divide”
(as noted by Napoletano and Gaffard (2009)). Domestic demand and trade openness
are complementary economic aggregates and, to some extent, superposed (imports are
also a part of domestic demand which is also defined as GDP minus net exports). To
avoid misspecification, I used them as alternative controls (i.e., the performance of large
countries was regressed on the domestic demand and that of the smaller countries was
regressed on trade openness). But as seen previously, the three large eurozone economies
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The openness and the inflation gap (∆Inflation=Inflation rate-2, measures whether the
country’s inflation is above or under the 2% threshold that the ECB used to define price
stability and captured the real interest rate differential across countries) are positively
correlated with growth and negatively with size, which confirms the small countries’
advantages in the eurozone. The deficit gap (∆Deficit=Budget deficit+3, is negative for
countries running deficits larger than the 3% limit and positive for those within the
Maastricht bounds) is positively correlated with growth but very strongly and negatively
correlated to domestic demand. This hints at a possible growth impediment for countries
relying heavily on domestic demand and running large deficits, i.e., large countries.
These inflation and deficit differentials are meant to reflect the institutional settings of the
eurozone and how far the economies fell away from the macroeconomic stability targets,
or bounds of the ECB and the SGP. These targets often bear opposite signs, according to
whether a country is big or small (especially ∆Inflation, because of the higher inflation on
average in small countries over the sample). The correlation structure of my indicator for
the territorial efficiency indicator, or output per 1000 km2, was not straightforward in
regards to country size but, in accordance with the non-linearity of their relationship (see
Section 1), it is because the relationship between both variables is not linear.
















GDP growth -0.4008 1
Unemployment 0.2759 0.0001 1
Population 0.9732 -0.3881 0.3945 1
Trade Openness -0.4147 0.3261 -0.5177 -0.5278 1
Domestic Demand -0.0033 -0.2067 0.3036 0.1183 -0.6188 1
Output per 1000 km2 0.1482 -0.2896 -0.3676 0.0589 0.5305 -0.282 1
∆ Inflation -0.3081 0.2512 -0.1009 -0.2379 0.1095 0.2073 -0.1657 1
∆ Deficit -0.2277 0.3839 -0.084 -0.2694 0.4267 -0.6912 0.025 -0.1317 1
Summing up the various arguments made as to which economic and institutional
factors country size impacts upon (positively or negatively), the model I empirically
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Where: Output per 1000 km2 for territorial efficiency, ∆Inflation, for the inflation differential,
and ∆Deficitfor the deficit differential.
5.3.3 Estimation Strategy
To estimate my model (see equations at the beginning of this section), I heeded the issues
raised by Baltagi (2005), i.e., the relationship between the country (or fixed) effects and
the regressors. My non-dynamic panel data analysis relies on the Generalised Least
Squares (GLS) model to obtain the best linear unbiased estimator. I chose the fixed effects
(FE or within) over the random effects (RE or between) estimator given the results of the
Hausman test. It indicated that the individual effects and our explanatory variables were
systematically related, so that the fixed effects or within estimator was appropriate.6 The
choice of a fixed-effects estimation was further justified by the small number of countries,
the high correlation values of the individual intercept term ui, the constant term and an
F-test for the significance fixed effects. The Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity
confirmed its presence in both data sets. Likewise, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation
in panel data indicated a first-order correlation. Following Drazen (2000), country size
was not assumed to be an important source of endogeneity and so the IV estimator was
not employed.
Taking these results into account, I selected three estimators for the non-dynamic
estimation: (1) GLS with a specification robust to panel-level heteroscedasticity and
first-order autocorrelation, serving as a rationale to assess the impact of the FE estimator;
(2) FE using a specification with robust standard errors clustered at the country level
(as clustering at the panel data level produces consistent estimates of standard errors
even in the presence of autocorrelation); and (3) FE robust to first-order autocorrelation.
In the case of the dynamic estimation (see model estimated below), the presence of
the lagged endogenous variable – justified by the presence of autocorrelation – was
crucial in selecting an appropriate estimator, as the FE is inconsistent in the presence of
a lagged variable (Baltagi, 2005; Kiviet, 1995). Panels were checked for unit roots using
6The tests yielded χ2(5) = 29.44 and p < χ2 = 0.0 in the 1998–2008 data set, and χ2(5) = 175.27 and
p < χ2 = 0.0 in the 1960–2007 data set.
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a Fisher test (or augmented Dickey–Fuller test with one lag), which dismissed their
presence, so that co-integration is not necessary. I estimate the dynamic model using
(4) the Arellano–Bond (AB) estimator with a robust variance specification and allowing
for serial autocorrelation. The AB estimator controls for unobserved time-invariant
characteristics of countries and captures the impact of the changes in the variables across
time. To ensure the consistency of this generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator,
I tested whether average autocorrelation in the first and second order residuals was equal
to zero. It was particularly important that the second order autocorrelation condition
was fulfilled, which is the case in all the estimations (results reported in the regression
Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5).
Table 5.3 presents the results7 of the four estimations for the 1998 to 2008 period, for all
fifteen countries in the eurozone.
Testing the relationship between growth and country size (taken as population), the
FE estimator with robust variance confirms a significant inverse relationship.8 Using
the summary statistics (Table C-1 in the Appendix), we find that according to the FE
cluster estimator, a one-standard-deviation increase in population lowers the growth
rate on impact by 4.59 standard deviations. Trade openness exhibits a positive significant
relationship with growth and likewise the size of the effect on growth is substantial
(a positive variation of one standard deviation of trade openness yields an increase
in growth of 2.52 standard deviations according to the FE cluster estimator). The FE
estimators were more conclusive than the GLS estimators as coefficients are larger in
absolute value and more significant (for the FE estimations all coefficients are except that
borne by the deficit gap).
5.3.4 Assessing the “Size Divide”
To test the “size divide” hypothesis, I run the same regression as before, but separately
for large and small countries (note that Spain was dropped of the regressions as it was
the only mid-sized country falling in neither categories). Table 5.4 details the results for
the large countries. The country size coefficient gained size and significance, confirming
the hypothesis of an inverse relationship between economic performance and country
7The inclusion of time effects, so as to possibly capture the effects of a “eurozone business cycle” proved
conclusive only in the case of small countries and is displayed in Table C-2 in the Appendix. In fact, time
effects were proven to be overall significant, but not individually (using a usual F-test). Given the limited
number of observations and degrees of freedom, we considered the results less relevant and favoured
estimations including only individual effects.
8 Taking the logarithm of population (instead of population in millions) yields similar results.
9Computed as such: β Population* σ Population/ σ GDP Growth or −0, 342 ∗ 25, 6/1, 93 = −4, 5
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Table 5.3: Regressions of GDP growth in the eurozone countries, 1998–2008
Estimation method GLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Arellano–Bond
(error specification) (hetero AR) (cluster) (AR) (AR)
Population -0.0203* -0.342* -0.421 -1.964
(-2.12) (-3.01) (-1.81) (-1.62)
Trade Openness 1.056 7.980*** 8.728*** 12.16**
(1) (8.79) (3.82) (2.65)
Output per 1000 km2 -0.238* -1.431** -1.384* 0.215
(-2.55) (-4.46) (-2.36) (0.19)
Inflation gap -0.134 -0.542*** -0.425* -1.089***
(-0.96) (-7.42) (-2.49) (-4.82)
Deficit gap 0.0212 0.198 0.195 0.433
(0.31) (1.34) (1.77) (1.88)
Lagged GDP growth 0.0348
(0.28)
Constant 3.626*** 10.96** 12.20** 45.78
(4.54) (3.57) (3.05) (1.55)
N 119 119 108 109
Wald test for groupwise R2 within 0.365 0.252 H0: no 1st-order auto-
heteroscedasticity correlation, p = 0.01
H0: σi=σ for all i
χ2(11) = 89.25, p=0.00 σu 11.42 13.68 H0: no 2nd-order auto-
correlation, p = 0.55
Wooldridge test for auto- σe 1.091 1.02 -
correlation in panel data
H0: no 1st-order autocorrelation
F(1,10)=141.386, p>F=0.00 ρ 0.991 - -
t-statistics in parentheses, alternatively z-statistics for the AB estimation. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001.
Data source: Eurostat.
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size. Following the FE cluster estimation, adding one standard deviation of population
now yields a decrease in growth of 14.410 standard deviations (against 4.5 previously).
The coefficients on population are significant in all econometric specifications (except
for the GLS estimator, that I reported for the purpose of comparing and assessing the
country effects) and substantially negative. The result also holds in the dynamic setting
(fourth column). The coefficient on population provided by the AB estimator measures
the relationship between changes in population and changes in GDP growth, so that
in the medium term, a positive change in population is associated with a negative
change in growth. The coefficient on lagged growth is small and insignificant, so a
persistence effect of GDP growth could not be pinned down. As already explained,
since large countries are comparatively more closed, I dropped trade openness from
the regressions and replaced it with domestic demand. Domestic demand– made up of
the sum of domestic demand and investment as a percentage of GDP – is on average
higher in larger economies of our sample for both components. Its impact on growth
seems however much more limited than that of trade openness, which can possibly be
explained by Germany’s structurally low internal demand and its exports performance.
The coefficient on the deficit gap is positive and significant with all estimators, confirming
a correlation between expansionary fiscal policies and GDP growth in large countries
(fiscal multiplier argument). However, given the high correlation between the deficit gap
and domestic demand (-0.69), as well as the significance interactions on their coefficients,
multicolinearity cannot be ruled out and limits the robustness of our results.
Table 5.5 presents the results for small countries. The FE estimator predicts a decrease of
19.4 standard deviations of growth with an additional standard deviation in population
(see summary stats Table C-1 in the Appendix for computation). Comparatively to large
countries with domestic demand, and as expected, openness has a greater and more
significant correlation with growth (here, the coefficient on domestic demand was very
small and was therefore dropped from the regressions). However, the hypothesis that
their larger inflation rates foster their growth (real interest rate effect) is not confirmed by
the regressions. On the contrary, upon closer inspection of the data, it seemed that small
eurozone economies tended to go through episodes of short-lived inflationary growth
(i.e., inflation soared with high growth rates, and in the next period, high inflation eroded
growth). In addition, with a positive, large and significant coefficient on lagged growth,
the AB estimator highlighted a persistence phenomenon at play in small countries.
10Computed as previously using Table C-1 in the Appendix.
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Table 5.4: Regressions of GDP growth in the large eurozone countries, 1998–2008
Estimation method GLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Arellano–Bond
(error specification) (hetero AR) (cluster) (AR) (AR)
Population 0.00284 -1.367*** -1.442* -1.302***
(0.08) (-91.62) (-2.82) (-4.05)
Domestic Demand 0.0619 0.347** 0.391* 0.455***
(0.86) (18.21) (2.44) (3.34)
Output per 1000 km2 -0.444 2.873** 3.464 2.092***
(-1.65) (15.43) (1.53) (3.65)
Inflation gap 0.274 0.144 0.203 0.438*
(0.97) (0.97) (0.44) (2.45)
Deficit gap 0.894*** 0.633** 0.602** 0.780***
(6.48) (24.71) (2.96) (8.63)
Lagged GDP growth -0.0933
(-0.40)
Constant -2.971 46.27** 44.42* 34.76*
(-0.38) (30.48) (2.58) (2.16)
N 30 30 27 27
R2 within - 0.637 0.625 H0: no 1st-order auto-
correlation, p = 0.25
σu - 15.11 15.55 H0: no 2nd-order auto-
correlation, p = 0.68
σe - 0.705 0.745 -
ρ - 0.998 - -
t-statistics in parentheses, alternatively z-statistics for the AB estimation. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001.
Data source: Eurostat.
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Table 5.5: Regressions of GDP growth in the small eurozone countries, 1998–2008
Estimation method GLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Arellano–Bond
(error specification) (hetero AR) (cluster) (AR) (AR)
Population 0.536* -7.758*** -7.438** -7.686***
(2.41) (-12.62) (-3.28) (-3.92)
Trade Openness 4.075* 7.141** 7.657** 8.041*
(2.27) (3.94) (3.16) (2.29)
Output per 1000 km2 -0.696** 1.434** 1.317 1.862*
(-3.02) (4.18) (1.26) (2.54)
Inflation gap -0.323 -0.666*** -0.585** -1.117***
(-1.80) (-7.50) (-3.04) (-8.98)
Deficit gap 0.0559 0.123 0.168 0.109
(0.68) (0.68) (1.34) (0.78)
Lagged GDP growth 0.312*
(2.52)
Constant -3.011 61.32*** 58.03*** 57.21***
(-1.03) (10.85) (4.43) (3.93)
N 75 75 68 69
R2 within - 0.528 0.392 H0: no1st-order auto-
correlation, p = 0.03
σu - 27.27 26.52 H0: no 2nd-order auto-
correlation, p = 0.47
σe - 1.068 1.056 -
ρ - 0.998 -
t-statistics in parentheses, alternatively z-statistics for the AB estimation.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001. Data source: Eurostat.
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In these large and small countries analyses, one eurozone country was left out: Spain.
Indeed having a separate “medium-sized” category for it proved a posteriori sensible.
Though Spain does not exactly fit the large eurozone country profile, a regression in-
cluding the “three big” and Spain was run. Though it obviously included with more
observations, the R2 dropped slightly, the significance results were roughly the same,
the coefficient on size was less negative and the inflation gap coefficient changed signs
without gaining significance. The inclusion of Spain in the small countries regression
proved even less appropriate. In this case, the R2 dropped to a maximum of 0.35, pop-
ulation and trade openness lost all significance. Only the significance of the inflation
gap was boosted. These results confirm that Spain falls into a size category of its own,
sharing with the large countries a weaker reliance on exports and displaying inflationary
growth as is the case of several smaller countries, but having overall economic structures
pertaining neither to small nor large economies.
To better fathom and round up the results of the different regressions this far, Table 5.6
presents a comparison of the regression coefficients in terms of size and significance.
Since the coefficients in the FE model regression are constrained across units, comparing
regression coefficients obtained for large countries and small countries is a good way to
check the empirical incidence of country size on economic performance. While coefficients
always bear the same sign for both groups, there still are a number of sizeable differences.
As far as population is concerned (my proxy for country size), the correlation is large in
both groups, with a more negative impact on growth for the eleven small countries than
that for the three large ones (one additional standard deviation of population leading to a
decrease of 14.4 standard deviations in large countries and 19.4 in small ones), confirming
an advantage to micro-states in the likes of Luxembourg, Malta and so forth in the
monetary union. Trade openness yielded the largest and most significant coefficients,
especially in the case of small countries. This confirms the findings of Alesina, Spolaore,
and Wacziarg (2005) that the smaller the country, the larger the positive correlation
between openness and growth. Domestic demand bears no significant coefficient for small
countries and a moderate positive impact on the growth variations in large countries.
The measure for territorial efficiency has a positive and significant coefficient in both
small and large country regressions and a negative sign in the “pooled” one. This is
partly explainable by the fact that this variable does not have a linear relationship
with size, as large countries are more territorially efficient than the small new entrants
countries catching up with their European counterparts. The most interesting results for
the hypothesis regarding the effects of the eurozone economic government on different-
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Table 5.6: Comparison of regression coefficients for GDP growth: range and significance
Large countries Small countries eurozone (15 countries)
Population [-1.442***; -1.302***] [-7.686***; 0.536*] [-0.0203*-0.342*]
Trade Openness 0.0524** [4.075*; 8.041*] [7.980***; 12.16**]
Domestic Demand [0.347**; 0.455***] No significance 0.215*
Output per 1000 km2 [2.092***; 2.873**] [1.434**,1.862*] [-1.431**; -0.238*]
Inflation Gap 0.438* [-1.117***; -0.585***] [-1.089***; -0.425*]
Deficit Gap [0.602**; 0.894***] No significance No significance
Lagged GDP growth No significance 0.312* No significance
Σu [15.11; 15.55] [26.52; 27.27] [11.42-13.68]
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001. Data source: Eurostat.
sized countries are those for the inflation and deficit gaps. The correlation between the
inflation gap and growth is negative and very significant in small countries, while it
is smaller in absolute value, positive and seldom significant in large ones. Computing
standard deviations effects from the regression coefficients as previously, shows that
one additional standard deviation of inflation depresses growth by −0.48 standard
deviation (FE cluster) and up to −0.81 (AB estimator) in small countries, while this effect
ranges between +0.08 and +0.24 for large countries. Looking at the correlation between
growth and inflation, it seems that their fluctuations are moderately correlated if we
take all countries (correlation coefficient -0.3081, see Table 5.3). Upon closer inspection,
however, there is a strong positive correlation in small countries between growth and
future (at t + 1) inflation (0.5751). For new entrant countries and the countries that have
been catching up (most notoriously Ireland), either the Balassa-Samuelson effect has
been at play or rapid growth has fuelled inflation. In large countries, the correlation
between inflation and growth was negative but small (−0.2774) and the coefficient on the
inflation gap was only significant with the AB dynamic estimator. Different interaction
mechanisms between growth and inflation in large and small countries in the eurozone
thus seem at play. In addition, the existence of an inflation externality generated by small
countries cannot be ruled out.
Turning now to the deficit gap: its effect on growth is positive for large countries,
thus corroborating the domestic demand-based growth argument; and difficult to pin
down for small countries in line with the expectation that these countries rely on external
demand for their growth and so have smaller fiscal multipliers. For large countries
(notwithstanding multicolinearity between the deficit gap and domestic demand as
explained earlier), the computed effect of the deficit gap on growth ranges between 0.15
(FE cluster) and 0.73 (AB) additional standard deviation. Correlation values confirm
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these size-dependent differences: the present and past deficits are positively correlated
with growth (at the respective levels of 0.4090 and 0.5135) in large countries, while these
values are much lower in smaller countries.
5.3.5 Robustness Checks Across Space and Time
To further substantiate the previous findings, I now show how the inverse relationship
between country size and economic performance is specific to the monetary union. Taking
“placebo” data sets either comprising comparable countries that opted out of the eurozone
or years of data for the eurozone countries before the launch of the monetary union, I
run robustness checks with similar regressions. I found no relationship for comparable
countries not participating in the monetary union over the same time span, and that
there was no such “size-divide” phenomenon at play in the 15 countries studied before
the launch of the monetary union.
More explicitly, I take first one small and one large EU country, Sweden and the United
Kingdom, as counter-examples of the “size divide” in terms of economic performance:
Table 5.7 shows the absence of a sizeable and significant relationship between their size
and their GDP growth. (The pooled OLS yielded a significant result, but the coefficient
was too small to be meaningful.) Notwithstanding the small size of the sample, in the EU
the “size divide” appears delimited by the eurozone frontiers.
Table 5.7: Regressions of GDP growth in Sweden and the United Kingdom, 1998–2008
Sweden and United Kingdom Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Arellano–Bond
1998–2008 (cluster) (AR) (AR)
Population -0.0129* 0.00777 0.0174 0.00773
(-42.72) (7.54) (0.09) .
Lagged GDP growth 0.304
.
Constant 3.219** 2.215* 1.709 1.435
(187.4) (44.37) (0.25) .
N 57 57 55 56
R2 within - 0.0000625 0.000151 -
σu - 0.708 0.995 -
σe - 1.708 1.656 -
ρ - 0.147 - -
t-statistics in parentheses, alternatively z-statistics for the AB estimation.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001. Data source: World Bank.
Now, using the 1960–2007 data set, I sectioned the data set along two milestones of
European monetary integration: first, the introduction of the European Monetary System
(EMS) in 1979 that paved the way for the EMU as it linked national currencies to each
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other within a fluctuation band and; second, the actual launching of the monetary union
in 1999. Table 5.8 presents the estimation results of the regressions, with the same AB
estimator as previously. I estimated the same dynamic model, separately for small and
large countries, over the 1960–1979 and 1980–1999 periods.
Table 5.8: Regressions of GDP growth in the pre-monetary union period, 1960–1999
Arellano–Bond All countries Small countries Large countries
(AR)
Time period 1960–1979 1980–1999 1960-1979 1980–1999 1960–1979 1980–1999
Lagged -0.0638 0.303*** -0.0163 0.292** -0.136** 0.410***
GDP growth (-0.76) (3.34) (-0.22) (2.97) (-2.99) (3.77)
Population -0.872 -0.159 -2.196** -0.0305 -3.168** 0.0476
(-1.77) (-1.71) (-2.93) (-0.09) (-2.83) (0.75)
Trade Openness 16.53*** 8.679*** 15.07*** 8.751***
(10.19) (6.28) (13.39) (5.94)
Output -1.252 -0.222 -0.848*** -0.208 20.29*** -2.966***
per 1000 km2 (-1.88) (-1.47) (-3.53) (-1.55) -9.23 (-3.41)
Inflation gap -0.0922 -0.0739** -0.148* -0.0745** -0.754*** -0.176***
(-1.43) (-2.90) (-2.12) (-2.71) (-12.40) (-7.97)
Deficit gap 0.423* 0.061 0.521*** 0.0625 -1.565*** -0.0752
(2.42) (1.92) (3.51) (1.87) (-92.43) (-0.40)
Domestic Demand -0.663*** -0.242*
(-14.54) (-2.20)
Constant 10 -1.577 14.62 -5.023 225.2*** 33.73**
(1.3) (-0.55) (1.6) (-1.32) (3.71) (3.07)
N 83 259 68 211 15 48
z-statistics for the AB estimation. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001. Data source: World Bank.
Strikingly enough, the coefficient on size was important, negative and significant for
small and large countries between 1960 and 1979. As the coefficient on trade for small
countries is also very large, the industrial development and integration of the smaller
European countries into the global markets that characterised this period, as described
by Katzenstein (1985), could explain the negative correlation between population and
GDP growth. Between 1980 and 1999 – the preparatory phase of the monetary union –
, the effect of country size on economic performance is smaller and insignificant. This
result strongly corroborates the contention that the eurozone “size divide” stems from
the economic policy settings of the monetary union.
Notwithstanding that I can only identify correlations and not directly causational
effects, country size seems to have a good explanatory power in accounting for growth
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differences in the eurozone.11 All used estimators indicated an adverse effect of country
size on economic growth. My analysis encompassed different components of growth
and corroborated that the economic structures of small countries are more apt to foster
growth in the framework of the monetary union.
When I introduced country and time effects (see Table C-2 in the Appendix), the
estimated pair-wise correlations exhibited less significance in the complex panel data
analysis, however, temporally widening the data set or running the same regressions on
EU countries that opted out of the monetary union, yielded the results I expected and
bestowed the first finding with a substantial robustness across time and space. Country
effects (measured by σu) and their incidence on the total variance (measured by ρ) were in
all FE estimations large, meaning that national peculiarities in the variables I controlled
for played a non-negligible part in growth differences. And there are certainly other
reasons possible for explaining these differentiated economic performances that were not
taken into account in the analysis. Another limit to the analysis is that of a selection bias in
our sample as described by Persson (2001), meaning that the measured size effect could
be magnified by unaccounted for characteristics of countries belonging to the monetary
union. Indeed, one could claim that most EMU members are small open economies
because they are precisely the ones more prone to benefit from a monetary union and
consequently the size bias would be tautological. Subtracting the selection bias with
the Heckman method requires the probability of belonging to a monetary union. The
sample of countries on which that probability should be computed is not clear. If we
compute propensities on all countries then we are not assessing the monetary union
treatment effect with all other things held equal. Likewise, restricting the sample to
advanced economies is not satisfactory as it neglects important factors of monetary union
membership such as geographic continuity or cultural closeness. There thus is a number
of rationale against which to test the monetary union treatment effect. Comparability
demands selection which in turn is subject to the “ convergence by construction” critique
of De Long (1988). The negative correlation between country size and GDP growth, while
still robust, may in fact be smaller. Furthermore, the negative incidence of country size
on GDP growth in the EMU cannot support the break-down of the monetary union into
NUTS-3 regions as each country is a collection of regions with different growth rates.
From the analysis on territorial efficiency, we may only induce that larger countries tend
to have a lower ratio of fast-growing regions to slow-growing regions.
11 The same regressions were run excluding the potential outliers. These outliers included Ireland and
Luxembourg (small countries with very high growth rates over the last decade) and yielded roughly the
same significance levels.
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Conclusion
Country size determines a number of economic structures; in the EMU it also impacts on
economic performance. As far as economic structures are concerned, a greater openness
is observed in smaller countries and a heavier reliance on internal demand is observed
in larger countries. In the context of the EMU and its economic rules, these features
influence economic performance because the “one-size-fits-all” rules are biased in favour
of the growth strategies of small countries. On the one hand, the SGP constrains larger
countries in their ability to fiscally boost internal demand; on the other hand the ECB
cannot internalise the negative externality generated by small countries because of their
usually higher inflation and encourages price competitiveness policies. There is therefore
a clear asymmetry in the benefits of EMU membership between small and large countries.
In this paper, I documented the emergence of a “size divide” within the eurozone – that
is, a sizeable negative effect of demographic size on GDP growth – with an econometric
analysis for the 1998–2008 decade, and for the 15 countries in the euro area (as of Jan.
1st 2008). The econometric analysis ran separately for large and small countries using
dynamic panel estimation methods, showed an even stronger negative “size effect” for
small countries. All estimators used concurred on the adverse effect of country size
on economic growth, so that the results obtained are robust to different econometric
specifications. Further robustness checks consisted in enlarging the scope of the data
to run “placebo” regressions on the pre-monetary union period and on countries that
opted out of the monetary union. They confirmed that the “size divide” was indeed a
by-product of the monetary union. Ironically enough, Germany and France, two large
countries, presided over the making of the monetary union, and so bear a responsibility
for their own disadvantaged economic fate in the eurozone. However, the fact that large
countries are economically disadvantaged by the workings of the EMU is a problem for
the eurozone as a whole: harming these members – together representing 70% of the
area’s GDP, as well as absorbing a substantial share of other eurozone members’ exports
– , will eventually also hurt the smaller economies. Under such a scenario, the eurozone
won’t be able to live up to its role as a key international economic power and the euro
may lose some of its international appeal.
Finally, it is sensible to extend the analysis of the impact of country size to the enlarge-
ment of the eurozone. Integration is a “shrinking process” and with each enlargement, the
relative sizes of Member States within the monetary union diminish. Another factor alter-
ing country size is demographic change. As the population of some eurozone countries is
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on the wane, while that of others grows, in the long run, the relative sizes of the Member
States will evolve. Will this make the effect of country size on economic performance
different and bring about new economic policy constraints? This question remains to
be investigated. As proven by the reluctance of the larger new Member States (Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic) to join the euro area rapidly, eurozone membership
remains so far more propitious to small countries. Future theoretical research focussing
on the modelling of country size and its implications for the conduct of economic policies
in the monetary union should complete the empirical findings of this paper.
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“The power of economists to say anything declined as the cube of the number of
economists present. The only hope for agreement was when only two were present: the
author and his conscience!” Robinson (1960)
This dissertation argues that country size matters for economic growth, because size af-
fects a country’s openness to trade, domestic demand, and its institutional and territorial
efficiency. This is particularly the case in the Economic and Monetary Union, where the
Stability and Growth Pact and the European Central Bank make up a “one-size-fits-all”
institutional and economic policy framework . It follows that in the eurozone the effects
and spillovers of fiscal policy depend on country size and fuel the differentials observed
between small and large countries. Therefore in a monetary union, size-appropriate fiscal
policies are more conducive to growth. As the concept of country size is at the intersection
of economics and political science, the approach was deliberately interdisciplinary.
First, we developed a micro-founded new Keynesian model of a two-country monetary
union, which is apt to show the effects of different fiscal policies with cross-country
heterogeneities in terms of size and openness. Second, resorting to the model previously
developed, we analysed the effects of several fiscal policies in a monetary-union with
countries of different sizes. As large economies rely more on domestic demand than
small and open eurozone countries do, they react differently to fiscal stimuli. We found
that small open economies benefit more from their neighbours’ fiscal stimulus and that
large economies are better off spurring domestic demand with increased public spending
than in engaging in tax-cuts competition with their smaller neighbours. Third, taking
an empirical perspective, we developed a country size index with Principal Component
Analysis (PCA), which includes demographic, economic and territorial dimensions of
country size. Using a panel of 163 countries with yearly data from 1969 to 2007, we
showed empirically that country size is negatively linked to GDP growth and business
cycle volatility independently of trade-openness. Finally, we examined the mechanisms
at play in the EMU as the negative relationship between country size and growth became
more pronounced. The emergence of a “size divide” was explained with a political
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economy analysis of the eurozone’s fiscal and monetary rules and shown econometrically
to be correlated with the creation of the monetary union.
Current developments – especially the financial and sovereign debt crises of 2010-
11 – underline the relevance of country size in the eurozone. The Economist1 argued
that “the laziest distinction that investors are now making between markets is based
on size. Indeed public revenues are backed by a more diversified economy in larger
countries and their bond markets attracts more investors who prize liquidity. That
is a particular worry for Portugal, which is less of a credit risk than Greece but is
vulnerable because it is so small[...]Bigger bond markets are less easy to abandon”.
These imbalances are traceable to the launch of the single currency. The adoption of the
euro brought about a drop in the interest rates and cheap credit fuelled the booms in
uncompetitive small economies. Meanwhile in the past decade, Germany introduced a
wage moderation policy that lowered labour-costs and raked in large trade-surplus from
its eurozone partners. Because of its size, Germany imparted a deflationary bias onto
the rest of the eurozone. But Germany now needs to find new sources of growth and
rebalance it towards domestic demand as its partners cannot sustain deficits forever. This
growth paradigm is inappropriate for single countries that cannot replicate Germany’s
market position and also unfit for the eurozone as a whole, as it is too large to rely
more on demand outside of the EU. To this end, unions are pushing for a minimum
wage – boosting demand and imports – , whereas more liberal options include more
low-wage jobs to strengthen the services sector. However, Alesina and Perotti (2010)
warned that Germany’s spending is not the cure; the real problem resides in supply-
side rigidities, and the specialisation of uncompetitive sectors such as construction in
peripheral eurozone economies. There, “internal devaluation” could be a catalyst to
regain lost competitiveness: increasing VAT while decreasing payroll taxes would shift
economies away from domestic demand and towards exports.
The global rebalancing needed within the eurozone underlines the issue of efficient
fiscal policy rules design. The 440 billion euro rescue plan set up in the wake of the Greek
crisis confirms indeed that monetary union brings about de facto fiscal federalism. There is,
however, no consensus on the fitness of the fiscal rules of the EMU with regards to fiscal
solvency. While Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) deem them unnecessarily stringent,
Sims (1999) contends that they cannot eliminate the insolvency risk highlighted by the
fiscal theory of the price level. Redesigning the Stability and Growth Pact also necessitates
that the punishments for excessive fiscal profligacy not impair those inflicting them, so
1That sinking feeling, May 22nd, 2010.
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that Member States do not actually hurt themselves by enforcing fiscal discipline. Burda
and Gerlach (2010) proposed, for instance, to “reallocate costs of running Europe from the
countries that have their house in order to those that don’t”, by imposing a surcharge on
additional debt distributed amongst Member States according to their contribution to the
EU budget. Furthermore, the sovereign-debt crisis has demonstrated that price stability
alone is no bulwark against economic and financial turmoil and has made the ECB’s
involvement in vouching for public debt and the credibility of public finances figures
necessary. The difficulties of peripheral economies qualify the benefits to a small country
of belonging to a currency union. On the one hand, export competitiveness proves hard
to gain back and on the other hand, investors can inflict considerable spreads even on
euro-denominated sovereign bonds.
Fiscal policy coordination is often wished for but hard to implement. For reasons of
political and national preferences, countries have conflicting objectives that go even
beyond the size differences we detailed in this thesis. Coordination may be efficient
in dealing with supply shocks as it prevents fiscal and monetary policy from going
in divergent directions but benefits seem narrower in the face of demand shocks. For
instance, in the aftermath of the crisis, small open economies have stronger incentives
to start re-tightening their fiscal policies as most of their gains from loose fiscal policy
spill abroad. Rather than seeking complex coordination, fiscal policy should concentrate
more realistically on the composition of aggregate demand, the level of taxation and
redistribution so as to increase national potential output.
We thus hope to have provided a relevant grid to think about country size, national
heterogeneity and their implications for the conduct of economic policy in the monetary
union. In short, our contribution to the debate is that the negative scale effect of country
size on growth is especially acute in the monetary union, so incorporating country size
into the design of fiscal policy is essential for national growth performance. Much remains
to be done. As the implementation of EMU is very recent,the economic effects of EMU still
unfold before our eyes and we have only limited hindsight. There is not yet an apparatus
of economic models that capture all of its institutional features. We are now learning how
common European rules can be adapted to specific national conditions and structures,
deciphering which institutional settlements induce which economic developments.
The size patterns in the EU and EMU are evolving as populations grow older, national
demographic developments diverge and new Member States join. If Turkey were to
enter the union and Germany’s demographic decline were to continue, it could be the
fourth country by population in the EU by 2050 and its economy will shrink relative
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to that of its neighbours. Further modelling of country size should also consider the
regional level. This is of economic relevance as disparities in terms of economic activity
are often larger within eurozone countries than between them. The EU has also been a
source of political empowerment for regions, especially for rich ones voicing separatist
claims. Empirically, a worthwhile econometric experiment would be to regress growth
performance on region size within one same country so as to determine whether it is
really country size that matters or just the size of a given economic territory. Interestingly
enough, the unwillingness of separatist regions to pay for the development of poorer
ones has mirrored the power games between Member States that came in the wake of
the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Such fiscal "selfishness" undermines the convergence of
Member States and should be condemned by the EU. This would convey the message
that a Member State cannot expect to reap the benefits of the Union while refusing to
share the burdens that are a legitimate part of membership. Furthermore, there is no
interest on the part of the EU to have regional members; functioning with 27 members
is already complex enough. In spite of globalisation and regionalisation, the nation –
regardless of its size – remains the relevant unit for the conduct of economic policy.
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Figure A-1: Comparing responses to an increase in government spending with different σc values
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Figure A-2: Comparing responses to a VAT cut with different σc values
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Figure A-3: Effects and spillovers of a cut in the payroll tax – 1 of 3
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Figure A-4: Effects and spillovers of a cut in the payroll tax – 2 of 3
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Figure A-5: Effects and spillovers of a cut in the payroll tax – 3 of 3
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Appendix B – Country Size, Growth and
Volatility
Table B-1: List of countries
List of countries
Albania Eritrea Mali Suriname
Algeria Estonia Malta Swaziland
Angola Ethiopia Marshall Islands Sweden
Antigua and Barbuda Finland Mauritania Switzerland
Argentina France Mauritius Syrian Arab Republic
Armenia French Polynesia Mexico Tajikistan
Australia Gabon Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Tanzania
Austria Gambia, The Moldova Thailand
Azerbaijan Georgia Mongolia Togo
Bahamas, The Germany Morocco Tonga
Bahrain Ghana Mozambique Trinidad and Tobago
Bangladesh Greece Namibia Tunisia
Barbados Grenada Nepal Turkey
Belarus Guatemala Netherlands Turkmenistan
Belgium Guinea New Caledonia Uganda
Belize Guinea-Bissau New Zealand Ukraine
Benin Guyana Nicaragua United Arab Emirates
Bhutan Haiti Niger United Kingdom
Bolivia Honduras Nigeria United States
Bosnia and Herzegovina Hong Kong, China Norway Uruguay
Botswana Hungary Oman Uzbekistan
Brazil Iceland Pakistan Vanuatu
Bulgaria India Palau Venezuela, RB
Burkina Faso Indonesia Panama Vietnam
Burundi Iran, Islamic Rep. Papua New Guinea Yemen, Rep.
Cambodia Iraq Paraguay Zambia
Cameroon Ireland Peru Zimbabwe
Canada Israel Philippines
Cape Verde Italy Poland
Central African Republic Jamaica Portugal
Chad Japan Puerto Rico
Chile Jordan Romania
China Kazakhstan Russian Federation
Colombia Kenya Rwanda
Comoros Kiribati Samoa
Congo, Dem. Rep. Korea, Rep. Saudi Arabia
Congo, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Senegal
Costa Rica Lao PDR Seychelles
Cote d’Ivoire Latvia Sierra Leone
Croatia Lebanon Singapore
Cyprus Lesotho Slovak Republic
Czech Republic Liberia Slovenia
Denmark Lithuania Solomon Islands
Djibouti Luxembourg South Africa
Dominica Macao, China Spain
Dominican Republic Macedonia, FYR Sri Lanka
Ecuador Madagascar St. Kitts and Nevis
Egypt, Arab Rep. Malawi St. Lucia
El Salvador Malaysia St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Equatorial Guinea Maldives Sudan
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Table B-2: Large countries
Large Countries
Argentina Germany Russian Federation
Australia India Spain
Brazil Indonesia Turkey
Canada Italy United Kingdom
China Japan United States
France Mexico
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Table B-3: Summary statistics
Summary Statistics
All Countries
Variable Nb. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lpop 8424 1.441 2.021 -4.200 7.185
indexLpcar 6645 0.000 1.551 -4.368 3.905
indexjar 6645 0.656 1.850 0.000 18.951
gdp_growth (%) 6654 3.937 6.385 -51.03 106.28
trade_op (%) 6325 0.751 0.462 0.053 4.625
real_ir (%) 3725 6.241 19.620 -98.15 789.80
inflation_cp (%) 5583 34.44 410.04 -17.64 23773.13
Large countries
Variable Nb. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lpop 665 4.555 1.148 2.350 7.185
indexLpcar 665 2.543 0.549 1.985 3.905
indexjar 665 4.490 4.136 0.916 18.951
gdp_growth (%) 663 3.863 4.131 -27.10 19.40
trade_op (%) 637 0.346 0.176 0.053 1.106
real_ir (%) 454 5.759 9.819 -24.60 78.73
inflation_cp (%) 594 46.366 248.44 -7.63 3079.81
Small countries
Variable Nb. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lpop 5980 1.316 1.777 -3.927 5.090
indexLpcar 5980 -0.283 1.357 -4.368 1.985
indexjar 5980 0.230 0.294 0.000 1.710
gdp_growth (%) 5903 3.914 6.529 -51.03 106.28
trade_op (%) 5404 0.779 0.429 0.063 4.625
real_ir (%) 3233 6.329 20.726 -98.15 789.80
inflation_cp (%) 4679 33.89 438.21 -17.64 23773.13
OECD
Variable Nb. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lpop 1440 2.596 1.518 -1.737 5.709
indexLpcar 1310 1.152 1.133 -1.933 3.905
indexjar 1310 1.598 3.060 0.018 18.95
gdp_growth (%) 1302 3.555 3.029 -14.570 18.710
trade_op (%) 1253 0.659 0.407 0.093 3.266
real_ir (%) 820 4.414 4.166 -19.490 16.75
inflation_cp (%) 1285 9.024 21.110 -0.900 555.38
Eurozone, post 1999
Variable Nb. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lpop 135 1.998 1.688 -0.947 4.413
indexLpcar 134 0.541 1.344 -2.403 2.384
indexjar 134 0.606 0.763 0.006 2.639
gdp_growth (%) 134 3.111 1.976 -1.610 10.720
trade_op (%) 113 1.093 0.640 0.440 3.266
real_ir (%) 86 3.765 2.668 -2.650 11.640
inflation_cp (%) 135 2.592 1.335 0.190 8.880
BRICs, post 2000
Variable Nb. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lpop 32 6.080 1.012 4.953 7.185
indexLpcar 32 3.145 0.470 2.563 3.837
indexjar 32 6.497 3.905 2.634 12.772
gdp_growth (%) 32 6.903 2.943 1.270 11.900
trade_op (%) 31 0.439 0.159 0.217 0.720
real_ir (%) 32 12.600 19.380 -9.630 47.680
inflation_cp (%) 32 6.918 5.599 -0.770 21.460
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Figure C-2: Country size and territorial efficiency: a non-linear relationship
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Table C-1: Summary statistics
Summary Statistics
15 eurozone countries, 1998–2008, Source: Eurostat
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP growth,% 162 3.12 1.93 -1.61 10.73
Population, million 165 20.76 25.59 0.38 82.54
Trade openness 163 1.11 0.62 0.47 3.24
Domestic demand,% 148 97.67 8.43 69.40 113.50
Output per 1000km2 163 4.55 4.36 0.40 15.15
Inflation gap, % 165 0.59 1.34 -1.86 6.81
Deficit gap, % 121 1.81 2.66 -5.41 9.63
Large eurozone countries, 1998–2008, source: Eurostat
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP growth,% 33 1.69 1.07 -0.27 3.91
Population, million 33 66.73 11.27 56.86 82.54
Trade Openness 33 0.59 0.11 0.47 0.90
Domestic demand,% 30 98.35 2.14 93.00 101.90
Output per 1000km2 33 4.27 1.32 2.47 6.35
Inflation gap, % 33 -0.13 0.61 -1.44 0.81
Deficit gap, % 33 0.52 1.03 -1.05 3.03
Small eurozone countries, 1998–2008, source: Eurostat
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP growth,% 118 3.48 2.00 -1.61 10.73
Population, million 121 6.27 5.09 0.38 16.70
Trade Openness 119 1.31 0.62 0.53 3.24
Domestic demand,% 108 96.95 9.61 69.40 113.50
Output per 1000km2 119 4.93 4.94 0.40 15.15
Inflation gap, % 121 0.74 1.47 -1.86 6.81
Deficit gap, % 77 2.19 3.06 -5.41 9.63
15 eurozone countries, 1960–2007, source: World Bank
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP growth,% 648 3.75 3.06 -8.90 20.27
Population, million 720 19.27 24.16 0.32 82.50
Trade openness 642 0.85 0.53 0.15 3.27
Domestic demand,% 609 106.35 8.48 80.57 137.37
Output per 1000km2 654 2.53 2.60 0.10 13.10
Inflation gap, % 642 3.74 5.40 -2.88 30.86
Deficit gap, % 481 2.49 4.52 -12.32 16.75
Large eurozone countries, 1960–2007, source: World Bank
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP growth,% 130 2.85 2.07 -2.09 8.21
Population, million 144 63.01 11.73 45.70 82.50
Trade openness 130 0.43 0.11 0.25 0.85
Domestic demand,% 133 106.82 4.96 93.52 115.21
Output per 1000km2 131 2.72 1.29 0.67 5.79
Inflation gap, % 110 3.39 4.76 -1.50 19.28
Deficit gap, % 107 3.29 1.78 -1.30 8.00
Small eurozone countries, 1960–2007, source: World Bank
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP growth,% 518 3.98 3.22 -8.90 20.27
Population, million 576 8.34 9.84 0.32 44.90
Trade openness 512 0.96 0.54 0.15 3.27
Domestic demand,% 476 106.22 9.23 80.57 137.37
Output per 1000km2 523 2.49 2.84 0.10 13.10
Inflation gap, % 532 3.81 5.53 -2.88 30.86
Deficit gap, % 374 2.26 5.01 -12.32 16.75
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Table C-2: Determinants of GDP growth in the eurozone countries, 1998–2008
Fixed Effects all countries all countries (3)small countries (4)large countries
(with time effects, cluster)
Population 0.113 -0.143 -2.973** -0.595
-1.86 (-0.67) (-4.45) (-2.22)
Trade Openness 0.0850*** 0.0763***
-15.1 -11.94
Output per 1000km2 -0.0575 0.281 0.774*** 7.227
(-0.37) -0.55 -8.59 -2.17
Inflation gap -0.0224 0.24 0.036 0.0685
(-0.22) -1.55 -0.33 -0.61
Deficit gap 0.0243 0.0674 0.0508 -0.247
-0.31 -0.8 -0.59 (-1.64)
Year 1999 0.173 0.193 0.251 -0.397
-0.51 -0.51 -0.44 (-0.79)
Year 2000 -0.533 0.0121 -1.102 -0.443
(-1.09) -0.02 (-1.99) (-0.39)
Year 2001 -2.450*** -2.016** -3.027*** -2.797
(-5.08) (-3.68) (-6.85) (-2.30)
Year 2002 -2.819*** -2.623*** -2.962*** -3.945
(-7.36) (-5.61) (-6.90) (-3.18)
Year 2003 -2.810*** -2.732*** -2.833*** -4.187
(-6.29) (-4.61) (-7.37) (-3.50)
Year 2004 -1.900*** -1.497* -1.811** -3.119
(-4.66) (-2.47) (-4.30) (-2.24)
Year 2005 -2.533*** -1.942** -2.347** -3.909
(-6.47) (-3.54) (-5.52) (-2.34)
Year 2006 -1.950** -1.13 -1.759** -3.097
(-4.14) (-1.34) (-3.71) (-1.32)
Year 2007 -2.223*** -1.222 -1.867** -3.666
(-5.31) (-1.51) (-4.35) (-1.57)
Year 2008 -3.757*** 0 -3.483** 0
(-7.80) . (-5.62) .
Domestic Demand 0.0259 0.1
-0.24 -1.6
Constant -5.901* 4.442 21.01* 3.613
(-2.76) -0.52 -3.23 -0.14
N 119 108 75 30
R2 within 0.765 0.656 0.807 0.952
σu 3.675 3.7 10.64 6.441
σe 0.698 0.821 0.744 0.332
ρ 0.965 0.953 0.995 0.997
t-statistics in parentheses. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001. Data source: Eurostat.
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Table C-3: Determinants of GDP growth in the small eurozone countries, 1998–2008
Estimation method GLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Arellano–Bond
with time effects
(error specification) (hetero AR) (cluster) (AR) (AR)
Population 0.0464 -2.973** -1.453 -6.784*
-0.35 (-4.45) (-0.81) (-2.48)
Trade Openness 0.188 7.626*** 8.376*** 3.109*
-0.19 -11.94 -5.35 -2.04
Output per 1000km2 -0.0766 0.774*** 0.25 1.217
(-0.57) -8.59 -0.45 -1.75
Inflation gap 0.244* 0.036 -0.0658 -0.593***
-2.14 -0.33 (-0.41) (-3.32)
Deficit gap 0.168*** 0.0508 0.0785 -0.0496
-3.54 -0.59 -0.91 (-0.72)
Year 1999 -0.0599 0.251 4.009***
(-0.52) -0.44 -4.97
Year 2000 -0.293 -1.102 2.982***
(-1.55) (-1.99) -4.53
Year 2001 -3.254*** -3.027*** 0.749
(-13.32) (-6.85) -1.27
Year 2002 -3.250*** -2.962*** 0.761
(-15.20) (-6.90) -1.34
Year 2003 -2.759*** -2.833*** 0.82
(-14.27) (-7.37) -1.45
Year 2004 -1.743*** -1.811** 1.747**
(-7.47) (-4.30) -3.26
Year 2005 -2.077*** -2.347** 1.169*
(-7.93) (-5.52) -2.48
Year 2006 -0.688* -1.759** 1.728***
(-2.54) (-3.71) -4.09
Year 2007 -0.716* -1.867** 1.577***
(-2.34) (-4.35) -3.93
Year 2008 -2.441*** -3.483** 0
(-6.92) (-5.62) .


















Constant 3.415* 21.01* 4.705 56.63**
-2.27 -3.23 -0.3 -3.1
N 75 75 68 69
R2 within - 0.807 0.815 H0 : no 1st-order auto-
correlation, p = 0.03
σu - 10.64 6.544 H0 : no 2nd-order auto-
correlation, p = 0.47
σe - 0.744 0.716 -
ρ - 0.995 - -
t-statistics in parentheses, alternatively z-statistics for the AB estimation.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Data source: Eurostat.
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